Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IX, International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities

299. Report of the Special Committee on Stockpile Objectives¹

Washington, November 11, 1965.

Summary

This report contains the initial findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on Stockpile Objectives established at your direction by NSAM No. 321 on December 1, 1964, to review strategic stockpile objectives and post-nuclear attack planning. The Committee, chaired by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and consisting of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, was charged with examining planning assumptions and policies for the several stockpiles, with particular attention to:

• “(1) The major military and economic assumptions used in calculating existing conventional war stockpile objectives.
• “(2) The assumptions, techniques, and goals used in the establishment of post-nuclear attack supply requirements.
• “(3) The relationship of economic rehabilitation requirements to other post-nuclear requirements, such as those for food, shelter, medicine, and other resources required for the survival of the remaining population in the period of extreme emergency.”

The Committee has sought to assess the various elements of stockpile planning and policy in the light of current military planning and present and prospective international conditions. We have endeavored to insure that stockpile policy is consonant with other elements of national security planning and to avoid the establishment or perpetuation of excessive stockpile objectives and inventories. Unduly high stockpiles result in a drain on scarce budget resources not only in the form of foregone receipts from disposals of unneeded assets, but also in possible further budget expenditures for the purchases of materials.

As of June 30, 1965, the Government held inventories ofstrategic and critical materials having an acquisition cost of $8.2 billion, and an estimated market value of $8.2 billion. These materials are contained in three principal inventories: The National Stockpile, established by the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1964;² the Defense Production Act inventory, created by the Defense Production Act of 1950;³ and the Supplemental Stockpile (and a related Commodity Credit Corporation account), materials for which are obtained from the barter of surplus agricultural commodities under P. L. 480, as amended.⁴

In April 1964, the Office of Emergency Planning completed supply-requirements studies which have become the basis for present conventional war stockpile objectives. Of the total materials in Government inventories on June 30, 1965, $4.3 billion at estimated market value were considered to be excess to these conventional war objectives. As of that date, inventories equaled or exceeded the conventional war objectives for 62 of 77 strategic and critical materials for which objectives have been set. The Committee believes that present conventional war stockpile objectives are higher than the Nation needs and that further amounts of stockpiled materials can safely be declared excess and thus become available for disposal action. Its recommendations, therefore, are directed primarily at altering the various conventional war stockpile planning assumptions which are responsible for the present condition of overstated objectives. Many of the recommendations essentially involve little more than the implementation of the most recent “Guidance for Non-Military Planning” document, which was prepared by the Presidentially-established Committee on Non-Military Assumptions (State, Defense, CIA, and OEP), approved by the Cabinet, and issued by OEP in March of this year. The Committee has also considered the need for a nuclear war and reconstruction stockpile and it finds that an adequate basis does not exist at this time for the establishment of formal nuclear war stockpile objectives which would warrant retention of present stockpile surpluses which might otherwise be eligible for disposal.

The specific findings and recommendations of the Committee are summarized below and treated in more detail in the balance of the report.

The Nuclear War Stockpile. The Office of Emergency Planning is now engaged in studies to determine nuclear war stockpile objectives. These studies are not intended to result in a new and separate stockpile, but to augment the existing conventional war stockpile objectives where nuclear war requirements are higher. The OEP expects to complete the studies and establish the nuclear war objectives by the end of the current fiscal year, accepting the higher of the conventional or nuclear war objectives as the overall stockpile objective.

Although the Committee is impressed with the need to move ahead in developing the techniques for determining nuclear war requirements and stockpile objectives, it believes that establishment and announcement of formal nuclear war objectives by the end of the current fiscal year would be premature for several reasons:

(1) The relationship of a nuclear war stockpile to other existing or proposed elements of the national damage-limiting and survival system (including fallout shelters, antiballistic missile defenses, etc.) has not been assessed adequately. Until the interplay between competing and complementary elements of the overall system is clear, it is not possible to measure with any confidence the relative marginal benefit of stockpile additions to meet nuclear stockpile objectives.

(2) The wide band of uncertainties concerning the nuclear war environment complicates the task of measuring the payoff from stockpiling for post-attack reconstruction.

(3) The Committee notes that some of the data used in the current studies and analyses are not current (e.g., enemy capabilities, U.S. defense capabilities) and that some of the basic assumptions employed (e.g., the assumed continuance of prolonged hostilities after a nuclear attack, the selection of the 25 percent “risk” level for loss-planning purposes, etc.) are in need of clarification.

(4) The risk of deferring action on setting official nuclear war stockpile objectives does not appear to be great. On the basis of these observations and conclusions, the Committee recommends:

(1) That conventional war stockpile objectives be regarded as the maximum objectives and that no stocks be withheld from sale in anticipation of possible future nuclear stockpile goals.

(2) That current nuclear war requirements studies be continued (and refined as new data and techniques become available) but that objectives generated by the exercise scheduled for completion this fiscal year be regarded as tentative and unofficial pending thorough review by the Executive Stockpile Committee.

(3) That the Office of Emergency Planning and the Department of Defense review the various assumptions involved in the nuclear stockpile issue (e.g., the likelihood and timing of follow-on attacks, the probability of continued hostilities following nuclear attack, and the probable levels of damage—both to facilities and resources and to the population) and that differences be presented to, and guidance sought from, the Executive Stockpile Committee.

The Conventional War Stockpile. The Committee believes that several of the basic assumptions underlying the present conventional war stockpile objectives result in considerable overstatement of objectives. We believe that it is unrealistic to assume a long and massive conventional conflict on the order of World War II, that current assumptions on the availability of overseas supplies to the U.S. during an emergency period are unduly pessimistic, and that civilian requirements supported by the present objectives are overly generous. For these reasons, and in order to make our mobilization planning more consistent with our military planning, the Committee recommends (1) that the present 3-year war assumption be reduced to 2 years, which would, because of lags in converting raw materials into end products, still yield production for up to a third year of conflict and (2) that most free world nations be regarded as available sources of supply in the emergency period. The Committee suggests that OEP be directed to calculate tentative objectives consistent with these assumptions by December 15, 1965, for the review of the Executive Stockpile Committee.

[Here follows the body of the report.]

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217. Secret. The source text, which is marked “Draft,” is attached to a December 6 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to members of the Special Committee on Stockpile Objectives and the Executive Stockpile Committee that announced a meeting of these groups on December 9. A draft NSAM, November 10, on these revisions in strategic stockpile objectives is also attached.
2. 50 USC 98; 60 Stat. 596.
3. 50 USC 2093; 64 Stat. 801.
4. Section 303 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 7 USC 1692; 68 Stat. 459.