Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

207. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 9, 1966, 1936Z.

714. For Secretary of State, Goldberg, Harriman, Bundy and Sisco.

1. Met with ICRC President Gonard and Executive Director Gallopin today and received oral report on meeting of ICRC delegates August 8 at which USGʼs note verbale² reportedly received careful study and consideration.

2. Referring to moderation displayed by Hanoi in postponing trials of American POWs, Gonard said ICRC had hoped that USG, the major power in the conflict, would have offered a more positive gesture to enhance ICRC efforts to bring Hanoi to conference table. Gonard then recalled ICRC note verbale in which they inquired as to willingness of USG to suspend or restrict military operations.

3. The ICRC feels, Gonard said, that USG offer to engage in discussions on an abatement of the Viet Nam conflict and willingness to accept reduction of hostilities on reciprocal basis, ties ICRC hands vis-à-vis Hanoi. As consequence, Gonard believes any approach by ICRC to Hanoi “would not appear to offer much hope for success.”

4. Gonard observed that humanitarian law, on which ICRC proposed efforts were to be based, “does not know the notion of reciprocity.” The purpose of this law, he said, is to alleviate the suffering of all victims of conflict regardless of relative positions of contending parties.

5. Referring to Ambassador Goldbergʼs comments and observations, Gonard said that ICRC appreciated that USG experiences during the Korean conflict and in Viet Nam during 1965 bombing pause account for the USG attitude now; however, he reiterated that our request for reciprocity would jeopardize ICRC chances for success in Hanoi. At this juncture I recalled to Gonard our complete lack of success in getting any favorable response from Hanoi during last suspension of bombing and informed him that during first four weeks of last suspension the Viet Cong committed more than 2500 terrorist acts against the South Viet Namese people, i.e., school teachers, doctors, nurses, farmers, health workers, religious leaders and all categories of local civic officials. I said that I personally thought the reaction in the U.S., and in South Viet Nam, would be bitter if there were yet another pause during which Hanoi continued to carry on aggression and committed atrocities. Gonard said as soldier he appreciated problem for our forces if they were hit by enemy during a pause.

6. Referring to the Sainteny report³ and other reports which suggest that Hanoi may be adopting a more conciliatory attitude, Gonard said ICRC does not agree with these views. Gonard observed that Hanoi is decentralizing its industry and that there is large-scale evacuation of civil populations from urban areas. Gonard stated further that he believes decentralization of industry reflects a far-reaching decision which suggests that Hanoi may be preparing for a long struggle.

7. Gonard said it was neither his wish nor intention to dictate to the USG but rather he wanted to make USG realize difficult position of ICRC in this matter. Gonard said that because USG so strong he thought it could afford make a more positive gesture. In this vein be observed that the greater power can make gesture at lesser risk. The USG must evaluate, Gonard said, whether risk of another pause would be worth taking on chance that it would lead to negotiations. He suggested pause of 10 to 15 days may be sufficient to test Hanoi.

8. While again reiterating ICRC willingness take soundings Hanoi, Gonard said USGʼs request for reciprocity makes it difficult for ICRC to operate on basis its proposal. He then expressed hope that USG would reexamine its position with respect reciprocity condition. He also alluded to possibility of abandoning broader approach and reverting to President Johnsonʼs proposal expressed at July 20 press conference⁴ indicating that USG would be ready whenever the Hanoi government is ready to sit down at a conference table under the sponsorship of the ICRC to discuss ways in which the Geneva Conventions of 1949 can be given fuller and more complete application in Viet Nam.

9. I assured Gonard that ICRC views would be communicated to Washington immediately and that I would be in contact with him again when reply available. Gonard will be in Geneva balance current week but will be absent most of next week.

10. Comment: Despite strong representations by Ambassador Goldberg and myself re U.S. willingness to deescalate on reciprocal basis, clear that ICRC feels U.S. should make first gesture, even at risk that another bombing pause would not lead to negotiations.⁵ As have previously reported Gonard on recent trip to several Eastern European countries got impression that new pause might lead Hanoi to table. However today he spoke of signs indicating Hanoi preparing for long struggle. ICRC caution understandably may be due to fear failure of mission to Hanoi “unless given a strong hand,” and I suspect even with it, they would recognize chances for success limited.

Tubby

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House.
2. See Document 199.
3. See Document 182.
4. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, p. 744.
5. Rusk replied in telegram 26108 to Geneva, August 11, that the United States stood by its position on reciprocity and could not accept a bombing pause, “which would, once more, permit the other side to move substantial additional forces into South Viet-Nam with impunity.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)