276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
2624. Saigon Eyes Only for Bunker from Secretary.
1. To give added force to your presentation to Thieu, or to speed up his seeing you by notifying him of its existence, the President has authorized you—in your complete discretion—to deliver the following personal message from him to Thieu:
Dear Mr. President:
I have asked Ambassador Bunker to deliver this personal note to you, concerning the dangerous implications that I see developing from the situation in Paris.
The simple fact is that a continued stalemate on present lines can only have most serious effects on basic American public support for our whole effort to assist your country to preserve its independence. You and I must rapidly reach a common position that will produce agreement—or that will at the very least put the public blame squarely on Hanoi for failure to do so.
Specifically, neither the American public nor the American Congress can understand our inability to accept a continuous, and if necessary unmarked, round table. Such a table is not inherently four-sided in any way. With space at the table divided, as it would be, on a 50-50 basis, the table would indeed have a clear two-sided tendency even if it were not marked.
As you know, Hanoi has already said that it could drop its demand for flags and nameplates if we agree to a round table. As we have previously agreed through Ambassador Bunker, this was the most important single element for us to obtain, and it is now clear to the public that it is within our reach.
Moreover, I have every confidence that if we are prepared to accept a round table, we shall be able to get a clearly two-sided order of speaking [Page 806] arrangement. If Hanoi should reject this, on any of the several lines Ambassador Bunker will be putting to you, then the burden would shift to them and we would both be in a much stronger position.
Hence, I see no reason why we cannot agree to a reasonable position that can produce arrangements which we could convincingly depict as two-sided and in full accord with the statements made public on November 27.2
In my judgment, this would be the proper course for us to take at any time, and regardless of public opinion factors. But these factors cannot be left out of account either by you or by me. At the present moment, the situation in the Congress and in the American public is as dangerous and volatile as I have seen it at any time in the last four years, or indeed in my 40 years of public service. Failure to make these reasonable adjustments in our position can only mean a real avalanche of criticism directed in part at the American Government, but far more acutely and damagingly at the image of your government in the American Congress and with the American people. As I come to the close of our official relationship, I have no regrets for the course we have followed, and I have every hope that I and my associates will be in a position to support your cause effectively into the future, so that we may emerge with an honorable settlement that preserves your country’s right to determine its future without external interference. You and I have a long history of close and constructive collaboration. We have tried always to do the right thing, and this is what I am asking you to do now—in the firm belief that it is right, and in the equally firm belief that it is essential if my country is to go on with the basic course of action which I have supported throughout. Please do not force the United States to reconsider its basic position on Viet-Nam.
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Paris Todel-Paris Delto, Vol. XVIII. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/HARVAN Plus. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Rostow and John Walsh of S/S, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1930 literally eyes only for Harriman and Vance. In telegram 4101/Todel 1944 to Saigon, January 10, the Department reported: “Highest levels desire that you definitely deliver Presidential letter. I am sure you are fully aware of the great importance President attaches to satisfactory agreement from Thieu at this critical time. Good luck and all best wishes.” (Ibid.)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 236.↩