Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

124. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 23, 1965.

581. Reference: Department telegram 509, repeated USUN 289.² Following are some comments on the general subject of diplomatic negotiations:

1. Although the U Thant proposal is as unfair as one would expect, there is advantage in handling it very carefully—not because it will lead to an end to the aggression in Vietnam, but because news of it will leak and the U.S. Government must appear in a good light in the minds of those who think that peace can be promoted in this manner.

2. Convincing these people that the U.S. Government is leaving no stone unturned has undoubtedly been a big factor in the remarkable education of U.S. opinion in the last six months under the President’s leadership. Today, practically every American of good will understands why Vietnam is important and therefore why we must be here.

3. This is of the greatest importance in our effort to ward off the aggression here. In fact, a unified and determined U.S. opinion is the decisive ingredient. It also creates favorable opinion abroad.

4. But there is another aspect which gives me pause. I believe we are approaching the point when further public eagerness by US for “negotiations” will harden Hanoi and Peking’s resolve and convince them that we are weak internally (however strong we may be at Chu Lai) thus making things harder for our soldiers, tending to prolong the conflict, and sapping the will to win of the GVN and RVNAF.

5. The President’s bombing decision stopped the argument in Saigon as to whether to continue the war and it started the discussion on how best to win it. The President’s decision on troops has brought a conviction that the U.S. is not clock-watching and is determined to see this thing through. In Vietnamese minds, this makes a successful outcome inevitable. These are precious assets which must be conserved and cherished and certainly not diluted or destroyed.

6. The above in no way means that we should not work hard for peace, but what is needed for peace at this moment is a conviction in the minds of the enemy that its aggression is doomed to failure.

7. It would be helpful here and would have a constructive effect on U.S. and foreign opinion, and ultimately in the UN, if we gave great prominence to the fact that our effort in Vietnam is being undertaken in the letter and spirit of UN Charter which states in Article I that the member states shall “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for suppression of acts of aggression… .” This is precisely what we are doing. Our effort is thus noble, respectable and legal in the highest sense. It should be made to appear so and not look like a unilateral American adventure. I have only seen one excellent statement by the President at a press conference concerning the aggression aspect. Could not more be done along this line?

8. It is for this reason that I question the wisdom of paragraph 8 of the proposed aide-memoire (reftel). To talk about “a cessation of all hostile military activity by all concerned” implies that we and the South Vietnamese on the one hand are in the same moral position as Hanoi and Peking on the other. This is not the case. Hanoi and Peking wish to dominate South Vietnam. South Vietnam and the U.S. do not wish to dominate North Vietnam. Hanoi and Peking are the aggressors. South Vietnam is the aggrieved party. We must not give the impression that it is “six of one and a half-dozen of the other”.

9. I also fear the effect when paragraph 9 becomes public.

10. And the words “cease fire” make many hairs stand on end in Saigon and could give rise to widespread feeling that the “Americans are negotiating behind our backs and therefore why should we fight any more?”

11. I recognize the difficulty of these decisions and that there is much to be said for a sympathetic attitude toward U Thant’s proposals. I also recognize the commitment which we have already made for the record. But there are other factors and a constructive contribution could be made to public thinking by reminding members of the UN and public opinion generally of Article I of the Charter.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:23 a.m. Ambassador Lodge arrived in Saigon on August 20 and presented his credentials on August 25.
2. Telegram 509 to Saigon, August 21, transmitted a copy of the draft reply to U Thant’s initiative on August 12, and asked for Embassy comments. (Ibid.) The reply, which incorporated changes in response to Lodge’s comments, was approved and sent to Thant on August 27; see Document 129.