56. Memorandum From the President’s Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnson1
For the President
The CIA summary for the past few days has reported substantial movements of NVN troops out of forward positions in I Corps, II Corps, and III Corps. In some cases the disengagement appears to be total, and the NVN forces have moved back into Laos and Cambodia. I understand current estimates are that between 1/8 and 1/10 of NVN forces formerly in I Corps have left in recent weeks.
It may well be that these units have decamped only in order to re-fit for further action. Or that Abrams and the monsoons have harassed them so successfully that they are simply retiring from a bad situation for a while. Nevertheless our intelligence seems too uncertain for us to make a positive judgment that the North Vietnamese are only preparing for another round of attacks.
In these circumstances, perhaps we should consider scaling down the number of bombing attacks on North Vietnam.
The daily sortie rate has been in the 420 range for a long time now—with the exception of yesterday, when there were 324. By dropping the number of sorties into the 200’s or high 100’s, we might give some indication that we are prepared to scale down as they do. If they continue to move troops out of contact and out of country, we would further reduce the number of sorties. If they renew heavy activity with troops that have returned to action, we would scale up the number of sorties again.
Harriman could suggest this to them in Paris, reminding them that stopping the bombing altogether will take some assurance on the DMZ and participation by the GVN in the next round.2
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 F, Memos on Bombing in Vietnam, 3/67-10/68. No classification marking. The notation “ps” on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. A separate notation in an unknown hand reads: “To Rostow for comment.”↩
- In an October 10 memorandum to Rostow commenting on this memorandum, Ginsburgh wrote: “Harry McPherson suggests that, in view of recent withdrawals of NVN troops, we should consider scaling down the number of bombing attacks on North Vietnam. I can’t think of a worse way to fight a war—or to negotiate a peace. If the North Vietnamese were to initiate such a suggestion—either directly or indirectly—it would at least be worth considering. Lacking such an initiative on their part, I can see no basis for thinking that a scaling down of the bombing might open up any new avenues toward peace. Hanoi already knows by our word and deed that we are prepared to scale down as they do.” (Ibid.)↩