Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

178. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 2, 1968, 0345Z.

41746. Ref: State 265320.²

1. President Thieu refused to see me despite urgent messages and attempts to reach him personally by telephone. I was told that he had closeted himself in his private apartment in Independence Palace and did not wish to be disturbed. A message did come back to talk to the Foreign Minister.

2. Although this was obviously unsatisfactory I immediately called on the Foreign Minister and in the briefest terms told him that I had a message from the President and that it was imperative that I see President Thieu before he made his address to Parliament at 10 o’clock. I summarized a talking paper prepared for my interview with Thieu and finally persuaded Thanh to try to penetrate the barrier around the President. I gave him a copy of my talking notes (see septel).³ I followed Thanh’s car to the Palace.

3. Thanh took my talking paper and said he would use it to make the principal points himself to the President after which he would try to have me asked in. We (myself, Berger and Herz) waited until 10:15 when Thanh emerged and said he had failed in his attempt to see Thieu but had managed to give the talking paper to Thieu’s brother, Nguyen Van Kieu, who had taken it to the President.

4. Thanh assured me at the same time that he knew the President’s speech would be moderate and inoffensive, etc. I did manage to impress Thanh before he went into the Palace that the critical point concerned what the President would say about the other side having to be one delegation.

5. I said if Thieu would say that the GVN would treat the other side as one delegation, he could add that the US had given assurances that it would do the same. On the other hand, if he said that Hanoi must acknowledge that its side is only one delegation, this would in effect mean “closing the door” to GVN participation and could have the disastrous consequences against which I had intended personally to warn Thieu.

6. Under the circumstances outlined above it was not possible to deliver the President’s letter to Thieu before he made his speech.⁴ I had of course expected Thanh to open the way for me to talk with the President personally before he made the speech.

Bunker

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Received at 11:18 p.m. on November 1. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
2. Document 175.
3. In his talking paper, transmitted in telegram 41753 from Saigon, November 2, Bunker again made the point that the North Vietnamese would never admit that the DRV and the NLF were the same. This paper closed with the following points: “Victory is now within our grasp, both in the fighting which lies ahead in the South and at the conference table. I beg you not to throw away victory. I plead with you not to say anything in your speech that will cause American support of the war to be further reduced. I urge you not to say anything which will make this more difficult. If the American people have any feeling that you fear Hanoi and the NLF, it will shake their confidence in the situation here. The American people will never understand your failure to take part.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/Double Plus, Vol. V)
4. The President’s letter was transmitted in Document 175. In Thieu’s November 2 speech to the National Assembly, he imposed conditions upon South Vietnamese attendance at the expanded peace talks, insisting especially that his government would not send a representative to a peace conference if the NLF participated as a separate delegation. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, September 6-13, 1969, p. 23550.