Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Thailand, Australia, the Philippines, Korea, and New Zealand¹

Washington, November 2, 1968, 0658Z.

266087. 1. This is interim guidance for your handling of the Thieu speech in Saigon today.² We are anxious at all costs to avoid public or private expressions of support for Thieu’s position from TCC countries, and we leave it to your discretion whether initiative is necessary to head off this possibility.

2. Essentially, Thieu has now surfaced the matters that in the end prevented agreement on a joint announcement Thursday night, our time.³ He wished us at that time to agree that if Hanoi did not give express assurances that it would deal directly with the GVN, and that the NLF would be present only as part of the Hanoi delegation, the new Paris meetings would not get underway. The first of these two points is now explicit in Thieu’s speech, and the second seems to be implied in Thieu’s third point.

3. We have given the GVN clear assurances, in writing, that the practical situation, including the fact that the GVN plays a leading role, makes it inevitable that Hanoi will be talking to the RVN—Hanoi has over and over again assured us that it will talk seriously, and it cannot do this without talking to the RVN. At the same time, we have pointed out again and again to the GVN that Hanoi will never give an express assurance to this fact, at least without demanding that either we or the GVN, or both, give a parallel assurance that we will talk directly with the NLF. We gain by letting the practical situation speak for itself. We would only lose in an exchange of express assurances. This point has been clear in our discussions with the GVN over weeks and months, and it has been clear (by silence) in our talks with Hanoi. Although we are not unwilling to do so, we think it would be fruitless to raise this question with Hanoi at this stage, and we most certainly are not prepared to make this a condition for going ahead with the talks.

4. Precisely the same considerations apply to any effort to get Hanoi to admit that the NLF is part of its delegation only. The way that we have handled this with our talks with Hanoi is to make absolutely clear that the GVN will be a separate delegation from the US delegation. At the same time, we have deliberately refrained from even raising the question whether the NLF will be a separate delegation from Hanoi. This leaves the way clear for us to join with the GVN in treating the other side as a single side—that of Hanoi—but it is perfectly clear that, if we do ask for assurance, Hanoi will say categorically that the NLF is a separate delegation and we will be stuck with it or forced to make this a condition—which would upset the whole formula on which we and the GVN have been in accord for months.

5. It is not wholly clear whether Thieu’s reference to ruses to elevate the NLF goes as far as the point just discussed. Insofar as it refers to devices (such as Hanoi leaving the room) to force us to address the NLF as such, or as an independent entity, we have again given the GVN clear assurance that, in the event of any such ruses or maneuvers, we would at once consult with them with a view to action (including termination of the meeting) which would make clear that such tactics could not continue. In other words, this point is buttoned down so far as it relates to ruses.⁴

6. The second of Thieu’s points—about the direct talks constituting a “completely new phase” is of much lesser difficulty and importance. In our earlier agreements with the GVN on a joint announcement, we had agreed to refer to the next phase as simply “Paris meetings on the substance of a peaceful settlement”, or words to that effect. They had in mind, and we accepted, that this was a new designation designed to show a new phase. At the same time, we have strenuously opposed such terms as “four-party-conference” and have been leery even of the term “conference”, which tends to elevate those present and especially the NLF. In any event, we have no doubt that the world press will christen the meeting what it chooses and that the sense of that christening will be in the direction of “a completely new phase”. Indeed, this has already taken place for practical purposes, in large part, and we will certainly do nothing to discourage it.

7. In short, Thieu’s key points are an effort to reopen matters that have long been understood as being left deliberately vague, so that the practical situation could be developed to our common advantage.

8. In any conversations you may have, you should be as discreet as possible to avoid any impression of US pressure. Moreover, you should refrain from any public comment whatever and take your cue from what is said here. Our general posture should be that these matters can and will be ironed out between ourselves and the GVN, so that the meetings will go ahead in the general manner contemplated.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Priority; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Bundy and cleared by Director of the Executive Secretariat Staff Jeanne Davis. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1459 and to Saigon.
2. See footnote 4, Document 178.
3. October 31.
4. In telegram 266088 to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Seoul, and Wellington, November 2, the Department noted that “Thieu’s speech does not demand explicit assurance from Hanoi that the NLF is present only as a part of the Hanoi delegation.” It stressed that the DRV delegation could bring with it to the table NLF representatives as part of its side but that “we do not regard the NLF as anything but a tool of Hanoi and in no sense an entity independent of North Vietnam.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968)
5. In telegram 41752 from Saigon, November 2, the Embassy recommended against GVN participation in the preliminary talks on procedure since, in light of Thieu’s speech, “their participation would mean the instant precipitation of ‘Three-Power’ vs. ‘Four-Power’ issue, which would only make it more difficult to obtain the initial procedural arrangements that are so important for them.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/Double Plus, Vol. V) In telegram 266086 to Paris, November 2, the Department concurred in the recommendation against GVN participation in the procedural talks and instructed Vance to meet again with Lau on November 2. (Ibid.) In telegram 23320 from Paris, November 2, Harriman reported that Vance had postponed the first procedural meeting with Lau until the following day. (Ibid.) See also footnote 2, Document 182.