125. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1
Honolulu, August 23,
1965, 2:30 p.m.
2400302Z. Increasing pressure against DRV (C). A. CINCPAC 220043Z.2
- 1.
- We believe a main element of Communist strength in North and South Vietnam has been their complete confidence in ultimate victory according to their strategic plan. VC morale in SVN depends in large measure upon things going as planned. Superiority of the VC over the RVNAF and sure victory is the backbone of troop indoctrination.
- 2.
- Indications are that when Hanoi saw in early 1964 that the U.S. had decided to step up assistance to SVN, decision was made to move more rapidly toward victory through increased organized military action in SVN. With SVN political system in disarray, the RVNAF remained the hard core upon which the U.S. could build. Disintegration of the armed forces through multiple large-scale assaults could remove the last stumbling block to decisive control of the country. The rapid build up of the VC with organized PAVN units and augmentation of support activities and political cadres began.
- 3.
- Hanoi has received two strategic surprises since initiating what was intended as the final phase. First, the U.S. has introduced, and is continuing to build up, air and ground forces in SVN on a scale that Hanoi must never have anticipated. The second surprise was the air campaign against NVN.
- 4.
- The impact of U.S. forces in SVN has upset VC timing. Obvious intentions to embark upon a campaign of large scale attacks materialized in Feb. In their efforts to make 1965 a year of decision, the VC have made some limited gains but at a high price. Since March 1965 they have suffered heavy losses in virtually all of their major military efforts. This trend has been particularly pronounced since May when Viet Cong initiated large-scale operations such as those fought at Song Be, Dong Xoai, and Duc Co which cost the VC very heavy and probably unanticipated casualties. The introduction of expanded U.S. air and ground forces and naval support have further compounded the Viet Cong problem as illustrated by the dramatic U.S. operation on the Van Tuong peninsula, south of Chu Lai, where U.S. Marines destroyed the 1st VC regiment. Employment of U.S. forces in the highlands hear Pleiku can and will disrupt VC plans for seizure and control of that strategic area. Following Chu Lai [Page 342] more ground forces will be introduced when the 1st Cavalry Division lands. Hanoi knows that the ROK division and other U.S. forces will soon be introduced. Employment of B-52’s and scheduled deployment of additional U.S. air squadrons will further emphasize U.S. intent. More prisoners are being taken now. More defections are occurring. These rates will rise when augmented U.S. air and ground forces are brought more fully to bear in harassment, attrition, and search and destroy missions.
- 5.
- The evidence is now overwhelming that the Communist forces in both Vietnams are all under the command of Hanoi, and the battlefield in North Vietnam can be regarded as the support area or zone of interior. After the first surprise of air attack in NVN, against what must have been regarded as a sanctuary, Hanoi probably expected world opinion to cause the U.S. to limit operations to sporadic, punitive attacks if not stop them completely. We have just reviewed our program, Ref A, we are now at a point where we can move toward the effective disruption of the current RT area. This will make it extremely difficult for Hanoi to continue support to forces in Laos and SVN. But the important thing now is to keep the Communists psychologically off balance. We believe the process is well underway in the SVN portion of the battlefield. In the north we must concentrate upon the same objective. Communist belief in victory must be destroyed. They are now taking comfort from greater air defense capability and there are some indications that use of the IL-28’s and MIG’s may be contemplated. We may expect some dramatic effort as their need for a morale boost grows. We must not allow their developing capabilities to generate hope of turning the tide.
- 6.
- Recommend that hard on the heels of the landing of the 1st elements of the 1st Cavalry Division in SVN that we attack the POL at Hanoi (JCS 49) and at Haiphong (JCS 48). A large percentage of the population in the delta area would see the fires and all would know of the attacks. Grossly exaggerated Hanoi air defense propaganda would begin to ring hollow. These two actions would have a tremendous psychological impact upon NVN.