Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

109. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell¹

Washington, October 23, 1968, 10:05 a.m.

Russell: Hello?

President: How are you?

Russell: A bit shaky this morning. My emphysema’s acting up on me. Hope you’re well.

President: I’m doing fine. I’m so sorry—I thought you’d have some warmer weather down there.

Russell: We have beautiful weather here. I don’t know what happened to me. Well, it’s just drafts.

President: I won’t keep you long. I just wanted to tell you that we are still wrestling with this very difficult subject and it gets worse everyday. Our friend that I have to rely on a good deal—Abrams—tells me that he only needs 2 hours notice; that from a political and military standpoint he would recommend this; that he thinks that it is desirable. The thing would be this in short: not much change since you heard about it, but we would take our action and at the moment we said the next day we would have meetings. They come back and say a week later. We’ve told them that in no case would we go longer than 2 or 3 days. They still insist on a week in between the time we act and they act on—

Russell: Is there any reason for that?

President: They imply they Don’t want it to look like a condition and they want to get folks in that area located down in the delta and the NLF crowd. That’s their assumption. I said, “Okay, you take the next week to get them in and we will take our action.” But we are hung up on that now, and my guess is that they will start leaking on account of the dovishness of the folks we have to deal with—the Soviets in the middle of it and all the papers are in the middle of it—and my judgment is they’ll start putting it on me, that I have had 7 days and I would not act on the 7-day one—I have turned it down. I have turned it down as of this moment and said to them that we will do it in a day or 2 days or 3 days, but we’re not going to sit there on our fanny and let you tear down the Saigon government by waiting 7 days and letting the people think that we’ve sold them out. You’ve got to act pretty soon to show that you are sitting down with the GVN. Now, we are giving our man out there instructions that he has authority to act on his own to respond to violations of the DMZ.

Russell: You mean Abrams?

President: Yes. He doesn’t have to clear it. He can just respond. We’re telling them—they’re not agreeing, they will do anything on the DMZ or the cities—we are just telling them that if they do we will respond and they know what they are getting into.

Russell: Yes, I thought about that.

President: And that worries me because I would look like a boob before the election to call it off 1 day and start it 2 days later. The experienced diplomats Don’t think so. They think the Soviets are in this thing and they’re worried and wouldn’t let them do it and all that kind of stuff. But the net of it is—what you really get down to—we take our action and then they agree to sit down with the GVN. Now, our diplomats think that that puts the government in a hell of a good shape out there, that it says to all the NLF and the Communists that they’ve finally come around to doing something they said they’d never do—they really recognize them—and that it really strengthens that government when they do it. Now, if they wait a week, it may not be in existence.

Russell: It may not be in existence—I thought of that.

President: Now that’s my problem. So, we are fighting on that one. Now on the DMZ, he can respond and on the cities he can respond. And our military people think—Wheeler thinks—that they can never do anything in that country unless they do hit the cities. So if they do agree not to hit the cities, it is a great military concession. At least if they Don’t agree to it, but just Don’t do it. They know that if they do it that all bets are off and we might even go back to where we were—Hanoi.

Russell: I don’t think you have any option but to do that, Mr. President. Otherwise, it would make us look bad.

President: Now, the big damn question is this week. That’s what worries me. I honestly Don’t have anybody that has the feel of this thing like you have it and like even I have it, even as far removed as I am from getting out with the people. I know—I saw LeMay yesterday—and he said it was going to be a wheeler-dealer trick, and I know that a lot of folks say, “Well, you had 5 years. Why did you do it 5 days beforehand?” On the other hand, if I put it off, they’ll say, well, I could have done it and I wouldn’t do it because I didn’t want Humphrey. And I think I’ve just got to do what I think is right—when I get it in shape, when I think it is right. Now, I’ve been standing out here holding back and making everybody get aboard and now they’ve got aboard really on 7 days. I’m not going to take 7. I’m going back today and say, “Well, I’m going to take 1, but I would go up to 3.” Now when they say no to that, the question is, do I try to ride it out having been offered 7 and turned it down or what. So—

Russell: God knows, I don’t know. Those bastards are making problems. I sympathize with you in this thing because it gets down to where I don’t know what to do and Don’t have any suggestions on what to do. Well, as the fellow that finally has to make the decision, I sure feel sorry as hell that I got that much advantage.

President: Here is what I think I would do. I think that I would stick on not going above 3 or 3-1/2.

Russell: I don’t see how you can go much above that, Mr. President. I really Don’t.

President: Now, I may have to.

Russell: If they have any good faith, that’s all they’ll really need.

President: I may have to, but that is what I think. Now the next thing I think, if I did that I think then I’d have to go right back over the procedure I did the other day and get every one of those men to urge me to do it if they feel that way, just individually, every man that you sat at the table with the other day from across the river.

Russell: Yes.

President: Then I think I’d have to get a new, strong wire from Abrams. And then I think I’d have to get, when I was ready to sign on and I’d really made the decision, first of all, I’d like for it to be as late as it could. I don’t want it to become an election issue, but—

Russell: Well, just Don’t do that.

President: Not if it’s November 2nd or 3rd. That’s what I’m talking about. I would like for it to be the 4th rather than today.

Russell: That’s advisable.

President: You see, you have to take some time. You have to give your troops orders and you have to do things like that. Then I thought about meeting Abrams and really looking him in the eye and saying, “Now, you’re damn sure that if I agree for you to stop—?” The weather is so bad, that’s just terrible. Chuck [Robb] said they have had 30 inches of rain just in the last few weeks in Danang and they just can’t even—[everything] they’ve got, it’s just as wet as hell, and the airport is 4 inches under water. And they say they haven’t got anybody—the enemy has nobody north of Danang—moved them all out. They’re getting ready for this DMZ, getting them all on the other side of it or in Laos or in Cambodia. So they are apparently getting ready to respect it. But then I thought I might even see Abrams and just say to him, “Now you’ve got to be the man I rely on and I’ve got to have military advice. Are you goddamn sure that if I stop this that you’ve got enough advantages from doing it that justifies it. Now if you haven’t, I’m not going to.” I don’t believe anybody can answer these folks on the merits of the decision except the military.

Russell: No, I—well, they have at least got to be part of it. Nobody else could do it without them.

President: The other day they were enthusiastic, and he seems to be more enthusiastic every time you talk to him. Let me read you, if I can here, I want to read you, if I’ve got it, his latest this morning.² I sent him a cable.³ This is from the two of them—Bunker and Abrams: “If we have Thieu aboard and allow time for him to inform his leaders in advance, we see no serious difficulties here in respect to your questions, i.e. political viability with the GVN, effect on the military situation, or adverse effect on the morale of either our forces or those of the ARVN.” We see no serious difficulties. “Two, Thieu has not been concerned with the cessation itself, but rather to the NLF participation. If the nature of that participation is clearly understood and properly handled publicly, he is not concerned. I hope to reach agreement on this at this afternoon’s meeting. Three, assuming no further delay here with respect to the issues, when I have authority to notify him of the timetable which we would take up with Hanoi and to obtain his concurrence, I would work out with him the times when others here would be notified. Abrams says they will need 12 hours, but that the information can be restricted to the Chief of the JGS and General Lam, the I Corps commander, and General Troung, Commander of the 1st Division, which is in I. Assuming the timetable in your telegram, this would mean that Thieu would set a meeting next date to include the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, the Speakers of the Legislature and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I feel that Ky should be notified somewhat earlier, and I will tell Thieu that he could do this if he wished. I would remark that the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Legislature were strongly pressed to reveal what President Thieu had told them at the October 16 meeting and all three refused. The Legislature complained they were debating this whole issue without any knowledge of the facts. I therefore think we need not be too concerned about leaks at the top. We will discuss with Thieu how and when Ambassador Lam would be notified in advance.” That’s the Paris plan. Now, that is their last meeting. So what it narrows down to and consulting with you about, I am just trying to get a feel that I am on steady ground and just not jumping at the 7 days. I don’t want to look bad in history and say I was offered something and I was just hard-headed and obstinate. But—

Russell: I don’t know how in the hell they would really prove that you were ever offered that.

President: Oh, Harriman would just leak it all over the lot. He’s already practically doing it. You see, those—George Ball and Harriman and them—are working so close together. Harriman has really—feels that he has an obligation to party as well as to country, and I just Don’t feel that way on this matter at all.

Russell: Well, on these people, I never really was fully confident of them.

President: I just Don’t want people to say that this man kept on a war when he could have settled it in 7 days. Now, my judgment is that we may not get anything out of them when we start talking except more Paris and I rather think they’re doing it—the Soviets are doing it to affect the election. That’s what I’m afraid of.

Russell: Well, they’re smarter than I am if they can predict exactly what effect it is going to have on the election.

President: Well, I thought then I would get the [Congressional] leaders when I got ready to sign on and just get them to come in. And I thought I would just get the three principal candidates and just get them in, and say, “Now gentlemen, I want Secretary Rusk to tell you why he recommends this from a political standpoint. I want General Wheeler and Clifford to tell you why they recommend it from a military standpoint. I want to have Bunker and Abrams’ wire read to you. Now, I can turn this down and walk away. I don’t think the American people want to do it.” And then just kind of say, kind of in the language you used the other day, “I am going to take a try at it, but Abrams has his orders that they can trigger a response if they move on either these fronts—either the cities or the DMZ. Now they have not agreed—repeat, not agreed—not to move. But they know if they do move we will respond and it may make us look foolish. But I think it’s a gamble worth taking.” Just say that to Wallace and Nixon and Humphrey right in their presence. I can’t believe they could do a damn thing. When I told them that over the phone the other day, Wallace was just as meek as he could be. He said, “Mr. President,” he said, “I am going to support the Commander in Chief whatever you decide.” Nixon said, “Mr. President, you know I have said we will speak with one voice.” Humphrey just said, “Thank you.” But both of them supported my statement the other day when I told them over long distance telephone that this was the thing we were working on. And I don’t know, they would bring one hundred newspapermen in each plane and it would be a big extravaganza. On the other hand, I’m afraid not to give them all of the details so that they would really know that I could justify it.

Russell: The only thing that disturbs me at all, Mr. President, is that we Don’t know definitely whether we’ve got any quid pro quo at all.

President: We do with the GVN.

Russell: What’s that?

President: They tell us on the Government of Vietnam. Another thing I didn’t propose—I didn’t mention—I would propose to call in Dobrynin and say, “Now our relations are very serious between us and the Soviet Union. You recommended this and I want you to go back to your government and be damn sure that they recommend it. And I want you to know that if any of these three things Don’t work out, that I’m doing them because of my respect for your responsibility, and if they break loose, why you better hold your hat because I’m not going to be bound at all.” So that they would have plenty of time to tell Hanoi that they were in effect bound by these three things.

Russell: Well, if they’d do that, then, I think, of course, that would be tremendously helpful. I think they can urge and suggest these things, but I don’t think they’ve ever just told Hanoi that I think this is what you ought to do and do it now.

President: I think that’s right.

Russell: Well—

President: What do you think is wrong with the scenario after we sign on, if we ever get an agreement?

Russell: Well, if you get the agreement, I think it’s good. You’ve got everybody tied up then in the same boat.

President: Well, I mean—

Russell: If the thing folds up, everybody just goes, sits back and says that no fellow could have done a damn sight better than that.

President: Would you have the Cabinet in?

Russell: I just Don’t know about that.

President: It’ll be 6 hours difference. Some of them would be in California and some will be in New England.

Russell: You can’t afford to unless it is very firm, Mr. President.

President: That’s right, that’s right, and that’s where I am. For instance, if I—

Russell: If it’s very firm, I think that I would, because that’s just a relief that we’re moving completely on the picture.

President: Would you have the leaders with them or would you have two separate groups?

Russell: That’s a hard question.

President: I believe two separate groups because I think that you might have a Rivers that might hit you or you might have a Fulbright that will hit you who’d say it could have been done all along. You might have a debate.

Russell: I guess that is right, although I must say that I am not very apprehensive about that. I think if you have the Joint Chiefs all there and they all say they’ll sign up, and Rusk says he’ll sign up, and Harriman and the other group, I don’t think you will get a bad response out of them. I don’t know about Rivers.

President: From the standpoint—

Russell: Oh, hell no, Rivers won’t think about it if Westmoreland is there.

President: Well, if Westmoreland agrees, well then Rivers will agree. You’re going to have to have them seated together. Seems like they ought to know something before they start asking questions.

Russell: Yes, I agree with that. Who do you think—just setting the President aside—who do you think is our strongest card on this—Abrams or Wheeler or Rusk—from the standpoint of the country, and even the Republicans, and Eisenhower, and Nixon, and so forth?

Russell: Frankly, I think it would be Abrams and Bunker. I wouldn’t leave them out. Abrams is pretty well-known over the country and so is Bunker. The trouble is all may not know who Bunker is, but those that get out and make hell-raising speeches all know who Bunker is. I’d sure bring him in right along with Abrams. Let them come in together.

President: Would you meet either with Abrams or Bunker beforehand? That gives me a day or two time if I met them in Honolulu. It’d create a lot of talk, but I could do it on a weekend. It gives me—it moves me up a little closer to Tuesday.

Russell: That will, Mr. President, but you have to bear in mind that one of the candidates might break loose in the meantime. Have your boys talk to them. They know what you are doing. I’d have them come on in to Washington.

President: Well, they ought to be back out there when this goes into effect because Ky might start a coup or we got to respond if they violate.

Russell: Yes, sir, that’s really what I’d like to do with Abrams.

President: I want to be sure that Abrams is not—

Russell: Oh, Mr. President, he’s a solid fellow.

President: I want to just be sure.

Russell: If Abrams tells you anything in the cablegram, he will tell you the same thing when he sees you. That is my opinion. I have known him very light, not intimately, but I have known him for 2 or 3 years. [Other voices are heard on the line.] Who is it on this phone?

President: I don’t know—a party conversation, it looks like. I will let you go. Much obliged.

Russell: Not at all. I certainly hope that it works out all right.

President: Thank you, my friend.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Russell, October 23, 1968, 10:05 a.m., Tape F6810.06, PNO 2-4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
2. See footnote 3, Document 108.
3. See Document 105.