Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

105. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, August 3, 1965.

SUBJECT

• August 3 Dinner Meeting on the Information Problem

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Cater, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Califano, Mr. Marks, Mr. Chancellor, Mr. Greenfield, Mr. Jorden, Mr. Leibman, Mr. Cooper, and Mr. Chase

At Mr. Cater’s invitation, the group met for dinner at the White House Staff Mess to discuss the Government’s information program in the field of foreign affairs, and primarily as it pertains to the domestic audience. The discussion generally covered (a) the nature of the information problem and (b) general and specific ideas and agencies for meeting the information problem.

1. The Nature of the Information Problem

(a) Mr. Cater said that, with respect to public information, we lack many of the strengths we once had. We don’t seem to have independent validators of policy any more—the Vandenbergs and the Connollys. We don’t seem to have elder statesmen any more—Eisenhower is the exception. We don’t seem to have the newscasting we once had—the Ed Murrows and the Elmer Davises, to quieten us and to give us perspective; instead, the nature of T.V. is such that we always seem to get our news on a fragmentary basis. Finally, with the exception of the President, the Government does not seem to have the spokesmen it once had. Mr. Cater went on to say that our public posture is fragile; we rely too much on the President and too much on specific facts. There seems to be no basic understanding of the broader aspects on the part of the American people. And with this situation, we are extremely vulnerable to rumor, gossip, and quick reverses.

(b) Mr. Greenfield, with specific reference to Vietnam, outlined a number of dimensions that he sees as part of the information problem. First, we are always meeting the crisis of the moment. In practice, there is little time to think about the long term or the philosophical. We only plug holes and run as fast as we can to stay even. Second, we seem to be obsessed by Vietnam. Foreigners especially believe that the President thinks of nothing else but Vietnam. This is not a healthy image.

Third, we do not always keep the arithmetic in mind. There are almost 300 accredited correspondents in Vietnam and we must recognize that we are going to have to live with some unfortunate stories—e.g., brutality by Americans. Fourth, while our credibility with the press is improving, we are still not credible enough. We suffer substantial losses when we are not accurate, and there are plenty of inaccuracies. (Mr. Califano seconded this point.) Fifth, we do not have the highest quality military spokesmen in Vietnam; they should be improved. Sixth, we are involved in too many cliches. Some of them are all right but others may not be; we should re-examine them. For example, we should look again at “Our country’s honor is at stake”; one day we may be sorry that we are tied too closely to this stand. Another cliche we ought to examine is “Our friends won’t trust us if we desert the Vietnamese”; this one gives us trouble when foreigners say publicly that they want us out of Vietnam—in effect, pulling the rug out from under us. (Mr. Bundy and Mr. Cooper differed with Mr. Greenfield at this point; both agreed, however, that we should make more of foreign statements which support our argument—e.g., Willy Brandt’s reference to the conflict as “our war.”)

Seventh, we should probably try to do something about this curious business involving newsmen who say “the American people don’t know what’s going on.” When asked what they want, these newsmen say that they want more specific facts (e.g., how many tons of bombs were dropped); at the same time, they agree, when pressed, that the answer does not really bear at all on the essence of the Vietnam situation. Maybe this curious questioning relates to the proposition that the Vietnam war is different from anything we’ve seen and that we are all groping for ways to understand it. Mr. Cooper agreed that part of the information problem does relate to the fact that Vietnam represents a difficult and brand new type of warfare. While correspondents may not think it is important when B-52’s hit a rice dump, it really is important. In short, we may not know how to fight the war in Vietnam but the correspondents don’t know how to report it either.

(c) Mr. Jorden said that an essential element in our Vietnam information problem is that the South Vietnamese don’t say anything. They don’t say why they are fighting or where they are going. We must get them to state their own case—that what they are doing is good, just, etc. It would not only help with their own people but with the outside world as well.

Picking up on this thought, Mr. Cooper said that unfortunately the GVN is shadowy—there is not even a GVN ambassador here. As a matter of fact, for some time we have been trying in vain to get the GVN to do three relatively simple things—appoint an ambassador to the U.S.; appoint an information officer to the U.S.; and hire an American public relations firm to represent the GVN in the U.S. Partly as a result of the GVN’s ineffectual and mushy public information program, the American people do not think we are really associated with anyone in Vietnam. Mr. Marks seconded this point and noted that the American people do not really understand that the South Vietnamese have committed 500,000 people to the struggle.

(d) Mr. Chancellor said that this is indeed a remarkable situation; we are faced with an entirely different kind of war and there is no participation in the public information field by the people one would expect to hear from the most—e.g., South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong. (Some members of the group noted that the Viet Cong was indeed very active in the field.) In essence, perhaps we have, for the first time in our experience, a non-packageable commodity. Perhaps, therefore, we should try to emulate the 19th century British and try to get a sort of general commitment and support by the American people rather than a specific commitment and support for Vietnam. The “This is a long-term proposition—we are a world power and are stuck with this sort of thing” psychology may in fact bring greater comfort to the American people than the definition of the struggle as one of sharp confrontation. Mr. Bundy recognized the force in Mr. Chancellor’s argument but added, among other things, that we could never hope for enough support, in the general sense, to do the job. We must get involved in the specifics as well. We are faced with a situation of instant transmission of village episodes. The Communists know this dimension and deal with it effectively; we, too, must cope with this dimension.

(e) Mr. Leibman said that the American people do not yet really understand how we got into Vietnam in the first place; they have received only generalities and they need specifics. Mr. Bundy agreed that there is a problem here, but thought that this particular piece of exposition might simply not be manageable. Our best posture may be to say simply that somehow we are there and that we have to stay.

(f) The group noted that the nature of the information problem in Vietnam is changing in some respects. Mr. Leibman said that the problem will be intensified immeasurably when the effects of the doubling of the draft are felt. Mr. Chancellor said that the press is just beginning to get active in Vietnam. With increased staffs, we are going to get fewer people doing general interpretive work and we are going to get more of the poignant, Ernie Pyle-type stories. This may help our effort in getting support from the American people as the war starts to hit them locally. In this regard, Mr. Leibman noted that it may be useful to consider building local heroes rather than national heroes.

(g) The group discussed the similarities and differences between the Korean War and the Vietnamese war. Mr. Bundy said that the American people may have more patience than they did during Korea; twelve years have passed. He noted that people have been saying for the past several years that the American people would explode if nothing decisive happened in Vietnam; yet, there has been no explosion. Mr. Cater noted the anomaly of Korea which, in fact, was a real success story but was never understood as such by the American people. The job is even tougher in Vietnam.

(h) Mr. Greenfield raised two questions which were largely left unanswered by the group: What reaction would we like to get from the American people and from foreigners? Why do people seem to understand that it is necessary to fight over Berlin but not over Vietnam?

2. Meeting the Information Problem

(a) Mr. Cooper ticked off some of the specific projects that are now under way. First, there are the “American Friends of Vietnam.” While they still have a long way to go, they have done some good work; they work with students, publish a journal, run a speakers’ bureau and have an elaborate mailing list. While the Government has been helping and advising this group, we can’t get too involved; if it becomes too closely identified with the U.S. Government, its credibility will be badly affected. Second, we have sent 30 students to Vietnam. Our follow-up will, of course, be crucial. Third, we have brought some Vietnamese intellectuals over here. Fourth, we have been providing kits to certain speakers. There are other projects too.

(b) Mr. Leibman said that the key elements that had been raised are the complexity and built-in contradiction of policy and the need for perspective and continuity. With regard to continuity, we should use more effectively the President’s experience. Remember that “he was there” for 30 years. Mr. Leibman went on to say that part of the answer lies in using the private sector effectively. The private sector is anxious to be used.

Mr. Leibman then went on to describe a number of possible projects that might be explored. First, perhaps the private sector could brief journalists and editors. There are plenty of institutions and schools that would be willing and anxious to do the job. Second, we could put into effect the “That Was the Week That Was” concept to get across the idea of perspective and “the whole chessboard.” Third, we could make use of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces graduates. Fourth, with respect to high school teachers, there are three different types of programs that could be used—(a) special summer institutes on appropriate political subjects; (b) special programs for all teacher attendees at summer school; (c) year-round programs for teachers as part of in-service training. Fifth, we could use trade association forums. Mr. Leibman added that these ideas are only illustrative. The point is that there is a vacuum. If we don’t fill it, then it will be filled against us. He went on to emphasize that the teach-in problem is almost here again and that we should be ready.

(c) Mr. Greenfield noted that the only thing that makes our present posture swing is that the people have confidence in the President. Mr. Leibman added that this is one reason why the President must always be absolutely credible. Mr. Cater interjected that this is evidence of how fragile our posture is and went on to say that the President should not have to bear the whole burden of explanation.

(d) Mr. Califano made the point that there was great merit in repetition. The President and other spokesmen in the Administration should keep repeating the same facts again and again.

(e) Mr. Cooper noted Mr. Chancellor’s point that there will be an increase in coverage of Vietnam. He went on to suggest that we give serious consideration to educating the editors so that they know which stories are significant and fit to print.

(f) Mr. Greenfield said that we can only use the private sector effectively if there are effective Government spokesmen to support. And there are only four people who can give the Government position effectively—the President, Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy. Mr. Chancellor said that Bundy is probably not good for the housewife in the back yard; unfortunately, Bundy appeals to the sophisticated and the sophisticated are already rigid in their confusion or in their position pro or con the Administration in Vietnam. Only the other three can do the job that is needed—and, for that matter, McNamara probably less than Rusk.

(g) The group talked at some length about the problem of coordination of the information effort. Mr. Leibman, while recognizing the dangers of too much coordination, noted that it seemed to him that all sorts of people were involved but that no one was clearly carrying the ball or coordinating the effort. Mr. Califano said that there is a real need for orchestration on the Government side. Moreover, the only one who can really do the coordinating job effectively and get the right response from the major players is Bundy or Moyers. Mr. Cater said that what is needed is a sort of Tsar on the outside—a man with great prestige, preferably from New York, who could pull together and coordinate on the private side. Mr. Bundy agreed that there is a coordination problem as well as the ever-present problem of “finding the right man.” He went on to say, however, that the private sector would probably not sit still for a ringmaster. He also suggested that perhaps we do not want to get so heavily organized either in the Government or in the private sector in the area of public information.²

GC

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Public Affairs Policy Committee. Confidential. Prepared by Gordon Chase of the NSC Staff on August 4.
2. A follow-up meeting was held on August 4. (Memorandum for the record by Chase, August 4; ibid.) See also Document 117.