Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, May 27, 1965, 3:48 p.m.

2718. We are considering asking Canadians to instruct Seaborn to bear message to Hanoi, when he leaves May 31, for delivery to senior DRV official if and only if his first contacts with his normal liaison contact, in which he would inquire about availability senior officials, meet with forthcoming response and DRV initiative for appointment. We would not wish Seaborn to press for senior appointment and we would not wish him to deliver at lower liaison level any message other than that USG believes it has made its position clear and continues to await Hanoi’s response.

Proposed presentation Seaborn would make to senior official would be as follows:

1. In my last visit,² I conveyed a statement of US views concerning South Viet-Nam, which followed the lines of what the USG had stated to Peiping representatives at Warsaw. That statement, of course, remains valid. Its essential points have been repeated subsequently in public, and it would perhaps be wise to underscore particularly the manifest US determination to persist in the defense of freedom in SVN and to take those continuing actions which are, in the view of the USG, justified and made necessary by the continuing aggression of others.

2. Since my last visit, the USG has of course further publicly stated its position in President Johnson’s speech of April 7 and in the US reply to the note of the 17 non-aligned nations,³ in which the USG further defined its readiness for unconditional discussions, its objectives, and the sequence of actions that might lead to a peaceful solution of the problem.

3. The USG has been disappointed to note that actions in the South supported and directed by Hanoi appear to continue without change, and even to be currently intensified. The USG notes that Hanoi expressed no readiness for discussions in its reply to the 17 nonaligned nations, that it responded negatively to the proposal for a conference concerning Cambodia,⁴ and that it has been negative toward the recent Indian proposal⁵ even as a basis for discussions.

4. In addition, the USG informed Hanoi on May 12⁶ that it was undertaking a temporary suspension of bombing attacks for a period of several days. The USG regrets that this action met with no response from Hanoi neither directly nor in the form of any significant reductions of armed actions in South Viet-Nam by forces whose actions, in the view of the USG, can be decisively affected from North Viet-Nam. Accordingly, the USG, in coordination with the Republic of Viet-Nam, was obliged to resume bombing attacks. Nonetheless, the USG continues to consider the possibility of working toward a solution by mutual example.

5. In making these points, the USG again must make it clear that in the absence of action or discussions leading to a political solution it must and will take whatever actions may be necessary to meet and to counter the offensive actions being carried out by North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam and against American forces acting to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam.

6. If but only if senior DRV representative gets on to Pham Van Dong four points of April 8,⁷ Seaborn would reply that he has no message from USG on this subject. However, his study of four points would indicate that some might be acceptable to USG but that others would clearly be unacceptable. It has also not been clear whether DRV statements should be taken to mean that the recognition of these points was required as, in effect, a condition for any discussions. He would say that the USG appears to have made its position clear, that it would accept unconditional discussions in the full sense, with either side free to bring up any matter, and that he would be personally interested in whether the DRV representative wished to clarify the question of whether their recognition is regarded by the DRV as a condition to any discussions. End proposed text.

In presenting these instructions to the Canadians, we would explain that paragraph 4 represents a reiteration of the message conveyed to Hanoi at the time of the pause, and that paragraph 6 is an attempt to elicit clarification on the repeated DRV formulation of the four points. At the same time, we have not wished to appear to be taking any real new initiative for discussion. You will note also that the formulation, as well as the explanation to the Canadians, makes no reference to the recent Bo approach in Paris,⁸ on which we have not informed the Canadians and which we would not wish to seem to be picking up as such. At the same time, part of the reason for paragraph 6 is that we have some concern that the Bo approach might have been designed to have the French pass the word in diplomatic channels that Hanoi is actually ready for discussions without prior conditions, which might invite some unhelpful initiative by the French or perhaps by U Thant or others. If Seaborn should in fact use paragraph 6 and the DRV representative should respond that acceptance of the four points is a necessary precondition, we would have learned something; equally, it would indicate what might be a significant change if Hanoi should take a different position. We suppose that the former would be the result, based on our over-all reading of Hanoi’s position at this time, but at least the point would be somewhat better nailed down.

Request your comments on this whole approach. If you concur, we should be going ahead with the Canadians tomorrow if possible so that instructions could reach Seaborn in time.⁹

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Unger and Thompson, and approved by Ball and Rusk. Repeated to Ottawa.
2. See footnote 7, Document 199.
3. See Document 245.
4. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 716.
5. See Document 285.
6. See Document 293.
7. See Document 245.
8. See Document 313.
9. In telegram 3927 from Saigon, May 28, the Embassy endorsed the proposed channel and message, with suggestions for minor revisions. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 2732 to Saigon, May 28, the Department informed the Embassy that the Canadian Government was being requested to instruct Seaborn along the lines indicated in telegram 2718. (Ibid.) On May 30 the Embassy cabled the Department that Seaborn had received instructions that stipulated that he should ask for an appointment with the North Vietnamese Prime Minister or Foreign Minister and take the initiative in raising the question of Pham Van Dong’s Four Points as a basis for negotiations. The Embassy felt that this was contrary to the message outlined in telegram 2718 and asked Seaborn to wait for confirmation. (Telegram 3956 from Saigon; ibid.) The Department responded in telegram 2754 to Saigon, May 30, that the Canadian Embassy had confirmed that new instructions were being sent to Seaborn to bring his mission to Hanoi back into line with the intent outlined in telegram 2718. (Ibid.)