Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

127. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 26, 1965, 12:41 p.m.

624. 1. There is given below the text of an “Estimate of Viet Cong Situation” drafted by the Mission Intelligence Committee and concurred in by Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland which I have found of value and believe will be of interest to concerned Washington agencies:

2. Hanoi appears to have made the decision last year to intensify the war in South Vietnam. Whether the Communists actually expected to gain complete victory this year, or merely to accelerate the transition to their vaunted general counter-offensive, they had reason to hope that an early victory was possible. The build-up of Viet Cong main force and guerrilla units had made substantial progress, and the insurgents had evolved tactics for meeting the improving RVNAF air and ground capabilities. Viet Cong successes in countering the GVN’s pacification program had given the Communists control over wide areas which had previously been dominated by the GVN; their food situation had improved, and they had access to a substantial manpower base. Infiltration of both men and material from the north was essentially unchecked. RVNAF morale clearly was sagging, and its desertion rate mounting. Political instability in Saigon appeared to be heightened with each change of government, and further violent clashes involving Catholic, Buddhist and student elements seemed likely.

3. Given these conditions, it must have appeared to Hanoi that a modest escalation of Viet Cong military capabilities might permit the insurgents to end the war relatively quickly. They may have calculated that a successful military campaign would cause RVNAF and civilian morale to collapse, produce an impression of the inevitability of Communist victory, exacerbate political instability in Saigon, and create conditions favorable for a general uprising through which the Communists could seize power. Since the overthrow of the Diem government, Hanoi and the Liberation Front had increasingly put such an uprising forward as a feasible, quick alternative to the traditional protracted resistance struggle. Even if their broader hopes were not realized, the Communists probably believed that a successful offensive campaign by the reinforced Viet Cong would permit them to attain the initiative and pave the way for even greater offensive operations later this year. The Communists may have calculated that they would have a reasonable chance of achieving their aims without provoking increased U.S. intervention because of the seeming reluctance—last fall—of the U.S. to commit its military forces to operations in Vietnam. Even if the U.S. were to react, the Communists may have felt they could attain their objectives before U.S. intervention became effective.

4. To assure success, Hanoi evidently concluded that the military capabilities of both the Viet Cong and DRV would have to be further strengthened. Although the Viet Cong build-up was progressing favorably, their forces were clearly incapable of mounting an offensive of the scale desired. Hence, one of the goals established for 1964 was the accelerated expansion of Viet Cong forces to the extent required to establish that equilibrium with the GVN’s forces which is deemed essential by the Communists for the shift to a general counteroffensive. Toward this end, the Viet Cong intensified their recruiting and conscription programs, creating a number of new main force battalions in the southern delta, some of which were transferred to the area north of Saigon. The flow of weapons and equipment from the DRV was stepped up last fall to permit the rearming of some existing units with more modern and effective small arms, and heavy weapons, and to so equip some newly formed units. To add further to Viet Cong capabilities, Hanoi took the calculated risk of escalation by infiltrating regular units of the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN). All three infantry regiments of the PAVN 325th Division evidently have been deployed to South Vietnam, and it is possible that other units have been deployed without identification. To strengthen the DRV’s capabilities against the contingency of U.S. air attacks, Hanoi arranged with the Soviets in February for a reinforcement of its air defense resources, to include the introduction of surface-to-air missiles and the augmentation of the nascent DRV air force.

5. The military campaign planned by the Communists appears to be centered on the highlands. While the Viet Cong regard the densely populated and rice-rich Mekong Delta as the prize in South Vietnam, they consider the highlands as the major battleground, since the difficult terrain, dense vegetation, and limited lines of communication tend to minimize RVNAF ground and air superiorities. Their concept of operations envisaged a series of major (regimental-size) attacks against isolated outposts, aimed at destroying ARVN garrisons and drawing ARVN general reserve units into ambushes under conditions favoring Viet Cong success. These larger actions were to be supported by intensified, widespread guerrilla activity in order to consolidate their hold on the people. The principal objectives of the campaign were to destroy RVNAF units, enlarge the liberated zones, and constrict GVN control to isolated district towns and provincial capitals. In the highlands, it appears that they hope to eliminate the GVN strongpoints north of Kontum and create a large liberated area extending over most of Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. This area, adjoining the Laos infiltration corridor and offering motorable line of communications with North Vietnam, could be developed into an extensive redoubt area from which subsequent major operations could be mounted against the coastal plain or into the southern highlands. In the area northeast of Saigon, the Viet Cong concept was similar, based in this instance on the enlargement of Zone D by extending the liberated area into Phuoc Long, Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy and Lam Dong Provinces. From this redoubt, the Viet Cong would be in position to mount operations to link up with the northern highlands redoubt, westward to join Zone D with Zone C in northern Tay Ninh, or southwestward against Saigon itself.

6. Although they enjoyed some initial successes, the Viet Cong campaign has been frustrated by a series of fortuitous RVNAF tactical moves coupled with the effective use of increased US-GVN air support. In the prelude to their offensive, the Viet Cong inflicted heavy losses on ARVN units at Binh Gia (Phuoc Tuy Province) in December 1964 and in Binh Dinh Province in February 1965. They suffered a setback in their attack on Song Be, the Phuoc Long Province capital, in early May, but scored their most significant success at Ba Gia in Quang Ngai Province later that month. On 1 June, after overrunning Le Thanh district headquarters in western Pleiku, the Viet Cong placed the CIDG camp at Duc Co in a state of siege, which was to last over two months. The Viet Cong suffered a setback in their attack on the district town of Dong Xoai in Phuoc Long Province; although they inflicted heavy losses on ARVN forces, they were unsuccessful in their attempt to occupy the town and suffered estimated losses in excess of 700 KIA. In Phu Bon Province, the Viet Cong have effectively blocked Route 7 and made gains in outlying areas, but they failed in their attempt to destroy the garrison at ThuanMan (Phu Bon Province) and suffered heavily in an engagement with ARVN airborne units. The “Geneva armistice” anniversary attack on the CIDG post Bu Dop (Phuoc Long Province) was a costly failure, although the Viet Cong profited indirectly when another camp was abandoned to permit reinforcement of the Bu Dop garrison. In the area north of Kontum, their first major gain was the district town of Tuomoroung which fell on 25 July 1965. In mid-August, the Viet Cong intensified their efforts to dislodge the garrison at Duc Co (Pleiku Province) and suffered heavy losses when a joint ARVN/US operation broke the 68-day siege. On 18 August the Viet Cong furthered their gains in the area north of Kontum when they successfully attacked and overran the district town and CIDG post at Dak Sut. They have not yet dislodged or destroyed the GVN garrison at Tan Canh, near Dak To, and Dak Pek near the Laos border, although they have the capability to do so at any time. The Viet Cong have suffered a series of setbacks in fighting along Route 19, and have been unable to deny to RVNAF the use of any road when the latter made a determined effort to use them.

7. Thus, the Viet Cong have made some significant territorial gains during their summer offensive. They also put six RVNAF battalions out of action in the early stages of our campaign, but they were unable to sustain their pattern of success when ARVN altered its normal reaction pattern and, in several instances, spoiled Viet Cong preparations by mounting anticipatory operations. The Viet Cong did succeed in disrupting lines of communication, effectively isolating the highlands from the coast, and interdicting communications between most of the coastal provincial capitals. In the Mekong Delta area, aggressive operations by ARVN’s IV Corps appear to have frustrated Viet Cong plans for some major operations and have kept their main force units off balance. RVNAF morale has not collapsed, and may have recovered somewhat from its initial sag last spring. The political situation in Saigon, although still precarious, is not as unstable as the Communists hoped, and conditions are not ripe for a general uprising. Effective police action in the cities, a by-product of draft enforcement activities, and in part a result of improved counter-terror measures, has resulted in the apprehension of a number of Viet Cong cadres and probably has kept their subversive apparatus off-balance. Resources control operations in the Hop Tac area have also resulted in the seizure of explosives destined for Viet Cong terrorists in Saigon.

8. Not only has their campaign failed to achieve the optimum results envisaged by Hanoi, but since its inception the strategic balance has altered unfavorably for them. Preparations for the Viet Cong campaign were underway before the U.S. began its air attacks on North Vietnam and deployed its ground forces to South Vietnam—the bulk of the PAVN 325th Division had entered the south by February. Although US ground forces have not yet played a major role on the main battlefields, the Viet Cong are almost certainly becoming aware of the potential deriving from their presence. Sounder minds in Hanoi must appreciate that the opportunity for an early military victory has passed, and that the forces now available to the Viet Cong are incapable of dislodging the US forces from South Vietnam. Hanoi is therefore faced with the need to reappraise the situation and reassess its alternatives.

9. Courses of action open to Hanoi include the following:

A. Massive reinforcement of the Viet Cong, in the form of an overt invasion, in an attempt to regain their offensive momentum and perhaps defeat US forces before they are firmly established.

B. Limited covert reinforcement by infiltrating one or two additional PAVN divisions in order to restore the balance which has now swung in favor of the US-GVN forces and permit the continuation of recent levels of offensive activity.

C. Modest retrenchment of activity, reducing the number of major attacks and placing greater emphasis on local guerrilla activity and on consolidating their political base in preparation for a protracted guerrilla struggle.

D. Substantial reduction of activity aimed at creating the impression of a collapsing insurgency to lull the US into relaxing pressure on both the north and the south.

E. In combination with any of the above, initiating diplomatic moves designed to bring about negotiations for a settlement.

10. Massive reinforcement, either by PAVN alone or with Chinese Communist participation, would require assurance of logistic support on a scale which is probably beyond the capacity of the disrupted lines of communication in the southern DRV. Moreover, both Hanoi and Peking probably would estimate that such action might provoke more extensive US air strikes against the DRV and possibly even Communist China if the latter were directly involved. The same limitations would apply to the use of massive numbers of bloc volunteers. This course of action cannot be ruled out entirely as an irrational, desperation move to prevent the defeat of the Viet Cong or to provide a temporary strengthening of the Communist position as a prelude to negotiations. Because of the risks involved, however, the Communists probably would be inclined initially to pursue more limited aims which would be attained with limited means. The Chinese are also capable of participating in the defense of North Vietnam against air attacks, but have thus far shown an inclination to avoid involvement except when US aircraft approach the Chinese border.

11. Limited covert reinforcement, on the order of one or two PAVN divisions committed in the same fashion as the 325th, is more within their capabilities. Such a move would permit the Communists to restore some semblance of a balance of forces without serious risk of escalation beyond North Vietnam. The principal disadvantage of this course would be the uncertainty of adequate logistical support pending the development of a motorable supply route through the Laos panhandle. Any substantial increase in the number of troops in the highlands area would also further strain the already difficult food situation confronting Viet Cong forces in that region. The Communists cannot be sure that they will be able to deliver sufficient quantities of ammunition by sea in view of increasing US efforts to interdict this line of supply. Some reinforcement is obviously necessary to prevent the Viet Cong from losing the initiative to the expanding US-GVN forces, but, if the movement of the 325th Division is any gauge, the deployment of further reinforcements would require two to four months from the date of decision. Both Hanoi and Liberation Front radio broadcasts appear to be laying the groundwork for some reinforcement through their reference to organizing the “regrouped southerners” in preparation for their return to the south. On the other hand, it must now be apparent to Hanoi that growing US-GVN air and ground capabilities pose serious risks to large concentrations of insurgent forces, thereby placing a premium on smaller scale guerrilla actions of a type for which the capabilities of “foreign” PAVN units are not best suited.

12. A modest retrenchment of activity, similar to that which occurred in 1962 after the initial US intervention, would permit the Viet Cong to conserve the offensive potential of their main force units while studying the impact of current US deployments and operations and evolving a new strategic approach. Widespread guerrilla activity would be continued to counter GVN pacification operations while consolidating the Communist hold on “liberated areas” and developing the Viet Cong subversive apparatus in areas largely under GVN influence. Hanoi could continue the infiltration of key cadre elements and weapons and ammunition to permit the expansion of local guerrilla forces. A major portion of the Viet Cong main force units could be dispersed to support the guerrilla campaign. The principal disadvantage of this course of action would be its adverse impact on Viet Cong morale. Political cadres would face a difficult task in re-educating even the main forces in terms of a prolongation of the struggle. Conscription in Communist areas brought a substantial number of relatively unindoctrinated youths into Viet Cong units of all types, even into the main forces. These inexperienced youngsters have already shown symptoms of an unwillingness to fight, as reflected in the rising numbers of defectors and ralliers from the Viet Cong. If US and GVN forces succeed in inflicting a number of significant defeats on the Viet Cong and continue air actions at the current level, this morale problem will mount despite Viet Cong indoctrination efforts. Although a temporary retrenchment would not decisively impair Viet Cong morale, a prolonged retrenchment might pose insurmountable problems.

13. A substantial reduction of activity, coupled with a voluntary curtailment of support from the DRV, might be attempted in an effort to lull the US into relaxing its pressure. This course would, in effect, produce a limited disengagement. By giving the appearance of a collapsing insurgency and avoiding major actions, the Viet Cong might hope that the US would be inclined to reduce its forces and discontinue its bombing attacks on the DRV. The disadvantages of this course are similar to those enumerated in the preceding paragraph. The adverse psychological impact on the Viet Cong would be even greater, however, since the absence of support from the north would tend to discourage even some hard-core insurgents. If it were explained as a ruse, the Viet Cong could not be assured that word of this would not reach US and GVN authorities, thereby negating the effectiveness of this course. Hanoi might be tempted to adopt this course however, taking the calculated risk that enough of the Communist structure could be held together to permit a renewal of insurgent activity when conditions were more favorable.

14. The Communists could, at any time, embark on diplomatic moves aimed at bringing about negotiations for a settlement. They are not likely to undertake this course until convinced that they cannot achieve success by violent means in the south. DRV leaders continue to give the impression of confidence in the ultimate success of the insurgency, and so far have conveyed no hint that they are prepared to relax their conditions for the initiation of negotiations or for a settlement. Should the Communists agree to negotiations, they will probably first attempt some form of major military action designed to strengthen their position. They can be expected also to demand concessions on our part which would relax US military pressure during the period of negotiations.

15. There are indications that the Communists have already laid down the guidelines for their autumn-winter campaign. Agent reports suggest these are similar—for the Delta area—to those of the summer campaign. Both Hanoi and Liberation Front broadcasts reflect continued determination to press the war, and indicate preparations are underway for the introduction of additional troops from the north. On the other hand, they now speak in terms of a prolongation of the struggle for up to twenty to twenty-five years, suggesting that they see scant prospect for the short-cut solution they were touting as possible only a few months ago. Appeals to the urban populace to prepare for the violent overthrow of the government have similarly lost their urgency. There are no indications that the Communists are preparing for a massive reinsurgement. Continuation of the insurgency at the present level or retrenchment of activity poses serious problems with respect to surrendering the initiative to the reinforced US-GVN forces and sustaining Viet Cong morale. Only limited overt reinforcement—provided the logistical problem is overcome—offers some prospects for negating the impact of the US build-up and sustaining the morale of the Viet Cong.

16. In conclusion, lack of complete success of their summer campaign has frustrated Viet Cong aims for 1965. If they have not done so thus far, the Communists must soon acknowledge their inability either to achieve an early victory or to dislodge the growing military strength of the US forces in the south. Massive intervention is probably beyond their capability to support, and would carry with it the risk of a substantial widening of the war. While retrenchment might permit them to conserve their capabilities, it would pose serious morale problems, and would surrender the initiative to the US and GVN forces, which would gradually be able to resume pacification programs and regain control over populated areas recently acquired by the Communists. Only limited reinforcement offers prospects for sustaining the insurgency on a scale and at a level that provides reasonable expectation of successfully testing and perhaps eroding US determination to continue the war. Diplomatic moves to open negotiations would appear unlikely until the Communists are convinced that US determination to continue the war cannot be eroded and that defeat of the Viet Cong is probable.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC.