Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, August 4, 1966, 6:59 p.m.

21944. For Ambassador Lodge from the Secretary. Saigon 1781 and 1927.² Several of recent reports from Saigon have raised intense interest here at high levels in possibility of generating GVN initiatives to foment divisions among VC/NLF, stimulate increasing scale of defection and ultimately pave way to GVN-VC/NLF talks to work out negotiated solution to Viet-Nam conflict on favorable terms. We have in mind both a covert course of action for the GVN, which is discussed in this message,³ and a longer range overt GVN program which will be discussed in Septel.⁴

2. We have made specific note of Kissinger conversation with Tran Van Tuyen, and have related it to the reports of poor morale and dissension in VC ranks (e.g. recent Rand/Goure Report)⁵ as well as hints at more significant divisions among VC/NLF leaders and eventual possibility splitting off certain dissatisfied, anti-NVN elements not wholly under communist discipline. Our conclusion is that time may now be favorable for aggressive GVN action on covert side to exploit its contacts with VC/NLF elements and encourage expanded contacts in order to smoke out all evidences of divisions in VC ranks and prospects for important VC defections. As opposed to earlier periods, we judge that GVN today could take such actions from position of relative strength and therefore avoid spreading suspicion and consternation among its own people about possible intentions of making a deal with VC.

3. You will know better than we how GVN might proceed but we have in mind generally accepted reports that through family and village connections, ties of northerners who have gone south, etc. there are many quiet and informal avenues to VC/NLF and we also understand many GVN officials and military commanders know in greater or lesser degree their VC “opposite numbers”. It may therefore come down to a matter of confidential GVN instructions to appropriate officials and military to lift present inhibitions on contacts and provide them with effective line to be taken in any contacts which ensue.

4. We would like you to consider how we might best get GVN into motion on this matter and if general line set out above makes sense you are authorized to proceed without further exchanges with us. If you see problems in what we are suggesting, please let us know and give us your suggestion as to how to move this matter forward.⁶

5. You may also want to consider in this connection whether there is any way our own intelligence efforts might be expanded to develop greater body of information on VC/NLF especially their leaders, and potential weaknesses within its ranks (see Deptel 1130, Oct. 26, 1965 and Embtel 1467, Oct. 28, 1965⁷ for our previous exchange on this subject).

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Miller and Unger; cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, Harriman, Thompson, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Rusk.
2. In telegram 1781 from Saigon, July 24, the Embassy reported that, in a conversation with Kissinger on July 23, Bui Diem seemed prepared to accept the NLF “into the body politic of the South if (1) they would turn in their arms, and (2) agreed to participate on same basis as other Vietnamese political elements.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 1927 from Saigon, July 26, the Embassy reported that Tran Van Tuyen, an influential VNQDD politician, had taken the same position in a conversation with Kissinger, indicating that it would be appropriate and easy for the Vietnamese to establish contact with both the NLF and Hanoi, whose leaders were known personally to him and many of his countrymen. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III)
3. After the Presidentʼs lunch meeting on August 2, Rostow telephoned the following instruction to Read: “Cable to Lodge which asks him to encourage SVN to begin to see what contacts can make covertly with VC. Maximize covert operations. Suggest Ky, instead of sounding out about going to North, ought to launch peace campaign based on Honolulu where he said: come on over.” (Notes re Lunch Meeting by Rostow, August 2; Johnson Library, National Security Files, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President)
4. Document 203.
5. See Document 198.
6. Lodge replied in telegram 2814, August 5, and in telegram 2818, Document 204. In telegram 2814, he indicated that he had spoken to Ky about covert exploitation of contacts with the NLF leadership and that Ky had liked the idea. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
7. Neither printed. (Ibid. and ibid., POL 15 VIET S, respectively)