Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

211. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 29, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Mr. Schneider’s Conversation with Mai Van Bo, DRV Commercial Representative at Paris—Comments on Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Gilbert F. White, Professor in Department of Geography, University of Chicago; Chairman of the Board, AFSC
• Colin Bell, Executive Secretary, AFSC
• Louis Schneider, Associate Executive Secretary for Program,AFSC
• Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• W.A.K. Lake, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

1. Mr. Schneider said that Mai Van Bo had made the following comments to him during the course of a conversation on November 16 in Paris on the possibility of the American Friends Service Committee’s giving assistance to the people of North Viet-Nam:

(a) It might be difficult for the US to accept Pham Van Dong’s four points as a basis for negotiations as it would entail a loss of face. Bo suggested that a U.S. declaration of agreement with the principles of the Geneva Accords would be satisfactory to the DRV Government as a basis for negotiations. In response to Mr. Schneider’s question, Bo said that the DRV would not demand the withdrawal of American forces as a precondition to negotiations but would require that the US declare its agreement in principle to their eventual withdrawal.

(b) Schneider raised the question of a ceasefire. Bo said that the DRV would not agree to a ceasefire before negotiations began but gave the impression that the DRV would agree to some sort of de-escalation.

(c) Bo said that the DRV would not negotiate with the present Saigon regime, although it would have negotiated with the Diem Government. The successors to the Diem Government were not representative. However, there were many good people in South Viet-Nam, within and outside the National Liberation Front, from whom a group could be formed with which the DRV would negotiate. It was Mr. Schneider’s impression that Bo might even have been suggesting that the US form such a group. (In response to Mr. Unger’s question, Mr. Schneider said Bo mentioned no names but did mention some categories, including the Buddhists. He would check on what the other categories were.)

(d) Bo said that the DRV was prepared to accept the existence of an independent South Viet-Nam, although they knew that this would not be in accordance with the Geneva Accords.

(e) Mr. Schneider raised the question of an international body to guarantee a settlement. Bo volunteered the thought that the best international supervisory body might be a revitalized International Control Commission.

(f) Bo said that the North Vietnamese were fighting for their independence. They knew what colonialism was like, as they had been fighting against it for a thousand years. Bo made no specific mention of either the USSR or the CPR.

2. In response to Mr. Unger’s questions, Mr. Schneider stated that he thought that Bo was anxious to pass these thoughts on to an American and believed that Schneider would forward them to the USG. Bo said nothing, however, about what steps could be taken by the US to follow up on these statements, beyond his proposal that we declare our agreement with the principles of the Geneva Accords and our acceptance of eventual withdrawal of American forces. In response to Mr. Unger’s specific question on whether the Friends would carry the dialogue further with Bo, Dr. White said that the Friends would try to be of assistance in any humanitarian way possible. They would prefer not to allow their involvement in political questions prejudice the success of their non-political, strictly humanitarian efforts, however. In response to further questions, Mr. Schneider said that Bo did not mention how de-escalation could be achieved, any connection between US bombing of North Viet-Nam and negotiations, or how the DRV assesses the protest movement in the United States (beyond his remarks on Norman Morrison). Mr. Schneider thought Bo understood well the fact that the AFSC was appealing to the DRV as well as to the US to find a solution to the conflict.

3. Mr. Unger thanked Mr. Schneider for passing on this information, remarking that some of it represented a change from previous DRV statements we had heard.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Lake and approved by Herbert Thompson of S/S on December 22. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” The following note is typed at the top of the source text: “As indicated in the attached letter to Mr. Schneider from Mr. Unger, subsequent accounts of the conversation with Bo by Messrs. Mendel and Wood presented a less optimistic picture of the possibility of the DRV’s agreeing to talks.” The letter, dated December 5, is ibid.