Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

213. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas¹

Washington, December 2, 1965, 8:34 p.m.

CAP 65799. We have been talking about Vietnam deployment recommendations for an hour this afternoon, and think the following preliminary thoughts are worth reporting.

We accept for planning that Westmoreland’s deployment recommendations should be approved and that in all probability these deployments will take place in 1966. We do not see any good way of second-guessing Westmoreland and McNamara, although we can have a whack if you ask us to.

On this assumption, the December decisions seem to fall in four categories:

1. Proving that we have done everything that we could to move toward peace;

2. Preparing a solid base for the chosen level of later military action;

3. Building advance consensus for the probable budgetary consequences;

4. Balancing the size and energy of Westmoreland’s effort by action to the limit on the political, social and economic front in Vietnam.

Our preliminary thoughts on each of these follow:

1. Efforts for peace. We see four broad general possibilities here.

(1) First and most narrowly, we could make a high-level official gesture to Hanoi proposing unconditional discussions at any one of a number of fixed times and dates and places. One way of doing this would be to send Harriman to Paris to speak to Bo, since Bo is the most visible representative of Hanoi in the West, and Harriman is your most distinguished envoy of peace. We think this should probably be done privately for later surfacing. But it could also be publicly announced if that seemed better. Even if Hanoi unyielding, you will have made specific dramatic effort before Congress returns. Other simultaneous messages to appropriate capitals should be going on during this effort.

(2) You can have a pause in bombing the north. Califano and Moyers think any such pause should probably be very brief, while Bundy shares McNamara’s feeling that if we do, it should have a length of 3-4 weeks for international reasons. We all agree that such a pause should be quite hard-nosed. We would make it very clear that we were doing it to see whether there would be a response, and that in the absence of a response we would keep a fully free hand. One strong argument for a pause is that we all expect that it will be necessary to intensify the bombing substantially in 1966, and we will need to have shown that this is the fault of others.

(3) We are in the Christmas season, and it is possible that you could declare a Christmas armistice or ceasefire on a still wider basis, both in the north and in the south. Such a moment of peace could be as short as Christmas day, or as long as three weeks, depending on the balance of advantages and disadvantages. There are real difficulties with this course in South Vietnam, but it has a certain Johnsonian scale. During such a pause our men would of course be free to defend themselves and to reply sharply to any particular attack.

(4) Our diplomatic position on the Geneva Accords and free elections and the eventual future of Vietnam still lacks sharpness and punch. We think you should insist on a wholly new level of directness and definition in our peace aims for your State of the Union message.

2. Preparations for next military courses.

(1) Our principal preliminary thought here is that you might call Westmoreland back to consult with you. The deepest domestic danger we see is from those who will charge us with a no-win policy, and our best protection is that you and the responsible commander are on all fours. Moreover, we all feel that reading Westmoreland through other men’s eyes—even the eyes of McNamara—is not good enough for a Commander-in-Chief facing the decisions that are now before you. Understanding between you and Westmoreland will also help in insuring that the Chiefs stay with us. Only Wheeler himself among them is as broad gauged as Westmoreland.

(2) December should also include contingent decisions to make Westmoreland’s deployments and probably to intensify bombing in the north in 1966, unless peace breaks out. Such preliminary decisions would help keep the Chiefs and other military on board during any pause or ceasefire or diplomatic peace offensive.

(3) We would side strongly with McNamara—and might even go beyond him—in avoiding any reserve call-up or other action not immediately required to meet Westmoreland’s needs. In other words, we would carry forward the principle of minimum necessary action which you laid down in July.

3. Preparing the country for the FY-66 supplemental and the FY-67 budget.

(1) During this month, the military budget, as well as the civilian one, must be pushed down as far as is consistent with both your basic programs and your ability to withstand charges of concealment. In this connection we are exploring the manner in which the Korean war was financed by Truman.

(2) As your budgetary decisions become clearer, more of the advance background notices of the kind Moyers gave last week could be released to selected elements of the press.

(3) We should get the Business Council to support your budget and any related actions we take as noninflationary, and we should get the top labor leaders to keep the labor movement within economic guidelines.

(4) Before you make any dramatic decisions related to tax increases or even more drastic anti-inflationary steps, people like Heller should be consulted, as well as your principal economic advisers.

Peace steps, military preparations and overall budgetary/economic planning will require most careful orchestration and a gradually growing process of public comment which we should turn our way just as far as possible. It occurs to us that someone like David Ginsburg might be called in to give full time to this problem, so that we get the speeches and statements of support which we want all across the spectrum of opinion from Tom Dewey to Walter Reuther.

These are just our preliminary thoughts. You will clearly need close consultation with Rusk and McNamara before these bridges are crossed, and we think you may also need a chance to talk with more detached advisers like Clifford and Fortas. And as you approach final decisions, you will also want to consult Eisenhower and the Congressional leadership.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Flash. Also from Califano and Moyers.