Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

55. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson¹

Washington, undated.

Herewith the summary of the current state of play in the negotiations, which you requested, including this morning’s teabreak discussion,² our position and Hanoi’s stands as follows:

1. DMZ. In the last six private meetings, starting with the first Harriman/Tho session of September 6 [7]³ we have stressed the importance of re-establishment of the DMZ: the stopping of artillery fire from or across the DMZ; no ground attacks from or across the DMZ; and no massing of troops near the DMZ in a way threatening to the other side.

The DRV has agreed only to the point on artillery fire—which they conceded in the Oslo talks, but not in the Paris exchanges. However, they have questioned us closely and repeatedly (going back to the early Vance/Lau meetings) and while making no commitment, clearly understand our point of view.

Based on their statements and their silences in the crucial moments in their discussions with Tho, Harriman and Vance stated to Tho that, “we have concluded that, if the bombing of North Viet-Nam were stopped, and the US respected the DMZ, then the DRV would respect the DMZ.”

Therefore, Hanoi has in effect been told on three successive occasions that we would expect them to respect the DMZ if we stopped the bombing and we respected the DMZ, and they have not demurred.

2. Cities. Our major representations on this point were made in late May and early June when Saigon was being shelled. At that time Harriman stated publicly and privately that a conclusion of such attacks would have “the most serious adverse consequences on progress in Paris.” At that time also, you made clear in several public statements your deep concern with these attacks.

Shelling of Saigon stopped on June 20. On July 3, when Harriman asked Thuy if this was significant, Thuy replied “I think this is understandable to you. The rockets have stopped. What is your attitude?” (The DRV announced the release of three pilots at the same time, and Thuy also referred to this action during the same conversation.)⁴

In the Vance/Lau conversations, Vance asked for agreement on the absence of attacks against major population centers such as Da Nang, Hue, and Saigon. Lau’s answer was to refer Vance to the NLF if he wanted to discuss matters in the South.

In subsequent meetings, Harriman and Vance have referred to attacks on the cities, varying the intensity of their remarks in part in relation to communist behavior on the ground in the South. At today’s teabreak, Harriman and Vance repeated our position.

3. GVN Representation. Since the beginning of the Vance/Lau talks, we have been stressing the importance of GVN representation on our side of the table during any substantive talks concerning political settlement in the South. We have put forward the “our side/your side” mechanism as our device to meet our own requirement, while allowing the NLF or the Alliance to sit with Hanoi.

At first, the DRV may not have recognized the primacy of this point in our position. Furthermore, they appeared to have believed that we were demanding DRV recognition of the GVN. In the latter part of August, Vance and Harriman clarified our position. They pointed out that this was a question not of recognition but of representation at the conference table. Then, in the first Harriman/Tho meeting (September 7), Harriman added that GVN participation in plenary sessions would not rule out continuation of private conversations on matters of mutual concern to the US and the DRV.

In reviewing the North Vietnamese delegation’s statements on this matter, I find that throughout July and August the North Vietnamese invariably reacted to a statement of our position by a lengthy polemic attacking the GVN as puppets. More recently, however, the North Vietnamese (while still attacking the GVN) have laid greatest stress on an attempt to defer this question to the post-cessation agenda. They have made explicit that they have not yet expressed their position on this issue. Today, they said that they would be willing to discuss the question of GVN participation the day after cessation, and have said that quick agreement could be possible “if both sides take into account the views of the other.” I don’t know what this means.

B. Summary⁵

In summary, I note that the only item the DRV has so far given us explicit assurances on is artillery fire across the DMZ. At the same time, they have clearly avoided an outright rejection of any of the US requirements for cessation. They may have concluded that we are satisfied on the DMZ point; the question of cities has been less emphasized lately (until today) and it is difficult to judge its importance to Hanoi—their capability for massive attacks is undoubtedly diminished as a result of our intensified military pressure on them; and, on the question of GVN representation, I conclude that they have been backing away from this issue, looking for ways around it, and in general softening their rhetoric without yet giving us what we want.

Nicholas deB Katzenbach

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Misc. & Memos, Vol. VII. Secret; Nodis; HARVAN/Plus.
2. See Document 54.
3. See Document 7.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. VI, Document 291.
5. There is no section marked “A” in this memorandum.