Office of the Historian

118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, October 24, 1968, 2054Z.

260990. Ref: (A) Saigon 40987,2 (B) Paris 22740,3 (C) Saigon 40788.4

1.
We are pleased that Berger and Herz were able to reach agreement ad referendum with Thanh on considerable range of procedural problems. Based on previous exchanges (reftels), we assume that following represents substance of points agreed on, and would appreciate your confirmation and comments on specific points raised.
(a)
Flags and Nameplates. There will be neither flags nor nameplates on the tables on either side.
(b)
Name for the Conference. We note that USDel Paris has proposed “Paris Conference” or “Paris Conference on Viet-Nam” whereas our own preference would be to stick with “Paris Talks”. Can we assume that GVN has agreed to term “Paris Talks”?
(c)
Order of Entrance. We assume the GVN wishes to precede us at first meeting and that they will indicate their desires on doing so for any other meetings.
(d)
Chairmanship of Delegation. We assume GVN has agreed that there will be no designated chairman of delegation but that heads of each delegation on our side are co-equals.
(e)
Opening Statement. We assume GVN understands that its opening statement should not be deliberately provocative and that whatever they say about the NLF or the DRV can be matched by equally noxious statements by other side. Has GVN indicated its thoughts on main lines of opening statement?
(f)
References to Other Side. We assume GVN is prepared to refer to NLF as “the other side”. Is Thanh still thinking in terms of having GVN delegation make statement asserting that NLF representatives are part of DRV delegation, etc., every time “a member of the North Vietnamese delegation” purports to speak on behalf of NLF (point 5 of Thanh’s October 21 memorandum—Ref (C))?
2.
Although not specifically mentioned in reference A, we assume that, on seating arrangements, Thanh has agreed to arrangement of two separate tables facing each other, with each delegation on our side of table arranging itself beginning at center and going right and left. Can we take it that GVN desires to tail off to right in a position of honor while US goes to left? Under this arrangement principals would sit side by side in center of our side of the table.
3.
As to Thanh’s request that the US “join the GVN delegation” in statements that they would make about the NLF, we concur with Berger’s point that there is no difference between us on substance, although we might not use exactly the same words as the GVN delegation. At same time, we would not want to give GVN the impression that we intend to follow them if they plan to reiterate mechanistically a set formula on NLF status along the lines of paragraph 5 of Thanh’s memorandum.
4.
On Thanh’s point that “question of internal politics of the Republic of Viet-Nam cannot be raised by either side at the conference” (based on paragraph 8D of his October 21 memorandum), we concur with Embassy’s explanation that US position has all along been that each side must be free to bring up anything it likes. Clearly we cannot accede to Thanh’s request for agreement that neither of us will discuss internal GVN matters, but we see no point in making an issue of this at this juncture and agree that it must be left for later resolution.5
5.
As to Thanh’s request for assurances that any agreement coming out of the negotiations would not be signed by the NLF, we concur with Embassy’s observation that this problem seemed highly premature and that we could face it when the time comes. As Embassy has already pointed out to Thanh, what was in the document would be more important than signatures (Saigon 40885).6
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Bundy and cleared by Read. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1377.↩
  2. Dated October 21. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. III)↩
  3. Dated October 22. (Ibid.)↩
  4. Document 96.↩
  5. Thanh later would attempt to reassure Vietnamese political leaders that Thieu was not being pressured by Bunker into accepting a cessation that lacked reciprocity. (Memorandum from Karamessines to Rostow and Rusk, October 31; Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79-207A, DDO and Agency Papers for Role in 1968 Bombing Halt in Vietnam)↩
  6. Dated October 22. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. III)↩