128. Memorandum for President Johnson1
Washington,
undated.
Following is the text of a cable from Ambassador Lodge (Saigon 626):2
- 1.
- I had a meeting yesterday afternoon alone with General Ky which lasted almost an hour, with him doing almost all the talking in [Page 352] deliberate, grammatical English, sometimes interspersed with French. I began by saying that I wished to help in every possible way and that he could count on me to respect a confidence.
- 2.
- Ky covered many subjects, but his chief contention was that the people insisted on a revolution, that it was impossible to compete with the Communists without treating the peasant, the poor man, the laborer, and the soldier properly. Neither Minh, Khanh nor Quat had really understood what a revolution is all about.
- 3.
- It was impossible for a civilian government to carry out a revolution with the military standing on the sidelines complaining. The military had the power in Vietnam and they had to meet their responsibility.
- 4.
- For the future, he wanted the Americans to hold the “strategic points” so that the Vietnamese could concentrate on pacification operations. He was disgusted with the Chieu Hoi program and the way it had been run and said that much American money had been wasted. There were 30,000 cadres in various government departments which he was going to regroup and retrain, and send them to the 235 districts in the country. He would have a paper on this for me to read very soon.
- 5.
- I agreed that a Communist offer of a revolution, even though it was in brutality and slavery, could only be beaten by an offer of a revolution for a new life in freedom. We Americans agreed completely and stood ready to help. There were some things which we could not do, but there were many which we could do. If he and his associates could stay in power for a reasonable period of time, then it could be done. But another coup would really be bad. Could we be helpful in this regard.
- 6.
- Ky smiled at this, and it seemed to me that he didn’t take the possibility of a coup very seriously. He said he had been at Dalat for the last two days and had met with all division and corps commanders, and that they had all been in agreement. He said there had been discussion about my arrival signifying that something new was being brought into the Vietnamese problems. They did not know whether this was true, but they all agreed that I was against Communism.
- 7.
- Comment: If this is true, it is good that I am not taken for granted. My main hope at the meeting with Ky was not to settle any specific problem, but to develop a good atmosphere. I feel that this was done to some extent. He was rather tense when I arrived but he had a big smile on his face and was much more relaxed when I left.
- 8.
- Other remarks by Ky were
as follows:
- A.
- The Communists gave the peasant what in effect is a license to kill the landlord and then take the land themselves. “We can do better than that,” said Ky. I assured him of our desire to help, having in mind the report that landlords are heavily represented among generals.
- B.
- Ky said he was aware of the importance of having able Ambassadors and that he would make a number of appointments soon. Lodge.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIX, Memos. Secret; Limdis. There is no drafting information on the source text, which indicates that the President saw the memorandum.↩
- Telegram 626 from Saigon, transmitted at 3:25 p.m., was received at 8:04 a.m. (Department of State, Central Files,POL 15 VIET S)↩