275. Editorial Note
On January 7, 1969, President Johnson along with Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, Director of Central Intelligence Helms, General McConnell, Walt Rostow, and Tom Johnson met for their regular weekly Tuesday Luncheon Meeting. The meeting lasted from 1:40 to 2:50 p.m., and Vietnam was one of the issues discussed. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) Although no formal record of this meeting has been found, Clifford recounted the meeting for his staff at its morning conference on January 8 as follows:
“LBJ opened by saying, ‘What do you have to say Dean?’ Rusk admitted no progress, Hanoi has turned down all our proposals. It appears we shld stay with it—when Hanoi learns/accepts our firmness there will be progress. LBJ wanted to know what WAH & Vance say [?] Rusk said they were critical of Hanoi—Bunker reports no action. LBJ then asked CMC ‘to add’ any comments. CMC said he had nothing to add—rather, a diff’t interpretation.
“CMC: Hanoi has said it will accept—it has a reasonable offer—they will sit at a round table, they will give up nameplates & flags, & they will accept our proposal on who speaks. I said we [have] not given any attention to 9 diff’t table sizes, we’re way past that, we have a situation that parties can agree to. Saigon knows this proposition is acceptable to US & Hanoi, so they just stall—Thieu says he’s ‘sick,’ yet he’s able to go on inspection trip. All this is just part of deception & deliberate dilatory tactics. They just stall, delay, devious—for 67 days they’ve [Page 804] hamstrung us. We have a reasonable proposition—But we can’t move because we have let Saigon have a veto. ‘I think it’s wrong’—we pay, we fight, we owe it to ourselves & U.S. to get talks started—before 20 Jan—It’ll take weeks & months for a new team to start. It’s wrong—to go on killing Am. boys week after week, by sitting supinely by.
“LBJ asked sharply to Rusk— ‘Is the argument fair?’ Rusk said yes. LBJ asked Rusk to defend any objections—Rusk couldn’t defend Saigon. LBJ asked CMC what he should do. CMC said, ‘Look at last Bunker cable’ (all did). CMC: LBJ shd send a private letter to Thieu saying this is eminently fair—we believe Hanoi will accept. Leave no flexibility, no options, no choices—It’ll be fair, & leave an excellent record—tell Thieu support is eroding. Second, order Bunker to sell this; Congress is back & wild. Do it today. If Thieu is negative, we shld convene at once & decide next step.
“LBJ asked Rusk—Rusk says lv it up to Bunker. CMC broke in—Bunker doesn’t deliver the message! Only way to get it across is from you. LBJ sat. Finally said, ‘I’m getting fed up!’ (CMC said this is the first time he ever so said) ‘It’s apparent to me, “they’ll” toss anybody to sharks. They are planning delay. We are shut out of it.’ He turned to Dean Rusk: ‘I want these talks to start before Jan 20 even if we have to admit Clark has been right.’ CMC (It was not rec’d happily by Rusk & Rostow) LBJ asked how to get talks going—CMC says he cautioned about ‘grand-standing.’ If Thieu is negative, take another step. Rusk sat still & numb—this is not what he wants or likes. CMC played on—Why not get support out of Nixon admin. To get talks started—It’ll be to their advantage
“LBJ not sure that’ll work—’I’m completely disenchanted about Nixon, they’ll pull the rug out from under us—They’ve thrown a wrench into SALT, they’ve screwed up Paris before the election.’ LBJ—says—’It’s actually a possibility Saigon is acting under instructions from Nixon.’ [LBJ] ended: to Clark and Dean: ‘Get talks started!’” (Ibid., George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2])