310. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko1
After dinner I drew Mr. Gromyko aside into a small drawing room and had a talk with him alone.
I started by emphasizing the importance and seriousness of the Rostow–Dobrynin discussions and said that the President was personally and directly involved in all aspects of those conversations. Mr. Gromyko said they understood this and attached the highest importance to such discussions.
I then said that we had been giving further thought to what Mr. Gromyko had said to me in my call on him at his Mission about Moscow’s problem in dealing with Hanoi.2 I said that the Soviet Leadership might wish to concentrate on the point of the necessity of GVN presence in any negotiations leaving to us the problem of pursuing other points, such as the DMZ and attacks on population centers, for direct discussions between our delegation and the Hanoi delegation in Paris. I wanted to be very clear to Mr. Gromyko that I was not in any sense withdrawing the importance we attached to such military points as the DMZ and attacks on the cities; it was very important that there be no misunderstanding between the USSR and the USG on such matters. It is a “fact of life” that no President could maintain a cessation of bombing if there were abuse of the DMZ or if the cities were attacked. However, the question of having the GVN at the conference table required a political decision; if Hanoi agreed this would represent a “major development” in the situation.
Gromyko was noncommittal in his comment and repeated what he had said earlier about the USSR being able to be more effective in advising Hanoi if there were a cessation of bombing. I got the impression that he listened carefully to the point I made but I could not report that he agreed to act on it.
He then asked about the portion of their earlier message which discussed general principles on strategic missiles and I repeated my earlier statement that I thought that that part of their message was constructive, and that we would give them a reply after we have had a chance to examine it in detail. He inquired about what our present thought was about a possible meeting and I said I had nothing more [Page 738] to say on that subject but that the Rostow–Dobrynin channel should be kept open and available for any further discussion.
We then adjourned to another room to join our other colleagues for a discussion of the Middle East.3
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick. Top Secret; Eyes Only.↩
- See Document 307.↩
- A memorandum of their conversation on the Middle East is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩