335. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Negotiating Developments re South Viet-Nam
1. Bo Message and Seaborn Approach.
The Bo message of May 18 to the French2 still leaves the ambiguity whether recognition of the four points is a condition to any talks. The wording slightly shades the public formulations, but on its face does not change the sense of what Hanoi appeared to be saying, originally on April 83 and later in April when it used the four points as its statement on the appeal of the 17.4
We have given Seaborn a message designed to smoke this out.5 He returns today or tomorrow, we believe, but we have no report yet on whether he was received by any senior person, which was a prerequisite to his delivering the message.
Meanwhile, the French have reported the approach to the British, who in turn have told the Australians. We ourselves told the GVN, and the Canadians know of it through our intelligence publications6 (as perhaps do the New Zealanders through the same channel, which was a technical mistake). Thus, there is a leak danger from these facts alone, and Senator Pell’s mention of the subject at your hearing the other day7 strongly suggests that Alphand is at work peddling the line that the message did indicate Hanoi was ready for talks without preconditions, and also implying that we lost a chance by resuming so soon. Saigon 4062,8 in today, flags the leak problem and raises the question of what we should be prepared to say. I am drafting a reply, attached as Tab A.9
More basically, Hanoi propaganda is now going all out to play up the four points, while Peking has flatly stated their acceptance is a precondition [Page 729] to talks. I am more than ever sure in retrospect that Hanoi was playing just for the French gloss they appear to be getting, while not in fact committing itself, and of course denouncing the pause in their public statements.
2. The Chen Yi Conversation with the British10
This took place on May 31, and was obviously meant to be conveyed to us. I told the British yesterday they could tell Chen Yi we had received the message. Hopson is seeing Chen Yi again soon.
On substance, Tab B is Lindsey Grant’s analysis,11 with which I agree. Chen Yi was apparently being (a) tough about DRV resolve; (b) mild in the sense that he appeared to be saying China would not come in unless China itself were attacked; (c) tough as to China going all the way if it did come in.
Perhaps the most interesting thing is that Peiping was so forthcoming to Hopson on his first call. While the substance was nothing new, the repetition of a specific message, allegedly sent once through Ayub though not clearly conveyed to us through that channel, plus the length of the discussion, does indicate Peiping wants a channel and has perhaps chosen this one at least for the time being.
Knowledge of the Chen Yi approach is confined to the UKG and USG among allies. It was held very close when first received but [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Thus, it is more widely known within the USG than it should be, but I hope we do not have a leak problem.
3. Indian Proposal and Letter to Shastri
The long draft letter to Shastri, by the President, was rejected as a single letter by the President, and has been revised into a shorter letter, with a long memorandum conveying what was taken out of the letter. We hope the President will approve this morning.12 A major purpose of course is to encourage Shastri to keep the Indian proposal alive; latest word from New Delhi is that the Indians are shaken by negative Communist responses and might not really press it at Algiers, which is where it could play a real role.
Meanwhile, Hanoi is blasting away at the Indian proposal almost daily, usually pairing this with its play-up of the four points (The Bo message also contained a more measured rejection, with reasons.) The purpose is obviously to move the Algiers nations to adopt the four points.
[Page 730]4. U Thant Status
On Monday, I gave Stevenson the full pause story, including the Bo approach and our Seaborn plans, and he saw U Thant Tuesday. Our short report13 does not specifically say what Stevenson conveyed, but I assume it was the works, together with urging U Thant to help the Indian proposal privately. U Thant thought the Indian proposal had little hope, but said he would talk further with Stevenson next week. He is apparently not very itchy, but might at any time revive his idea of a “cease-fire across the 17th”;14 Stevenson has already tried to talk him in the direction—if he does anything at all—of a call for discussions of a broader cessation of hostilities, which we could buy.
5. Consultations with GVN
Ambassador Taylor did have his first talk with Quat and Do, and they were not far apart on ultimate conditions.15 We have had a further exchange with the Embassy on our ideas for a wider GVN initiative, but of course this has not been broached to the GVN.16
Meanwhile, Sullivan has a good short cable in,13 highlighting the need for a GVN statement to match the four points, the sooner the better. I think we would all agree, and perhaps we should be working to get the GVN onto a short general statement (a) using the sequence of our reply to the 17—cessation of aggression, end of “supporting actions” (bombing of the north, perhaps more), SVN to determine its future without external interference, US withdrawal, finally determination of relations between south and north by peaceable means; (b) going as far as possible about GVN willingness to determine the popular will as soon as possible, stressing local elections already held, perhaps implying ex-VC could participate in some formula: (c) saying frankly that the reunification issue could be faced eventually on the basis of a determination of free popular will (Michael Stewart said roughly this Thursday), perhaps even stating free elections right out. Points (b) and (c) would have particular appeal to the world, since Pham Van Dong’s four points would simply put the Liberation Front in at once without elections, and the fourth point on reunification likewise makes no reference to elections.
If you approve, I could put this suggestion to Saigon today for their thoughts. However, if the Ambassador comes back over the weekend, we probably want to await his return. Moreover, we have the imponderable that part of the fire on Quat has been for alleged peace tendencies, [Page 731] and he may be particularly edgy right now. However, they will be in a bad way at Algiers if we do not have a summary statement by the middle of the month, to compete with the four points.
6. Cambodian Conference
The British again pressed the Soviets on June 2, without response. Meanwhile, you have probably seen Sihanouk’s interesting letter to the Times yesterday, which repeats publicly that he will allow any SVN representation the great powers agree on, but is also remarkably frank that he would be swallowed by China if it got power in the area. (We have sent this out to posts, particularly for New Delhi use, in their soft approach to Nong Kimny.) The letter has an air of genuineness, almost of despair; maybe he is now hoping for mercy from the DRV, but he could be extending a wispy branch towards us.
7. Liberation Front Status
One interesting feature of Hanoi’s latest propaganda17 is that it groups the four points with the Liberation Front statement of March 22 (which is harder on its face). This could be an attempt to build up the Front more—again with an eye to Algiers. One of the shoes that could drop at any time would be a formal declaration by the Front of government status (which Michael Stewart alluded to the absence of); I have always thought they might be waiting to capture a provincial capital to do this (Pleiku or Kontum might be best for their geographical reasons).
- Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, June 1965. Top Secret.↩
- See Document 308.↩
- See Document 245.↩
- An authorized statement in English rejecting the 17 Non-Aligned Nation Appeal was broadcast over Hanoi radio on April 19.↩
- See Document 317.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Rusk appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 3. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩
- Not printed.↩
- See Document 321.↩
- Dated June 3.↩
- The letter and accompanying memorandum were transmitted to New Delhi for delivery to Shastri in telegram 2540, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 INDIA)↩
- Not further identified.↩
- See Document 233.↩
- See Document 319.↩
- See Document 320.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩