Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

208. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 10, 1966.

2375. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram:

A. Smell of victor

1. In the struggle for the independence of Viet-Nam, the following can be said:

2. We are not losing; we cannot lose in the normal sense of the word; never have things been going better; indeed, never have things been going so well. We are “on the track” with regard to almost every aspect of the war and we are winning in several.

3. All of this is a great tribute to the excellence of your policies and to the courage with which you have made your decisions. It is also a tribute to those who execute the policies, notably our magnificent military men.

4. But all of this is still not called “victory.” Indeed, however much they disagree about many things, everyone—in Washington and Hanoi and in Saigon—seems to agree that what we have now is not “victory.”

5. In truth we do not need to define “victory” and then go ahead and achieve it 100 percent. If it becomes generally believed that we are sure to win (just as it is now generally believed that we cannot lose) all else will be a mopping up. If there is the “smell of victory,” we will be coasting.

6. There are a number of things which would psychologically mean “victory” to US, to Hanoi, to Saigon and to the world, as follows:

A) First on the list would be some really smashing results as regards the “criminal” war: terrorism, subversion, village guerrilla. Figures indicate a diminution in assassinations of local officials, but we have as yet no good figures on the trend as regards civilian casualties in general.

B) Important defections as described in Stateʼs 21944² could mean a great deal.

C) A successful advance towards constitutional democracy could bring a feeling of success.

D) Really spectacular numbers of people coming into the Chieu Hoi camps would look like the end of the war.

E) Of great significance psychologically would be a situation in which one could start at Camau and drive securely all the way to Quang Tri, since this would mean that the 50 percent of the population which is in Saigon and the Delta and the 35 percent of the population in the coastal strip from Hue to Qui Nhon had been effectively pacified. To be able to ride the whole length of the railroad would also mean much. (Several months ago I sent you a population map³ which illustrates this.)

F) Other things which would have great meaning would be to be able to drive securely to Dalat or to Vung Tau.

7. Clearly the type of “battle victories” which we have been winning, and the impressive 10 to 1 casualties we are inflicting, do not look like victory to many Vietnamese as much as does the phenomenon of open roads. Driving the Viet Cong out of a certain place on the map seems to mean little in and of itself. In that sense this looks more like naval war in which one particular point in the ocean is much like another. The solid thing is the people and 85 percent of the people live in the area through which a traveller driving from Camau to Quang Tri would pass.

8. But none of these things are just around the corner.

9. Let us, therefore, by all means rejoice in the good news: that a wildcat, soul-destroying inflation seems unlikely; that a successful Communist takeover of the government of Viet-Nam seems now improbable; and that we have the beginnings of a policy on the main “unfinished business”—counter-terrorism, being mindful that unless definitively crushed, terrorism will always remain as Communist ace-in-the-hole and the ground for hope by Hanoi that it can at any time “go to Phase 1” and start the whole struggle up again. Finally, let us be thankful that our troops are so magnificent.

10. But our troops will be the first to speak of their respect for the hard-fighting Viet Cong—and General Westmoreland says North Viet-Nam army strength in South Viet-Nam has increased from 15,580 on January 1 to 47,100 as of July 31—the equivalent in battalion terms of from 31 to 81. Also 4 divisional and 10 regimental headquarters have been introduced since January 1. Average infiltration rate is 4,400 men per month. No evidence of serious food or ammunition shortage among major units is observable despite acknowledged effect of our air strikes. 60 percent of enemy forces, it is estimated, have yet to be committed to combat.

11. If the above is true statement of the situation, it is obvious that we have quite a stretch of time ahead of us.

12. The question, therefore, arises: How much time? And the corollary questions are: Can we shorten the time? Should we shorten the time: and, if so, how?

13. In trying to answer these questions, the first point is that time is not necessarily on the side of the U.S. or the Vietnamese.

14. Is not a relatively big, fast war easier for the U.S. to sustain than a relatively moderate slow war?

15. As far as the Vietnamese are concerned, they have demonstrated the patience for which Asians are famous and maybe they can keep on going as they have been. But their leadership is thin, both militarily and politically. This is partly due to the numbing effect of colonialism, with all its deliberate and rather diabolical discouragement of a national spirit, and with all of its educational effort aimed to make people Frenchmen rather than Vietnamese. The war has also played its part. Hope for the future of country is to be found among young people in Viet-Nam. But they will not be ready for some time.

16. Maybe the Vietnamese can last indefinitely—although it would be dangerous to assume it. But certainly they would be helped by a quick end to the war, assuming always that a satisfactory outcome was achieved. At present U.S. military forces must help the Vietnamese actively in order to get the Vietnamese pacification effort moving—let alone the war against the big units. We have high hopes that eventually they can undertake it all themselves and our soldiers have already expressed appreciation for the newly created Vietnamese political action teams and have recognized that they render the kind of service no American can render. Nonetheless our help is at present indispensable in the field of criminal/terrorist war as it is on the purely military side.

17. Therefore, it seems that, for both Vietnamese and American reasons, time is not necessarily on our side and that a quick victory would be of immense value to both.

18. These thoughts, which are not, of course, original with me, merge from many talks and much reflection. They reminded me of a statement which General Eisenhower once made to me, as follows:

19. If you desire to conquer one ably led and well organized battalion solidly entrenched and favorably located, and you try to do it with two battalions, you may succeed, but it will take you a long time and you will have many casualties. If, on the other hand, you use a division, you will do it quickly and the losses will be very slight.

20. In a war like this, in spite of everything, there is something tremendously effective about sheer mass. On the fifth floor of this building, I can see the port of Saigon, thick with shipping and in the green flat fields through which the Saigon River winds, I see more ships constantly making the sixty mile trip to and from the open sea. When I flew over Vung Tau last week, I counted eighteen ships anchored there. There are undoubtedly more in the Philippines and elsewhere. This is American mass, which none can produce as we can.

21. While I do not believe we can bring anything more into the city of Saigon (in fact, I think the American presence in this city must be reduced), I submit that if ports, piers and warehouses throughout Viet-Nam are ready and the military leaders can manage, and it can be done without political damage—three big “ifs”—there is a strong case for “more” coming in “quicker.”

22. Such are the agonizing questions of history, since we never know what would have happened had the course which was not followed been followed. But common sense suggests that the more we bring in and the quicker we do it, the sooner there will be the “smell of victory,” the sooner will the war be over and the fewer will be the casualties. Is this worth what it will cost in further dislocating the lives of Americans? Could they be made to understand that something is being asked of them now so as to avoid much great sufferings later?

B. Pacification

23. At Mission Council meeting on last Monday,⁴MACV presented their proposal for a revised role for the Army of Viet-Nam (ARVN) as regards pacification, as follows:

A. The war in South Viet-Nam is a political struggle with violent military and terroristic (criminal) overtones. We must thus succeed in both the conventional military and unconventional terroristic areas. If we are not equally successful in both, Hanoi will find some way to slide back to so-called “Phase 1” activities, consisting primarily of clandestine, guerrilla-type actions. (And Westmoreland recognizes that one effective guerrilla is worth two main force Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army soldiers.)

B. In the past, says MACV, ARVN has been so hard-pressed by Viet Cong main force and North Vietnamese Army units that it has had no choice but to concentrate on major offensive and defensive operations against these forces, leaving regional and popular forces with primary responsibility for providing local security in hamlets and villages. The latter have not been adequate to this mission. Now the buildup in U.S. and free world military forces makes it feasible to release a major part of ARVN from its former primary task of search and destroy operations and direct its main attention to pacification.

C. Thus, behind the security screen provided by U.S. tactical units (plus some elite Vietnamese Army units), who will take care of the enemyʼs regular, hard-core forces, the main task of the Vietnamese Army, along with regional and popular forces, political action teams, police and police field forces will be to support district and village chiefs in establishing and maintaining law and order in villages and hamlets.

D. Greater stress will be placed on ARVN small units operating at night, on continuity of operations and on more prompt and thorough exploitation of local intelligence.

E. For ARVN to be successful in these activities, there must be a new attitude among ARVN personnel towards the farmers, and ARVN commanders engaged in pacification will be evaluated to a large extent on their success in effecting this change. (Comment: Lansdale points out that the turning point in the Philippinesʼ campaign against the Huks came when the Filipino soldier began treating the peasant as his brother. End comment.)

F. No major changes in ARVNʼs organization in order to handle pacification is now envisaged. At least 50 percent of ARVNʼs strength in the I, II and III Corps areas will be diverted to this mission; in IV Corps, where U.S. forces will be much more limited in number, about 25 percent of the ARVN tactical units will be focused on pacification. In many instances, depending on the local situation, ARVN pacification forces will be placed under the direct control of the province chief.

24. General Westmoreland and his staff are working closely with the ARVN high command to develop a campaign plan for 1967 which will reflect and carry out this scheme.

25. This new concept of ARVN support of pacification operations will mean that U.S. tactical forces will be carrying the main burden of search and destroy operations against Viet Cong main force and North Vietnamese Army units, while ARVN will be concentrating on pacification. This will probably mean that U.S. military casualties will constitute a higher proportion of total friendly military casualties, although some elite ARVN units will participate with U.S. units in operations against main force units so that there will always be a Vietnamese presence.

26. But it will be important when announcing casualties in the future that the Vietnamese civilian casualties inflicted by the Viet Cong be announced concurrently with the Vietnamese and American military casualties. The Communists make no distinction between military and civilians and it seems ritualistic for us to adopt the World War II style of always announcing military casualties separately. It is disadvantageous to our best interests and, at the same time, it is not an honest reflection of the true situation. As I have said, we are working to set up a reporting system throughout the country on Vietnamese civilian casualties.

27. If, in the future, there should be criticism because U.S. military casualties are a higher proportion of total friendly military casualties than they have been, the answer is that the purpose of our military sacrifices and military successes is to create the opportunity to do the pacification job without which the war cannot be successfully completed. If we do not definitively end terrorism, this whole tragic business can start all over again. In pacification the overwhelming bulk of the casualties are borne by Vietnamese.

C. Casualties, military and civilian

28. For the first time in thirteen weeks the total of Viet Cong-North Vietnamese Army dead dropped below one thousand—to 649 for the week. Overall friendly military losses for the week as follows

• 189 killed in action (including 59 U.S.)
• 605 wounded in action (including 229 U.S.)
• 60 missing in action (including 6 U.S.)

29. The July figures for local officials killed or kidnapped by the Viet Cong are still incomplete. So far all of the four corps have reported in except for II Corps. The total to date is 33. Depending upon what II Corps reports, this could represent the lowest figure in the last eighteen months.

30. Totals for GVN officials killed or kidnapped for the first seven months of 1966, as compared with the same month for 1965, are as follows:

	1965	1966
January	258	76
February	68	91
March	119	59
April	120	52
May	112	78
June	214	64
July	73	33 Plus

31. As you see, generally speaking, the figures are lower in 1966 than they were in 1965. This may be because Viet Cong guerrillas were busy with military operations or that friendly defense against terrorism has been improving or a combination of both. It is hard to tell. Also, there is no reason to believe that the 1966 figures cannot be increased whenever the Viet Cong decide they want to do it. One thing is clear: this is a time tested traditional Viet Cong weapon. It is this—and not popularity—which brought them into existence at a time when there were no constabulary forces to cope with terrorism and it is their way to get started again if everything else they attempt has failed—as it looks as though it might.

32. I apologize because my civilian casualty figures are by the month and do not match up with the military casualty figures, which are by the week. I also apologize because we still have not got overall civilian casualty figures which are an integral part of the casualty picture. As soon as we have adequate figures for civilian casualties on a monthly basis, I will examine the possibility of providing them week by week, as I do the military figures.

D. Elections

33. The Central Election Review Council has recently met in Saigon to examine the cases of candidates who had either been disqualified on the basis of provincial screening or had been challenged by their opponents. Of the forty-two cases reviewed, twenty-three were reinstated. This review process was carried on beneath the gaze of the local press and the interested parties and even those who were adversely affected by the councilʼs decision have admitted that the hearing was fair and free of pressure from the central government.

34. Election lists have now been posted in all cities, provincial capitals, district towns, and villages giving the names of qualified voters in each area. Purpose of the posting was to permit citizens to see if their names were inscribed. Anyone finding his name omitted could petition for its inclusion. I have no country-wide results as yet concerning how many people checked the lists, found their names omitted and complained. However, as a spot check, over 5,000 people had already registered in Saigon last week after finding their names not included in the lists. Many of these were undoubtedly refugees who had moved to the city within the last year. This statistic provides some measure of popular interest in these elections.

35. The campaign itself will not begin until August 26. Until then candidates are proscribed from engaging in campaign activities so that everyone will have an equal chance during the fortnight the campaign officially runs. Nevertheless, some of the more sophisticated candidates are already engaged in the campaign here in Saigon through their friends, the columns of the daily newspapers, and in other ways.

36. I am cautioning Americans here and Vietnamese against making any very optimistic claims about the September 11 elections. I have told them to say in response to questions that, to hold elections in war time is very ambitious, particularly for a country with no experience with democracy; that even the British never had elections in World War II; that the Viet Cong are going all out to intimidate;⁵ and that the GVN will do very well if between 35 percent and 40 percent of the qualified voters vote.

37. As you know, I confidentially think it is going to be quite good. But if we make extravagant claims now, we will get no credit, whereas, if the public expects 35 percent and gets 70 percent, it will look like a miracle. I think this could be most important.

38. I am looking around for things to do which will put the people in a good humor as far as the government is concerned during the first ten days of September. The general supply office is helping: through the sale of rice from the backs of trucks in low income areas, the transportation and sale of pork, and the importation of motorbikes. Frozen pork carcasses will be arriving from Europe by September 1 and will be released on the market in Saigon at the rate of 50 tons a day, which is about 30 percent of the daily Saigon requirement.

E. Psychological

39. For the first time awareness of the elections—in urban areas—has become more general than complaints about prices, according to the JUSPAO weekly “evaluation of attitudes.” They get reports throughout most of the country that “rising costs seem to have leveled and have stopped rising, and there is relief that inflation has apparently halted.”

40. JUSPAO also reports that the governmentʼs publicity efforts are resulting in more people knowing about the elections, and that elections are being talked about, although sometimes cynically. The Viet Cong are increasing their effort to disrupt the elections, particularly in IV Corps, and elements of Buddhism are opposing or boycotting.

41. There is more ground fire against planes dropping leaflets indicating increasing concern by Viet Cong commanders over the psychological effects.

42. Other notes are: the Mayor of Danang is making an excellent impression on the public and is meeting with many groups to explain the governmentʼs program, and to invite them to make known their complaints. In IV Corps the flow of farmers from outlying villages into more secure hamlets is increasing due to heavier Viet Cong taxation and artillery barrages. A Viet Cong propaganda officer reported stubborn resistance by peasants to the Viet Cong draft, saying that the peasants cried out: “If you want a revolution, fine, but donʼt make us and our sons fight it for you.” Also morale went up in Kien Toung where a military operation uncovered another sizable cache of foodstuff and equipment.

43. Evidence was uncovered in Chuong Thien that a large Viet Cong campaign was in the making to obstruct the voters from reaching the polls and to confiscate their identification cards which are the equivalent of registration in the U.S.

F. Economic

44. The economic picture has brightened—a tribute to you and your associates for your long, hard efforts and to the GVN for following our advice. It is all set forth in Saigon 3055⁶ which also includes news on Chieu Hoi and the port and which I will not repeat.

45. Some months ago, Prime Minister Ky asked me for help in setting up a GVN PX/commissary system for Vietnamese military and civil servants—people with fixed incomes whose purchasing power has diminished as prices rose. As a result of our reaction to this request USAID and MACV have been working actively with the GVN general supply office under the Ministry of National Economy to develop a series of PX/commissary outlets for civil service and military use. The layout of the first proposed outlet in Saigon for the sale of vegetables, meats and staple items has been forwarded to the U.S. military subsistence center in Chicago for technical review and the site for this first service center in downtown Saigon has been selected. Certain refrigeration items have been identified in U.S. excess property lists and are being held in place for use in this center. In addition, a U.S. military specialist in commissary and PX systems is being assigned to assist the GVN run their system.

G. Visitors

46. Chester Bowles is here and is favorably impressed with our entire operation. He attended a Mission Council meeting and remarked on General Westmorelandʼs remarkable sensitivity to political factors and his breadth of view. Bowles believes this struggle is of both historical and world-wide importance and is the kind of thing that happens once in 200 years. If, he says, we succeed (and he is confident that we will) it will be the beginning of the end for world Communism and will be a date in Communist history comparable to 1917 when Communist government was born in Russia. He was much impressed by the way American soldiers understand and carry out in practice the truth that, in this war, unlike World War II, we must win the war and build the peace at the same time. He has seen them doing it. He believes also that victory here will change America, in that so many young Americans have seen at first hand the importance of economic and social development going hand in hand with security against violence.

47. Another visitor was Gough Whitlam, deputy leader of the opposition in the Australian Parliament. I had a fine visit with him. I sense that he does not think his party will elect the Prime Minister at their forthcoming elections. I also sense that he is favorably impressed with the effort here, and I would be surprised indeed to hear him attack what Americans and Australians are doing in Viet-Nam.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:34 a.m. and passed to the White House. In telegram 27780, August 13, Komer told Lodge that the President was “greatly heartened” by his latest weekly report, particularly by the plans to “shift much of ARVN into a stepped up pacification campaign.” In addition, the President hoped that the “civil side effort in the countryside” could be stepped up “in similar fashion” and also that, given the importance of a good election turnout, Lodge would “quietly keep pushing the GVN to get out the vote.” (Ibid.)
2. Document 202.
3. Not further identified.
4. August 8.
5. In its Field Information Report, [document number not declassified], August 8, the CIA Station in Saigon reported that “from all evidence the Viet Cong/VC/ intend to make an all-out effort to disrupt the government of Vietnam/GVN/ elections.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 85–00392R, 137–9–23, Government Activities in SVN, 1 Aug 66 thru 31 Dec 66)
6. Dated August 9, not found.