108. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk1

President: They’ve got to understand that we’ve got to play it straight, square and fair, for everybody, and lean over backwards to be sure we take no political advantage of it. Therefore, I think that we must say to Averell that what Clark said yesterday about the paragraph,2 that they said they’d have serious talks next day. That interests us. If it is in the far away future, that doesn’t interest us. We think it ought to be the next day. We want to be flexible. We were ready to go an extra day. We might even go 2 days, such as—and then give them your date. But what I would do there is move it up to Dobrynin’s November 2 and then 3 days ahead of that, which would be October 30 or something.

Rusk: Mm-hmm.

President: Even though it is not the weekend, I think that would help us some, and say, now, if you want November 2, we can understand that and we will give you 3 days—2 days—try to do 1 day. I would never go more than 3 days, 3-1/2 at the most. Let’s just be prepared. Now then, we will have to see how we defend ourselves when they leak the 7th. We will have to think what they could do in that event and how dangerous it would be and what it would do to the Saigon government and what it would do to these other things. I’m a little surprised that Saigon gets on the board so easy—always on first flashes—this cable this morning.3

Rusk: Yeah, yeah.

President: Looks like we made a terrible mistake. That may be part of their plan. It looks to me we would look like jackasses if we stopped bombing on November 2 and had to resume it on November 4. It just looks terrible. I could not do that 10 days before the election and have to resume it. So that is why that second date has some significance. So [Page 298] I think we have to say to him the GVN must be there and certainly make it abundantly clear that we are not agreeing to any unconditional stuff.

Rusk: Yeah.

President: That the GVN has got to be there. That they hear loud and clear once again in the language nobody can misunderstand that he has orders and they trigger it themselves—we Don’t. They need not come to Washington, but the moment they violate the DMZ, he operates—Abrams does. The moment they shell the cities, he operates. Doesn’t make any difference how minor it is, we can adjust it. But we ought to tell them that even if it is minor, we are going to do it and that we’ll give consideration to the 3 days before the 2d.

Rusk: Yes.

President: We’ve got to get it by their leak now so that we Don’t come up and agree on it that day. Then I think we have to go out to Abrams and say now this is what they’ll agree to and then give him the exact paragraph that Harriman read to them. And I want a wire from you endorsing this if you do. If you Don’t, I want you to say so.

Rusk: Uh-huh.

President: Then I think we ought to do the Joint Chiefs the same way. And I think if we’re ready to sign on and are going to sign on, I would think we would have to get all of the [Congressional] leadership in here, just like we did on the Missile Crisis, and tell them this and say, “I am deciding this, and I want to go around the table and let Dean Rusk tell you why he recommends it, let Buzz Wheeler tell you why he recommends it, and let every one of these men tell you instead of just having some guy in the Department leaking it.” And then I think we have got to do the candidates the same way. Now you can imagine bringing three candidates in here with their hundred press men traveling with them and all that kind of stuff. It’s just going to be a hell of a deal, but I’m not going to put this into effect before election unless I have had those candidates here first-hand—

Rusk: Yeah.

President: With us taking notes why Rusk recommended it, why Clifford recommended it, why Wheeler recommended it, why Abrams recommended it, and why Bunker recommended it. And they are going to have to take all of them on and do it openly if they question this thing. Now, they would like to not know much about it and come out and say, “Well, it wasn’t done right.”

Rusk: Mm-hmm.

President: So, we are going to have to make clear to Vance and Averell and let them know it is going to be a quickie. I think if you have [Page 299] doubts about it, you ought to discuss them a little later in the day. Now, Averell announced, according to UPI, that he’s having another meeting tomorrow.4 It’s very unusual for him to announce these meetings the next day, so that meant everything was imminent.

Rusk: I was curious about that to know whether or not he had checked that out with the North Vietnamese. But I will check on that. I haven’t got any word on that yet.

President: I would imagine that—Walt says UPI says it is nonsense. Paris says—we’ve checked with Paris—UPI item Thursday morning, it’s nonsense. Habib says they will knock it down via McCloskey. Now here is what I have in mind for Abrams: “I wish I could talk to you face to face at this moment of decision.” I guess we cannot do that, but I wish I could while he’s still in Honolulu. “Since we cannot do this, I wish to put to you bluntly the questions which are on my mind as I would put them if we could be together. First, if the enemy honors our understanding on the DMZ and the cities, will those actions constitute a significant military advantage to our forces and the ARVN? Second, will that advantage compensate for the loss of our bombing in North Vietnam south of the 19th parallel? Third, is it your estimate that the enemy will or will not honor those understandings? Fourth, if he does not honor those understandings, can standing orders for rules of engagement of the kind you and we have in mind to protect our forces and those of our allies for a period sufficient for us to make a basic estimate of enemy intentions and return if necessary to full-scale bombing of North Vietnam [be issued]? Fifth, knowing all you know of the position in Vietnam, if you were President, would you proceed with the proposed understanding?”

Rusk: Mm-hmm. Now, I think the question about does he think the enemy will observe them, I think that needs a phrase like “Do you have any information or reason to comment on whether you think the enemy will” because almost nobody can answer that question.

President: Is it your estimate that the enemy will or will not honor those understandings?

Rusk: What is your estimate?

President: If they are not, I am not going to do it, I’ll tell you that. I’m not going to stop the bombing on November 1 and start it on November 2 because I would look like the biggest boob in the world.

Rusk: I think there is a 75-25 percent that they will.

[Page 300]

President: Well, that’s the kind of answer I would like to have from him. Maybe we ought to look this over again. We Don’t need to do this until we get with Paris. Tommy Thompson5 is going to a military hospital in Wiesbaden.

Rusk: Yeah, he’s there now.

President: What is it?

Rusk: It is a polyp, I don’t know where, in his body, but it’s a polyp that has to be removed. It looks like he might be out as much as a month.

President: Hmm. It’s a hell of a time.

Rusk: Well, on Lou Harris,6 I frankly Don’t think much of that channel.

President: I don’t think much of him either, but—

Rusk: And I think we ought to—one thing Lou Harris might tell that fellow is that the best way to talk about things like this is for Dobrynin to talk to me.

President: Well, but he’ll just go out and tell all of the reporters that we knocked him off. I’m for it but I have nothing to do with it. I have no trust in Lou Harris at all, but he calls up here every week.

Rusk: Is he in town now? Should I get in touch with him?

President: I would just tell the White House operators to get Lou Harris and say this message that Jim Jones gave me that you called in for the President, I have it and we have these delicate things going on there and I am not sure that—we are seeing Dobrynin regularly and my guess is that we’re getting everything that he gets and that if I were you I would just listen to the fellow and say nothing.

Rusk: All right.

President: And I would tell Lou Harris that too.

Rusk: Right.

President: Now you think about what we ought to say to Averell. I sure do want these instructions to Averell to be tight and hard and when the wire gets going, I want somebody to call them and tell them how we feel about them.

Rusk: All right.

President: I don’t want any of this—in other words, I am not in any quickie on this and I want to take my time and I would suggest to—what was the last day they suggested?

[Page 301]

Rusk: The 2nd of November.

President: Well, I would—

Rusk: Which is a Saturday.

President: It would be better—be wonderful—if it were Monday and wouldn’t show up until Tuesday, wouldn’t it? [Laughter] I am just afraid that our friends are going to think we’re playing that election.

Rusk: Yeah.

President: Well, I think they are. I think that’s why they’re doing it. I don’t think there is any question but what they are playing with this election. You and I can’t have our reputations ruined the rest of our lives trying to get Humphrey elected. I’m going to try to elect him and I’m going to make television and radio [appearances] and drive into Michigan today and I’m going to Maryland tomorrow and I’m going to New York on Sunday with the ethnic groups. My grandson paraded with a flag for him yesterday in uniform. My wife flew all the way to Texas and back. John Connally got out and just stuck his tongue in his cheek and just went all over the state. But be damned if I am going to throw a peace for him. And I want you to protect me on this very, very carefully. Now, our other friends say they’ve felt for 8 or 10 months that we should do this—over at Defense—that each day is a great delay. But, I don’t know whether Buzz, I guess he feels comfortable with this.

Rusk: Buzz is comfortable. I have no doubt about that. As a matter of fact, I think given the understanding on resuming the bombing if they do these two things, I think the other Chiefs are comfortable.

President: Yes. But how do we look if we have to resume it? That’s the point. Suppose I stopped it today and had to resume it 2 days from now.

Rusk: Well, I think it wouldn’t be 2 days. You couldn’t very well do that. You couldn’t get the kind of reaction unless there was a big attack on the cities and I think that would be understandable to everybody. But I think the Chiefs themselves are comfortable about this on that basis.

President: Well, we’re going to get that paragraph down that you all worked out yesterday awful strong. See that it’s read to them again and that they all understand it. And one thing I think that ought to be added is that they realize that he has these orders and they trigger it, not us—that when they—if they Don’t respect the DMZ and if they Don’t do these things, then they trigger this response. Somebody has got to tell them that so that they know we’re not kidding and they cannot fool with it or play with it because I think we have got to make this awfully clear to Nixon. You’re going to have to be thinking of what you say to [Page 302] Nixon or Wallace and the LeMays and the rest of them because I don’t want to get their approval, but I damn sure want to get it to where they can’t tear it down. So you work on that and we will meet later today.

Rusk: All right, fine.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 23, 1968, 9:20 a.m., Tape F6810.06, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
  2. See Document 106.
  3. In telegram 40931 from Saigon, October 23, Bunker reported he saw “no serious” difficulties with the announcement of a bombing cessation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968) The President paraphrased the text of this telegram in a telephone conversation with Russell; see Document 109.
  4. Harriman suggested that the two delegations would meet in secret the next day, an assertion regarded as a slip of the tongue. See The New York Times, October 24, 1968.
  5. Llewelyn E. Thompson, Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
  6. Pollster Louis Harris had been in informal contact with Soviet diplomats.