Office of the Historian

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, May 31, 1965, 3:56 p.m.

2761. Ref Saigon Exdis 3941.2 Record of conversation with Quat and others on political settlement problems exceedingly useful to our thinking and planning here. Since your visit has had to be postponed, we are sending following observations which may be helpful in preparing thoughts you will be presenting to us on rescheduled visit.

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In general we see little serious disparity between position GVN leaders and ourselves. We agree with penultimate paragraph that it in fact important for GVN posture as sovereign independent government that it take its own position, as long as we are in close and constant consultation and understand each other on important matters.

Specific comments follow:

1.
There continues to be active interest here in making of Chieu Hoi program as effective instrument as possible in pursuing struggle against Communists. We will be anxious to learn of conclusions Mission reaches in consultation with special group from Washington which has been looking into problem and we still ready to help with personnel or funds as necessary to maximize program’s effectiveness. We realize one central problem related to Chieu Hoi is probably that of effecting major reform in prisoner treatment and rehabilitation and we will be interested in your recommendations as to how top government officials and military can be persuaded this must be done.
2.
Re Geneva Accords, you should of course continue pursue line that these should form basis for eventual settlement, since any other line would be politically damaging and in fact we feel that Accords offer us several advantages and pose no insuperable problems. We are looking into possible application Rusk-Thanat communiqué to SVN and will let you know results.
3.
Ref to “pushing on all fronts to convince Hanoi that everything of value in DRV will be destroyed” not clear. Is it meant to refer to importance of credibility of threat as influence on Hanoi’s readiness turn to negotiations or does it relate to judgment about how military action against North should develop in future, with regard to intensity as well as location and character of targets?
4.
Believe you can adequately reassure GVN on question US troop withdrawal since this is an action which we would not be taking without full consultation with GVN and not until we are satisfied that northern aggression no longer a threat and GVN capable handling security problem in South. In any case we envisage phased withdrawal capable being timed or even reversed in response developments.
5.
Re modalities for reaching settlement we can envisage, if tacit arrangement being pursued, situations in which it might at no point be necessary to have confrontation of viewpoints with DRV even though some formal meeting to put international stamp of approval on settlement might be required.
6.
With reference question 3G agree that actions will certainly speak louder than words with DRV. However, their own statements make it quite clear that Viet Cong and Peking and almost surely Hanoi as well are counting on governmental pressure (abroad) and private protest (at home) against US policies and actions to deter us from pursuing our [Page 700] objectives as fully and vigorously as may be necessary. More effective GVN efforts around the world, if such did not too seriously tax personal resources needed at home, could make significant contribution to our joint efforts. As you are aware,GVN Embassy Washington virtually a cipher and we are contemplating measures to bring about improvement. In considering public relations problem either here or in Saigon we are reminded again of Dang Duc Khoi and wonder if GVN prepared put him back to work.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Unger and cleared by William Bundy.↩
  2. Document 319.↩