Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

87. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, July 26, 1965, 12:30-3:15 p.m.

PRESENT

• President
• Vice President
• McNamara
• Rusk
• Goldberg
• Bundy
• Lodge
• Gen. Wheeler
• Ball
• Valenti
• Busby
• Moyers

Clifford, Helms, Raborn joined the group 30 minutes later

President: Please, Bob, give us your findings and recommendations on SAM sites.

Wheeler: SAM site that shot down the F4C is probably a mobile site, #6.²

(President and McNamara look at map showing where plane was shot down)

President: Any indication that there are more than five sites?

Wheeler: Yes, on Friday night we determined there are two more, #6 and #7. Site #4 is possibility, but 6 and 7 are better possibilities—more probably a mobile site.

(President asked technical questions about sites and their shoot down capabilities)

Wheeler: Chiefs recommendation:

We don’t know if any of these sites have equipment. We should attack all sites. At the minimum, we should take out 4, 6, 7.

McNamara: Good, but I would take out only 6 and 7.

President: Where does your intelligence tell you Russians are operating?

Wheeler: In 6 and 7.

President: Are you sure they are Russians?

Wheeler: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]—that is the weight of our evidence.

Rusk: I would not hit one of the sites close in to Hanoi. Only reason to hit 6 and 7 is to give warning to NVN. Very important if we strike that nothing be said about Russians being there. Political effect of hitting 6 and 7 is a warning to not move sites farther out from Hanoi.

Not at all sure we’ll hit anything—they may have moved them out from there.

Intensify reconnaissance to see if we can pick up anything.

President: Are we photoing regularly?

McNamara: Yes, but we are careful over Hanoi. We are using drones more.

President: What are you getting out of this?

McNamara: No reports of radar activity at these sites.

Wheeler: This is the first time we have heard their radar.

President: How much personnel?

Wheeler: About 1/2.

President: How provocative will this be?

Wheeler: When they sent up the missiles, they expected something.

President: What would be our reaction to the Russians bombing our sites?

Rusk: Various indications that if Russians and US collide, it would be dangerous. Killing the first Russians—[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

(Here President admonished the group NOT to speak to anyone about this. “This is a war—and the stakes are high”.)

President: You think, Dean, we should take out the sites even though the Russians are there?

Rusk: I think it would be a warning.

President: (I want the Secretary of State to draw up a document saying that if anyone wants to write article for Life he cannot participate.)

Ball: This is a very hard decision. But our intelligence is not very hard at this time.

There is no way to keep from identifying the casualties as Russians.

Before we make this decision I’d like to know if we take out 6 and 7 there is something there to take out.

Can we make some efforts to find out what is there. We don’t have to take them the next day. If they are building an outer perimeter, then we have to take them out.

Wheeler: We have already identified this site. Discussed low level rekky—staff advised against it because they will get out after rekky.

President: The assumption is in your favor, but we don’t know exactly where the missiles came from.

McNamara: I don’t see the logic to Ball’s argument—If we strike and they are not there.

President: Get bad story if we roam around and find nothing

Bundy: We haven’t addressed the question of turning [possible omission in the source text]. See advantage of not crossing this bridge until after making Presidential Statement.

President: Let’s not assume I am to make a speech. No one has decided that.

Bundy: Rapidity of action in Pleiku gave Russians a talking point. Is our position affecting these sites better later than now—then take them out on our way to munitions plant. Can see advantage if we punish SAM sites quickly. Also reports are saying we shouldn’t have let them go this long.

Don’t see the merit of waiting. The target is on authorized list—current Rolling Thunder list.

McNamara: Record shows there is military purpose for going over these targets now.

Ball: If we move promptly it will be a decision to step up war. In present heated tension of this decision making, this step will be viewed as a decision break-through—this will be a world impression.

Am sympathetic with view of Bundy—of taking out SAM site with purpose of taking out military target—SAM only incidental.

Also, if we wait we allow Goldberg to present his credentials.³ We ought to disassociate the SAMs from the present heat.

Rusk: Harold Wilson pleads we let him know in advance if we take 6 and 7. He needs to keep his people in line. (Bundy shares this view.)⁴

President: What do you think about this, Cabot?

Lodge: 6 and 7 are 40 mi. away—the rest are 10 mi away.

Would go ahead on the two that are 40 mi. away. But don’t think it is of pressing urgency.

Wheeler: If they announce that there are Russians in the site, it would make your decision more anxious.

President: If we leave 6 and 7 for awhile, what would it do to Rolling Thunder?

Wheeler: Would cut targets in half. Will cut down on armed rekky.

Ball: It’s going to make it difficult for us domestically if we don’t take out these SAMs right now.

We ought not let domestic politics guide us in making a small war larger.

McNamara: It hasn’t been necessary to take out SAM in order to get to a military target.

President: Helms, do you have any intelligence on this? Are we sure they came from 6 and 7? Wasn’t there a possibility it could have come from 4?

Wheeler: Our pilots’ intelligence—and depending on navigation—there is possibility it came from 4 or mobile site.

President: How liberally is it mobile?

Wheeler: According to Russian terminology this is semi-mobile site.

Rusk: We have knocked a key bridge connecting China with NVN. We could expect the Russians to set up sites there.

President: One of the great dangers is conveying wrong message by letting enemy miscalculate our motives. What will be reaction of enemy if he can knock down US planes and we do nothing about it? The sites are put there to destroy us. Are we going to sit and sit and let them knock down our planes? Are we going to let them move first?

Bundy: Let’s see if the sites impede Rolling Thunder.

(Wheeler went over map to point out targets)

Goldberg: It is difficult for the public to distinguish between 6 and 7 and the rest. What will be Russians reaction to this? This is what they have given to NVN. Where will they go for future?

May be a specific reaction to pinpointing the target. Do we know enough out of this episode—is it worthwhile to know how these sites are to be utilized? Is this their policy—or is it a gesture? Is it definitely their policy or is it a trigger happy officer?

Public reaction would be—this is Hanoi area.

Bundy: I don’t think we are facing a confrontation with the Russians that Amb. Goldberg suggests. I am attracted by the notion of waiting until we have to go. Real risk if we seem to be diverted by this episode—too much of our plans are operationally known by our military.

President: Why do we ferret out ammo dumps, etc. and lose men—and fail to take out something that is more dangerous like SAM site. How do you justify this. You bring bombing to a standstill. If you are to continue bombing these targets, how can we not take out SAMs.

Rusk: You cannot order pilots to bomb without helping them get back. We don’t know enough about sites.

President: Then we ought to cancel targets—we can’t send pilots over the missile sites.

V. Pres: We ought to face up to Russian involvement. What impact this will have on Russian relations, I don’t know. All the press knows the Russians are in the site business.

Wheeler says if we delay it will aggravate situation. They have to be taken out. If I were forced to decide, then if targets are to be kept, take out sites. If targets can be altered, 2 or 3 days later is not a matter of significance.

We can’t leave ourselves without response. But I think we can allow ourselves a little time.

McNamara: We simply have to change targets—we can’t keep target schedules with sites in. We are not going to learn anything more in the next 2 or 3 days.

Raborn: Information on these sites was obtained on July 20. First read-out did not read out sites. Finally disclosed on Saturday morning, July 24. Will take coordinated intelligence effort to sort out where these sites are. This effort is underway—using all kinds of intelligence information to come up with answer.

Until the effort is completed, I would recommend not going in. We know 6 and 7 are manned.

McNamara: If striking 6 and 7 properly, at low altitude, we will be protected from 8, 9, 10.

There are two problems: Should we take out 6 and 7 now—or wait.

My decision on taking out 6 and 7 depends on taking out Rolling Thunder targets—as well as telling the Russians we won’t allow them to conclude—we won’t do anything.

We don’t want to send planes to Rolling Thunder targets if they must be shot down.

Raborn: Study will be completed this afternoon. Suggest Thompson and CIA Russian expert tell us of Russian intentions.

President: Next question is US position at United Nations.

Do we want to make a proposal at UN at this time. Goldberg has shown me and Rusk a memo with his views.⁵ What instructions do we want to give him? My thinking would be if we agree on Westmoreland requests on men, equipment, etc.—playing all our decisions low key, and not telling the Russians we intend to break our policy on economy and nuclear production cutback.

Generally, want Goldberg to talk to every delegate including Secy. Gen. to tell them we are ready to talk unconditionally.

Goldberg: My view is that when you do anything forceful, must say our objective is peace. How best can assurance of peace be done.

1) Laying before Security Council a resolution echoing Balt.⁶ and confined to single topic—to endorse talks on VN with help of UN. People don’t understand sophisticated complexities of UN politics. They do understand their President asking for unconditional talks. Sometimes the public exhibition of an attitude can start us on the way. I would hope we would do the necessary exploration to get the votes—by consulting with our friends. Some dangers may turn out to be virtues—such as Viet Cong. I think there is great advantage in President’s saying simply we want to talk.

President: I said that in San Francisco.

Goldberg: Even though I don’t expect Russians to say in advance “Yes”, but it doesn’t mean they won’t come around to this view.

I think we need a new initiative—the effects of President’s Baltimore speech have worn off. What would be the worst that could happen to us in the Security Council? Are we so lacking in friends that we won’t be applauded? There must be equity in the final agreement.

If I thought the war could go on quietly—then I would acquiesce—but I don’t think the war can go on quietly. As we send in more troops—knock out SAMs—something must happen in UN and I want us to be the plaintiff, not the defendant.

Rusk: UN is an organization to which we have a treaty commitment. We have an obligation to use the UN as effectively as we know. But Hanoi and Peking are not parties to this organization.

Advantages: Help placate our critics.

Disadvantages: Can’t see how they would help. Maximum benefit is to reconvene conference.

Very negative if we asked for meeting and didn’t get it. International recognition of VC would undermine the Saigon government. We have to assume that a resolution that would meet our approval would draw Soviet veto. Might make it difficult for Soviets to push quietly for talks. Might draw amendments that would be inimical to us. If we didn’t get at least 7 votes, it would appear that the UN had repudiated us.

Recommend Goldberg talk with U Thant to sound out Soviets as to character and form of resolution and for us not to insist on resolution at this time.

Lodge: Am in disagreement with Goldberg on resolution but there are things he can do—Can do it by a speech—UN couldn’t possibly undertake our mission in Vietnam—it hasn’t the money nor the muscle.

We mustn’t overlook the effect on SVN, Russia and China. Everytime we talk about negotiations, you lower the value of the ARVN. You don’t impress China except when you’ve got blood in your eye.

President: I’m tired of words. I’ve been giving words for 20 months. I told the UN in San Francisco that I would back any effort by the UN to bring this to the conference table.

Lodge: We had to show the UN that what we are doing is entirely consistent with the UN charter.

Clifford: Goldberg makes a persuasive case. But I am unalterably opposed to a resolution in the UN. But we are in a paradox. On one hand, we are ready to meet commitments, but we are really ready to get out. We can almost guarantee that a resolution would fail. The Soviets must stand by the NVN. I see them using the resolution as a propaganda asset—using bombing and white-vs.-Asians. Talking at this time publicly will not accomplish anything. If it is underplayed, we have a chance to justify our views.

Lodge: How do you send young men there in great numbers without telling why?

Clifford: We have already explained why we are there. We cannot win the war in SVN. China and Russia don’t intend for us to win the war. They will match us in manpower. No matter how many men we send, they will match us.

The great danger is that additional troops are not [sic] a notice to the world that we intend to make it a land war.

We should get through the monsoon season and quietly see if we can work out an adjustment. I don’t believe we will suffer prestige if we can’t sustain.

(Moyers wanted to know if he can release names of those present—President against it because of press hounding the people for information)

President: (to Rusk) Try to determine what would go into Goldberg’s statement to the UN—desirability of writing letter signed by me to Secy. General—generally along lines of San Francisco speech—after talking to allies Goldberg can buttress his arguments for resolution.

Any objections to that?

(No one expressed dissent)

Meeting adjourned at 3:15 pm.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. An hour before the meeting, McGeorge Bundy sent the President an agenda that included: the SAM site, taking Vietnam to the United Nations, a general plan for Congressional consultation and a public announcement of the build-up, and further consultation with the South Vietnamese Government. In a covering memorandum, Bundy noted that an additional item on covert negotiations was not listed on the agenda. Only he, Rusk, Ball, and McNamara were aware of it, and all felt that no one else should be informed. Bundy suggested that the President might want to have a small follow-up meeting in his office on the matter. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII) No record of such a meeting has been found.
2. On July 24, a U.S. F-4 aircraft was shot down by a surface-to-air missile launched from a mobile missile site believed to be approximately 30 miles northwest of Hanoi, the first aircraft lost to the SAM missiles deployed by Soviet technicians. Air reconnaissance located two mobile SAM sites in the area of the attack, identified as mobile sites 6 and 7 in the series of SAM sites established near Hanoi. In telegram 265 from Saigon, July 25, Taylor recommended an air attack against the sites “to show Hanoi how seriously we view this incident and to prepare political opinion for our subsequent anti-missile campaign.” A copy of this telegram was sent to the President and there is an indication that he saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Cables) On July 26, however, Harriman advised against attacking the sites, since this would be seen abroad as an escalation and would prejudice efforts to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table. Harriman also felt that Soviet leaders would interpret the attacks as a direct challenge, requiring some sort of retaliation. (Telegram 164 from Belgrade; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. Arthur Goldberg presented his credentials as U.S. Representative to the United Nations on July 28.
4. On the evening of July 26, McGeorge Bundy sent a message through the British Embassy to Prime Minister Wilson informing him of the decision taken (see Document 90) concerning the SAM missile sites. (Telegram 462 to London, July 27; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
5. Document 82.
6. See footnote 2, Document 82.