Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

104. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, August 3, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with General Eisenhower, 3 August 1965

1. I met with General Eisenhower for an hour and a half in his office at Gettysburg this morning. I had arranged the visit with him previously by phone for the purpose of bringing him up-to-date on the situation and program actions relating to South Viet-Nam.

2. Before I began my remarks he expressed concern over one important aspect of recent actions. Citing Clausewitz, he pointed out that to every action we take, we must expect the enemy to take counter-action. It is important to avoid acting by “driblets.” If we want to win, we should not base our action on minimum needs, but should swamp the enemy with overwhelming force. He recalled that he had previously pointed out that if the enemy has a battalion on a position and we use two battalions against him, we may take the position but losses can be high. If instead we use as much as a division we will take the objective and our losses will be much lower.

3. He said he thought we should avoid using specific numbers in announcing our buildup. Specifically, he was troubled about the announced figure of 50,000. Instead, he thought the statement² should have been “sufficient to win.”

4. I brought out that the figure of 50,000 had been coupled with the kind of statement he proposed—“additional forces will be needed later and they will be sent,” and that in fact planning and preparatory work is going forward to provide all that General Westmoreland has asked for at a very rapid rate. He reiterated his view that we do better to avoid specific numbers which tend to suggest to our enemies that we are limited in our determination. He would think it better simply to say that SVN within the past year or two has become an open battle ground of freedom against Communism, and that we will do whatever is needed to defeat Communism there.

5. He thought that the call for more draftees struck a good note because it showed our seriousness of purpose. He commented that he had been asked by many people while he was in Wisconsin, particularly by young people, just what we are going to do about Viet-Nam. He said his answer was that we must win there—we must stop the infiltration, stop the Communists from cutting South Viet-Nam to pieces, and give the South Vietnamese a chance to build a free society. He returned to his original point with a statement that this is no time for “piddling” steps, and that such—in the present situation, in which there has been an appeal to force—would be our greatest weakness.

6. At this point I reviewed in terms of major units the planned deployments to Viet-Nam in response to General Westmoreland’s request.

7. I next discussed the concept for the employment of the U.S. forces as they close in the area. Secure bases will be provided at each of the key points selected. There will be an ample security force (a brigade or more), and normally a major logistics installation, and major tactical air base capable of general operations. As forces are built up further, they will be used for reaction operations, to fix and destroy Viet Cong units of battalion or greater size when they form for attack, and as a general reserve to locate, pin down and destroy Viet Cong main force units through offensive action, and to attack the Viet Cong base areas. As forces increase, the emphasis will shift toward offensive action on a sustained basis to carry the fight without letup to the Viet Cong. Maximum use will be made of air support, as well as artillery support, in these operations. General Eisenhower indicated he thought well of this concept of operations. I added that the Vietnamese will be expected to join in the foregoing operations to a limited degree (commensurate with their strength), but will particularly be responsible for locating and destroying pockets of Viet Cong smaller units and for establishing security in the countryside through wider areas. General Eisenhower thought these operations were of very great importance. He emphasized that propaganda activities should be intensified, and suggested that we be in position to extend to any village taken over from the Viet Cong immediate assistance in the form of food, medicines and the like. Such assistance, to be most effective, should be given at once.

8. In the course of this discussion I reviewed the general situation in South Viet-Nam, contrasting the situation observed in the Delta on my recent trip (where a highly capable corps commander has his troops on the offensive, carrying the fight to the Viet Cong with considerable effectiveness) with other areas where the Viet Cong encroachment continues, together with disruption of roads, railroads and all forms of communication.

9. I next commented on operations against North Viet-Nam. I told him consideration is being given at this moment to the question of expansion of the scope of attack operations to include attacks on POL, remaining LOC, and possible mining of major harbors. He said he considered that the selection of targets (speaking of military targets) amounts at this stage to deciding tactical matters. He thought that this is a matter for the field commander. It is important to comprehend what war is, and make sure we don’t lose effect through detailed control away from the scene of conflict. He thought it was essential to go after the POL and the lines of communication, and would mine the harbors without delay, telling the world to keep shipping out of the area and making clear that there is to be no sanctuary. If this is not done, we will pay in U.S. casualties in South Viet-Nam. He emphasized that the way to keep international pressures down, and to save lives is to win the struggle as quickly as possible.

10. Referring to the surface-to-air missiles, he said that in his judgment we should have hit them before they became operational. He added that he had understood that we were going to do this. He said he would urge that we get the SAM’s destroyed before they can be used. He said that, in fact, we should strike quickly whenever we see a new kind of danger building up, and not wait until it is in use. He commented that, operationally, there seems to him to be too much of a brake on everything we do. If the North Vietnamese use their SAM’s and anti-aircraft in combination, as they are skillful enough to do, our air operations will become much more difficult and costly.

11. I then outlined the program for force expansion which the President had approved. I mentioned that the question whether to rely upon the draft or call up reserves had received the most searching analysis and careful consideration, culminating in a decision to rely upon the draft, extend terms of service where permitted, and bring selected reserves to a higher state of readiness. The net resulting difference between the two methods will not be large; there might be some limited additional delay in readiness of forces under the scheme adopted. This would be of significance in case a contingency should occur in Europe. General Eisenhower said he was not concerned over this point. If we were to become involved in war in Europe of any substantial proportions, he would not be for sending large forces into the area, but would be for using every bomb we have.

[Here follows brief discussion of the Dominican Republic.]

13. General Eisenhower’s principal suggestion was to recognize that we are at war in Viet-Nam, and not base our action on “minimum needs” or a weak strike program against the North, but to “swamp them.”

G.
Lt. General, U.S.A.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, President Eisenhower. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Goodpaster.
2. Reference is to the statement President Johnson made at his July 28 press conference; see Document 97.