Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

209. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger)¹

Washington, August 11, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Possible Sequence of Actions Toward a Settlement in South Viet-Nam

I find the paper of August tenth on the possible sequence of actions toward a settlement in South Viet-Nam² excellent and most useful. I would like to suggest that I doubt that Hanoi will ever agree to negotiations until the Viet Cong are in favor of a settlement. If the VC should decide they have had enough, it seems to me that there might be great advantage in negotiating with them through the GVN rather than with Hanoi if this can be arranged.

I do not believe that we can get away with trading a cessation of bombing against a cessation of infiltration, and believe it would be unwise to put such a position forward even as an initial bargaining position because of the damage we would suffer in a retreat from such a position. I believe that we would have to agree to trade a cessation of reinforcements for a cessation of infiltration and agree that so long as the provisions of such an agreement were observed we would not bomb North Viet-Nam. I do not believe that this is as unfavorable a bargain as it might seem at first glance. In the first place, we could prepare for such an agreement by stepping up the numbers of our troops in South Viet-Nam and there is, in any event, a question as to what the optimum number should be. Casualty ratios are running so much in our favor that even allowing for the fact that a high proportion are Viet Cong and not North Viet-Namese, a continuation of hostilities in the South might well be in our favor without significant reinforcements from either side.

More important, such an agreement would presumably only come about if we were on the verge of serious negotiation, if not a real settlement. In these circumstances, I should think we would, for a considerable period of time, not want to send reinforcements even to replace casualties. If negotiations broke down, or if the agreement should be significantly violated by the other side, we could always call the whole deal off. I should think that in the event of such an agreement, large numbers of VC would rally to GVN in the light of the amnesty that presumably would be declared. This alone should mean that we would have no need for reinforcements. I quite agree that we would have to be free to bring in materiel and supplies.

I must say I doubt very much that the North Viet-Namese will ever admit that they have sent in regular units and this is why I believe that our negotiations should be with the NLF or VC. The NLF would be representing Hanoi rather than the other way around, and if agreement were reached, I should think the withdrawal of the North Viet-Namese regular units would follow automatically.

There are several positions in the paper which I do not believe could be sustained unless we have a greater victory than now seems likely. Among these are those on page 12. The first suggestion is that North Viet-Namese elements would have to be withdrawn before our withdrawal in stages. The second is that those southerners who went north for training and were reintroduced would also have to be withdrawn to the north.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret. Copies were sent to Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, McNaughton, and Taylor.
2. Drafted by William Bundy, the 28-page paper was sent by Unger for comment to Harriman, Thompson, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, McNaughton, and Taylor on August 10. (Ibid.) In an August 13 memorandum to Unger, Taylor took issue with a number of points, calling the exchange of a cessation of bombing for a cessation of infiltration “bad business.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 72, B/Negotiations and Related Matters) Bundy sent Lodge a copy of his paper, together with Thompsonʼs and Taylorʼs comments, under cover of a letter, August 19, in which he noted that his paper concluded “that we should explore exactly the same kind of ‘three track’ approach” that had been under discussion for a while but that its “discussion of other issues is somewhat more full and blunt than in any other paper we have ever produced on this subject.” (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)