Office of the Historian

214. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas1

Washington, December 3, 1965.

CAP 65810. 1. In two meetings today,2 Rusk and McNamara have made significant progress in clarifying their own thinking on Vietnam. So far they have concentrated mainly on the actual course of war and diplomacy, and have not yet got deeply into the critical questions of political management which Joe and Bill and I opened in our message to you last night.3 But I cannot disagree with their judgment that it is important to sort out the military and diplomatic priorities.

2. Today’s discussions confirm the judgment that we shall almost surely wish to proceed energetically on Westmoreland’s course in South Vietnam. Thus all of us believe that we should accept for planning purposes additional deployments averaging fifteen thousand a month over the next year. It does not follow that we should announce a large lump sum increase anytime soon. Indeed our preliminary judgment is that steady increase of pressure on the ground should be as undramatic as possible—and of course should have as many third country battalions as [Page 598] we can get (separate paper from McNaughton on this will be in tomorrow’s pouch).4

3. At the same time the two Secretaries do share increasing concern about possible Chinese involvement. There will be a special briefing tomorrow morning5 at which they will hear what Max Frankel has already been told. I continue to share Alex Johnson’s view that Chinese Communists will not fight for South Vietnam but only for what they regard as survival of North Vietnam.

4. The open question is the pause. The day’s discussions here have increased support for some form of pause. I will send a memo tomorrow developing pros and cons further,6 but the long and short of it is that we think the international advantages outweigh the international traps. We also think that firm and steady action in the south, together with public awareness of Chinese Communist danger, should keep most Americans in line with any decision you take on this matter.

5. We have agreed to make assignments for detailed planning documents in all relevant fields in a further meeting tomorrow morning,7 and it is our current intention to have all papers ready for discussion with you by the end of Monday,8 so that we could fly to you on Tuesday if you wish. The controlling item in urgency here is the pause, because it will require intensive diplomatic preparation in more than one capital if it is to have minimum danger and maximum benefit.

6. Meetings today have shown the Secretary of State at his best in the leadership of a complex discussion with a small group he knows well. At the direct request of the two Secretaries, Califano and Moyers have not been included in these meetings, but I have told the Secretaries that I think it important to keep them both fully informed of the course of discussion separately, and both Secretaries have agreed. Both Joe and Bill have a deep and penetrating understanding of your immediate interest, and together the three of us will try to keep in touch with all aspects of the matter from your point of view. But the Secretary of State feels that he has a direct instruction from you to operate this review and my judgment, in which Moyers concurs, is he should run it his way unless you have other instructions.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Cables. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The date-time-group on the source text is illegible. An earlier draft indicates that the telegram was sent on December 3. (Ibid.)↩
  2. According to Rusk’s Appointment Book, the Secretary met with McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and U. Alexis Johnson from 12:30 to approximately 3 p.m. Rusk also met with McNamara, Vance, Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy from 6:03 p.m. to 7:52 p.m. This telegram was apparently sent during the evening of December 3. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Document 213.↩
  4. Dated December 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (A))↩
  5. Hughes and Whiting of INR briefed Rusk, Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Thompson, McNamara, Vance, McNaughton, and McGeorge Bundy beginning at 9:35 a.m. on December 4 at the Department of State. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) No other record of the briefing has been found.↩
  6. Document 215.↩
  7. These assignments were probably made at the briefing by Hughes and Whiting described in footnote 5 above.↩
  8. December 6.↩