Office of the Historian

185. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)1

Honolulu, March 6, 1965, 12:35 p.m.

CINCPAC 062235Z. A. COMUSMACV MAC 1190 DTG 060500Z.2 B. CINCPAC 050401Z.3

1.
General Westmoreland’s commander’s estimate in Ref A is the best analysis of the situation in Vietnam which I have seen. So far as the estimate itself is concerned, there is nothing that I can add.
2.
However, I should like to reemphasize certain of his observations in order to give even stronger support to recommendations I have already made in Ref B as to:
A.
The increased use of air in RVN.
B.
The necessity for much tighter control over coastal shipping.
C.
Requirement for use of U.S. forces in security missions within Vietnam.
D.
The need for a U.S. logistic base within country.
3.
In Westmoreland’s estimation the war has moved out of the purely guerilla phase and into a more formalized military conflict. It is essential, therefore, that we recognize this transition and react immediately and with our best tactics and weapons. Obviously it is a situation which should allow us to employ our airpower. Anything, therefore, [Page 408] which can be done to bolster the tactical air control system must be accomplished as a matter of urgency and I will support any new requirements in this area. Similarly I support with enthusiasm the requirement stated for additional experts for the targets research and analysis center and the allied equipment for dfing and IR recce. The target acquisition function is absolutely vital to proper employment of air. You know my strong feelings as to the requirement for the MEB(-) at Danang. In the light of Westmoreland’s estimate I would put even a higher priority on its employment. Aside from all the other considerations which would argue in favor of this deployment we must give ourselves some insurance against a collapse of the ARVN will or ability to resist in the critical area of Danang where we have so much already committed. In this connection it may again be appropriate to consider establishment of a U.S. logistic base in this area.
4.
In the matter of sea surveillance and patrol of coastal waters, we are, of course, in the midst of studying and preparing to deal with this problem. Certainly the U.S. Navy should be able to control shipping other than junk traffic off the coast of RVN.
  1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV, Message Files Top Secret. Repeated to COMUSMACV.↩
  2. Document 182.↩
  3. Not found.↩