Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

51. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk¹

October 6, 1968, 10:49 p.m.

President: [Reading a statement by Kaplan] “I discussed the general notion with Governor Harriman and he specifically authorized me to say that he sees no basis”—

Rusk: His man called, Ellsworth called, and asked if Mr. Nixon could see me tomorrow, and I said my only chance was to drop by to see him between a breakfast I have [and the] swearing in of our mission to the General Assembly. So that’ll mean probably about 30 minutes or something like that. What I did not know until just a few moments ago was that the message was that if he was not able to see me in New York, he would hope very much to have a chance to see you. So we have it open to transfer this down to you, if you want to.

President: Yes. I think that’s what I would do because I think we’re in serious trouble. I Don’t know what we’re going to do about it. I’m worried—I want to talk to you. But our whole outfit is deep in this political thing, and I think if we Don’t recall Averell, we’ve got to find some explanation to give to him. Ball sent a man² over there to counsel with Averell and Averell was part of this whole ploy. And I Don’t think we can have people working for us that are writing campaign speeches and getting themselves involved with private citizens and breaking out to the nation speeches that neither the Secretary of State nor the President know anything about.

Rusk: Yes. I wonder if that doesn’t mean we should get Averell to come back out?

President: I rather think so.

Rusk: Yes.

President: Yes, I rather think so. What I’m going to do is to go to Honolulu. I hope we can get out Wednesday³ night or Thursday and spend some time with Abrams and try to figure out with him what his situation is and really what he thinks about all these proposals and what he thinks the next 3 months hold for him, what he can do about it. Then I want to get Bunker’s judgment too. Then I thought I’d just ask Bunker to go on over there. And while they’re two old men, I think he might be a little bit realistic with Averell by pointing out the problems that they have and what would happen if the GVN were ignored and how the other two matters are just facts of life—if they start bombing the cities or if they use the DMZ—and see what came out of just 2 or 3 days of bringing them up-to-date on South Vietnam. If at the end of that period if we have any more static here, I think we just might ask Averell to come back. I think it’s just another MacArthur deal. I think it’s terrible that he would do a thing like this. I’m told that he felt he thought he just had such an obligation to the Democratic Party that nominated him for governor. Well, hell, I’ve been in the Democratic Party longer than he has, and I Don’t feel an obligation to any party above my country and I Don’t think he ought to be playing politics as a negotiator.

Rusk: And certainly not without our knowledge.

President: And certainly not without reporting it. And I think it’s a dirty trick that George Ball is not to tell us what he’s done. He was talking to me all the time and was sending his men across the ocean to talk to our people. And it’s all going to turn up. Nixon is going to expose it all and I think we’re going to look pretty bad if we’re not careful—appearing to be neutral and saying that we Don’t want to get political and the Secretary of State is not going to make any political observations, the President wants him to speak with one voice beyond the water’s edge, and all the time we’re conniving around here with a speech trying to trap somebody. And the very day it happens, Joe Kraft tells it all. They’ve leaked it to him. Now I Don’t know, I thought maybe—I’m surprised that they haven’t denied either the Murrey Marder story or the Hedrick Smith⁴ story. I asked about it today and Cy said that he had told State Department yesterday. They said you were denying it very strong and he had told them again to deny it. But I’m told when they got any of them at Camp David to deny it, but I’m told that when I got into Camp David tonight, they just blew it up.

Rusk: Well, I saw a statement that Cy made—now, I didn’t see it on the ticker, have to double-check—but that statement ought to be available to the press.

President: Well, Cy, according to what I’m told, thought it was outrageous. First, he told Walt Rostow that he was in terrible shape because he worked for one man and he was loyal to the President and he just didn’t think these things ought to be going on this way. Did he tell you that?

Rusk: He made it very clear. He didn’t say that in so many words, but he was very troubled about the whole business.

President: Well I just asked him outright. I said, “Did you know about this speech?” He said, “Yes.” I said, “How did you know about it?” “Well,” he said, “I got it from one of Ball’s associates.” And I said, “Were you consulted?” He said, “Yes.” I said, “By a fellow who lives there in Paris?” “No,” he said. “By a fellow they sent over.” Now what do you think we ought to do in a thing like that? I had written this letter and I told them to check it with you because I had a little doubt, but I thought it might bust up things some. But—

Rusk: Yes, I think probably it’s a thing that ought to be said direct, personally, rather than in a communication.

President: You see, he was here last week, Averell, and he didn’t mention any differences to me or didn’t make any new recommendations.

Rusk: Nor did he to me.

President: And Cy has been here and he hasn’t done it. So I Don’t know what the hell they’re doing recommending to Hedrick Smith and Murrey Marder without talking to us. I told Cy to talk to you after this meeting tonight—talk to you tomorrow.

Rusk: I’m not sure but that some of this tipping off to people like Murrey Marder might come from the kind of people who might have given Howard K. Smith⁵ certain papers and withheld others. And I know, I think, some of that stuff could have come out of Washington.

President: Well, I Don’t know, though. Its headed “Paris” and—

Rusk: That’s the Smith story, isn’t it?

President: Yes, and I Don’t know what they know. I haven’t been seeing any cables along that line. He wrote you a letter.

Rusk: Yeah, yeah.

President: But I Don’t believe—have they ever recommended that we just stop bombing per se, do nothing without anything else?

Rusk: No, no.

President: Doesn’t everybody agree the Government of Vietnam ought to be in?

Rusk: I think everybody, including Clark Clifford, Cy Vance, and Averell Harriman, agree that this is utterly fundamental, and that when Averell left here he also agreed to the other two points as fundamental.

President: Well, you’ve had more experience than I have with these diplomats. I Don’t know what to do with them. But I thought a negotiator followed his instructions and the first instruction I gave him was to stay out of politics.

Rusk: Yeah, yeah. Well, let’s see now, Mr. President.

President: You think about it and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Rusk: I think I would just get Averell back here after the next Wednesday meeting or toward the end of the week, get him back here when you get back from Honolulu.

President: Well, you might tell Cy that tomorrow. I think Cy ought to come down here before he leaves and maybe see me. And I think he ought to have a press conference. And I think he ought to just flatly say that Harriman has been back here but he hasn’t made any new recommendations. Our position is basically what it has been, and that he’s back and he hasn’t brought any recommendations, and that these two stories are just without any foundation, and that he doesn’t want Hanoi to get the conception that they’re accurate because if they believed them, it would affect—and nobody can really—I think we ought to say when they say, “Does this affect the peace negotiations?” I think we ought to say, “God only knows what affects Hanoi?” I Don’t know what affects them. I Don’t know whether it affects them or not. I know if I were in their place. I think the simple question is this, Dean: if I were Hanoi, I’d say, “Can I get a better deal out of Humphrey than I can Johnson?”

Rusk: Um-hmm.

President: How would you answer that question?

Rusk: Well, if I were listening to the backgrounding some of the people around Humphrey have been giving, I’d think maybe I could.

President: Or just anything. I just think it’s pretty evident from everything you see, read, hear, who supports him, folks line up with him. I just think you’re bound to. Well now, if they do, that’s bound to affect it, isn’t it?

Rusk: I think it is.

President: Why would you pay 10 million [dollars] for something you could buy for 5 million 3 weeks from now? And I’m afraid that’s what Nixon wants to do. I’m afraid we’re going to get him to demagoguing and both of them will be here before it’s over with. And I think this is just a part of the Kosygin letter he wrote me—he had “reason to believe”—and then India, then the Mansfield speech, then the Ogden Reid group, then the Javits and Cooper and Curtis.⁶ And now, it culminates in my negotiators saying it, everybody but me and you and Rostow, according to him. Now I think we’d better find out from our folks if this is true. I understood that Nick Katzenbach felt very strongly that in this little committee he meets with—

Rusk: On these three points—he never wavered on these three points.

President: All right. Doesn’t Bill Bundy feel the same way?

Rusk: Yes, he does.

President: That’s what Walt tells me. Well, then, who in the hell are they talking about?

Rusk: I would be—

President: The Joint Chiefs are certainly with us. Bunker is certainly with us. Abrams is with us. I Don’t know who they’re talking about. Could they be talking about some of the civilians at Defense?

Rusk: It’s possible. I Don’t know. I Don’t know them. Averell may be trying to make his contribution to the campaign at this point in his own way. I just Don’t know the facts about that. But I’d be surprised if he went as far as some of these stories because, pretty generally, he’s been a pretty loyal fellow.

President: Yes. But I gather from both Jorden and Cy that they’ve been troubled by these conversations with the press.

Rusk: Maybe, maybe Cy has made a contribution to this?

President: I would expect so. All the time. Does he have any cables in on it from time to time?

Rusk: No. He wrote me a little private note here sometime ago enclosing an editorial from The New York Times. And I wrote him back and said, “Well, just tell me what you think Hanoi ought to do to make peace,” and I haven’t heard from him again.

President: What was the editorial from The Times?

Rusk: That was the one—

President: Stop bombing?

Rusk: Yes, that was the one. About a month ago. But I haven’t heard from him again. Cy tells me he’s not taking part in the action of discussions very much.

President: Pardon me?

Rusk: Cy tells me he isn’t taking part in the action of the discussions much.

President: He oughtn’t to be. I’d tell Cy that he ought to be very cautious about that because we’ve got the Bill Moyers running back and forth, you know.

Rusk: Well now, on two points on this, Mr. President. Suppose I can get ahold of Mr.Nixon and suggest that he transfer this from me to you—

President: That’s right. Just tell him you’re going to be—just tell him that you’ve talked to me and I’ll be here and I’ll be delighted to see him and talk to him about it, and that if it’s necessary, you’ll join him anytime later, but to just come on here anytime he wants to in the early part of the week.

Rusk: All right. Now, secondly, I have a heck of a problem if I myself leave the latter part of next week. I’ve got Stewart and Hasluck and Holyoake,⁷ and two other Foreign Ministers that are all landing on me in Washington the end of next week. How essentially do you think it necessary for me to go to Honolulu with you?

President: Well, I’d hate not to have you. Can we—I’m getting rid of most of those folks by Wednesday.

Rusk: I know you are, and it’s a good idea, but it’s another problem for me to do the same.

President: Well, I’ll give you my appointments. You just—Holyoake is going to be here, you know, Wednesday, and we’re having the dinner and so forth.

Rusk: He and Hasluck had insisted on a so-called meeting the next day, and Michael Stewart is coming down. Debré is going to be in town for 3 days.⁸

President: Well, I wouldn’t stay here for 3 days with them. I’d just tell them that you’ll see them Wednesday or Thursday, if we want to stay Thursday. I was hoping we’d get out Wednesday. We’ve got to attempt to. You’ve got elections on the 5th and I Don’t think these guys are going to contribute much to it. But I think that what we do is going to be pretty damned important, and I’d hate to, with Clifford in Europe, to go just alone, although I will, but I’d hate to do it on the grounds that you’re staying here to see Holyoake, and I’d just arrange those appointments where you can spend an hour with them, four of them for four hours, on Wednesday, if you have to, Wednesday evening or Thursday. I’m going to try to get rid of Holyoake Wednesday and spend all the time talking about meat imports.

Rusk: If you go to Honolulu, when would you announce it?

President: I thought I’d do it in the morning. I thought we’d start preparing early in the morning.

Rusk: Because as soon as it’s announced, then I would have a basis on which I could talk to them about rearranging.

President: I think we ought to tomorrow, and I would say to them along sometime Thursday on, “The reason I want to do this, I want to see these things that we have and talk to Abrams and see what he really thinks is happening there and what he can do and how far he can go without any dangers, so if we’re confronted with anything, why we can make a decision based on not killing Americans, period. That’s about that simple. I would like for Bunker to go over there because if we recall Averell, we might want Bunker to spend some more time there.

Rusk: Well, if you make the announcement.

President: And I’m not going to tolerate Averell one more week of these stories, whether they’re coming out of him or they’re not, if he doesn’t deny them. I’m amazed that he hasn’t denied them now, and I think you ought to be sure to tell Vance in the morning that he ought to come on down here and have a press conference and deny it himself. I Don’t know, they say your public affairs people over there stopped him—he said he wanted to yesterday and he wanted to again today, and they told him no, not to do it.

Rusk: Let me check and see what happened on that.

President: What happened tonight?⁹

Rusk: I urged my man to concentrate on that one point and said that we would concentrate on the other two in direct contacts in Paris. He didn’t give me any answer on it. We agreed that this special channel ought to be kept open, but I think he was thinking about it. But I left him under no illusion that in some combination we’ve got to have a legion of confidence on all three points, and if they were willing to work on the one point, we’d work on the others in our own way.

President: You mean, on the big one, the one that Clifford—

Rusk: That’s right.

President: Oh, yeah.

Rusk: He didn’t give me a categorical answer, but I had the impression he was at least interested in the problem. On the Middle East, I think we made a little headway on that in terms of supporting Jarring¹⁰ on a number of points—refugees, opening of the [Suez] Canal—and things like that. He asked me what the reaction was about a meeting. I said that I couldn’t give him an answer on that, that we’d be in further touch with him through the same channel, but there are obviously some complications in our situation. And I hit him very directly on Berlin, and he gave me a categorical assurance on Berlin, for whatever that’s worth, so that I think we chopped a little wood but we didn’t make peace. Well now, if you announce this trip to Honolulu, Mr. President, I think that if you could not announce it at the same time that I’m going with you—that is, on the first announcement—then I’m going to try to touch base with these Foreign Ministers and we’ll rearrange things.

President: All right. Now, what are your dates with them—Thursday, Friday?

Rusk: Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. In other words, I’d have to do a good deal of juggling around, so I’ll get busy on that right away.

President: Well now, of course, I’ll have to go out to Bunker. What time is it out there now—10 or 11 in the morning?

Rusk: Yes, sir.

President: I’ll get Walt to talk to him and see what suits their pleasure. Okay.

Rusk: All right. Fine.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 6, 1968, 10:49 p.m., Tape F6810.02, PNO 6-7. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Rusk called from New York, where he was attending the UN General Assembly. The President was in Washington. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary)
2. George Fitzgibbon of Lehman Brothers.
3. October 9.
4. Reporters Joseph Kraft of the Chicago Daily News, Murrey Marder of the Washington Post, and Hedrick Smith of The New York Times.
5. Howard K. Smith, reporter and commentator for ABC News television.
6. Senator Mike Mansfield, Representative Ogden Reid, and Senators Jacob Javits, John Sherman Cooper, and Carl Curtis.
7. British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, Australian External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck, and New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake.
8. French Foreign Minister Michel Debré.
9. Reference is to a discussion between Rusk and Gromyko earlier that evening. The memorandum of this conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Document 310.
10. UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring.