Office of the Historian

117. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Washington, October 24, 1968, 3:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bob Ginsburgh and I have been trying to figure out what it is that makes Hanoi stick so hard on a period longer than 3 days. For what it is worth, neither of us believes they are entering this with the intent quickly to grossly violate the DMZ or otherwise to undertake some outrageous military action that would force you to re-start the bombing. Our reasons for that view are:

—First, they do not have either a present capability or the weather to do anything very significant in a short period of time;

—Basically their military and political position is deteriorating; they are moving toward the best settlement they can get, cautiously and carefully;

—A full scale reopening of the bombing and an end to negotiations—including the bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong—is not what they now want to see happen.

Then, why a period longer than 3 days?

We believe they are trying in every way they can to save face and dignity as they go into this phase of negotiations. That is why they are trying to balance “unconditional” with our facts of life. They probably also want to be able, after the bombing stops, to have the photographers take pictures of the NLF man getting on board a plane at Phnom Penh—or Hanoi—with a bunch of roses and a propaganda statement. They want it to appear that they sent this fellow to Paris only after the bombing actually stopped, or—as the conversation today suggested—after we had announced the time of a bombing cessation. In short, we think this is a matter of their saving face (given the travel time from Vietnam to Paris) rather than a sinister plot; although their saving face in these circumstances does have some marginal effect on their subsequent negotiating ability.

This analysis—for what it is worth—doesn’t bear on some of the issues that have concerned you. But I thought you might wish to know how two of us, after examining the alternatives, came out on this matter.

Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [2 of 2]. Secret; HARVAN Double Plus.↩