Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

210. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk ¹

Washington, November 29, 1965.

Several representatives of the American Friends Service Committee called this morning on Mr. Unger to recount a conversation which one of them, Mr. Lewis Schneider, had on November 16² in Paris with Mai Van Bo, DRV commercial representative. This conversation suggested that the North Vietnamese position is considerably more flexible than we have heretofore been led to believe; it is of course difficult to evaluate how much was being said for the benefit of an American group which does not support the war in Viet Nam and how much represents approved DRV policy.

The following are the principal points made by Mai Van Bo in the Paris conversation (a full account is in course of preparation):³

1. Mai Van Bo accepted that the United States for reasons of face could not accept North Viet-Nam’s four points and said that all that would be required to open the way to negotiations would be a clear statement by the United States in support of the principles of the Geneva Accords of 1954.

2. The withdrawal of American forces is not a prerequisite to negotiations; all that is required is a U.S. statement accepting the principle of withdrawal of US forces, presumably eventually.

3. The DRV will not agree to a ceasefire. Mr. Schneider also did not remember any reference to a cessation of the U.S. bombing of the North.⁴

4. Mai Van Bo said the DRV was prepared to make an important concession in that it was ready to accept the existence of two separate Viet-Nams, with South Viet-Nam as an independent country.

5. The DRV is prepared to talk with the U.S. but not with the Government in Saigon. On the other hand there are acceptable individuals outside the NLF (and possibly including some people presently in the Government) who could constitute a group which could be represented in the negotiations. Interestingly, Mai Van Bo stated that the DRV would have been prepared to negotiate with the Diem Government but it does not recognize its successors as governments.

6. Mai Van Bo said nothing about next steps. In answer to Mr. Unger’s question, the Friends left open the possibility of their carrying the dialogue farther forward, although this point was not pursued.

The AFSC called on Mai Van Bo for the purpose of asking whether North Viet Nam would permit the Friends to carry on humanitarian, civilian relief activities there. Mai Van Bo’s answer on this is being awaited. The Friends realize of course that there would be questions about licensing goods to go to North Viet Nam and validation of passports for any American Friends who would wish to participate.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret; Exdis.
2. NB—Two days before last XYZ—BHR” [Footnote in the source text in Read’s hand. Regarding the November 18 conversation with Mai Van Bo, see Document 185.]
3. See Document 211.
4. Mai Van Bo also mentioned the possibility, instead of a ceasefire, of a mutual de-escalation of military actions but did not indicate how this might be brought about.” [Footnote in the source text.]