182. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)1
MAC 1190. 1. This message replies to JCS 0718–65.2
2. Agree with the substance of the four paragraphs which you quoted from the CIA memorandum.3 However, I feel that the terms “large gains” and “accelerating” are suggestive of changes which are both massive and rapid. Except for Binh Dinh and Phu Yen, this is not the case. The security situation in I Corps and the bulk of II Corps has been steadily deteriorating since mid-1964. The developments in Binh Dinh suggest that we are approaching a point in the deterioration process which must be recognized as critical.
3. The overall situation is assessed as follows.
- A.
- General: Throughout the RVN the Viet Cong hold the initiative. They have had continuing success in their efforts to consolidate political gains in the rural areas; to increase their military strength by a combination of infiltrated cadre and levies on available manpower; and to improve their organization, weaponry, and logistic capability. Through the use of military action, intimidation, and propaganda, they are implanting a sense of the inevitability of VC success. The VC have a propaganda advantage. The GVN combat losses are well publicized, but even larger losses of the Viet Cong are shrouded in secrecy, thus having less impact on the people.
- B.
- The several corps areas:
- (1)
- In I Corps, the VC have continued to extend their influence through the piedmont and into the lowlands despite some successful, albeit limited, ARVN operations, and despite serious VC losses. The VC have, in effect, isolated the centers of GVN strength from access to the rest of the population. In short, they have succeeded in erasing the pacification gains made by GVN prior to mid-1964.
- (2)
- In II Corps, GVN forces are on the defensive and pacification efforts have stopped. The VC are expected to commit more forces in the northern provinces of II Corps in an effort to depress GVN morale further, or, hopefully, force a psychological collapse. Some GVN forces in II Corps are already in a pessimistic frame of mind and are reluctant to [Page 401] engage in offensive operations. Meanwhile, Montagnard situation, while temporarily quiescent, may explode at any time. Five battalions of the general reserve are in the process of being committed in II Corps in order to bolster morale and to prevent any further deterioration of the situation.
- (3)
- In III Corps, an apparent force equilibrium has been reached, the Hop Tac campaign cannot move much further forward without substantial reinforcement. At the same time, the general reserve, on which Hop Tac has heretofore depended for reaction forces and for spoiling operations on the periphery, has been committed to other geographic areas. By contrast, the VC has the capability of upsetting the equilibrium should they opt to commit part or all of their reserves in the critical provinces surrounding Saigon.
- (4)
- In IV Corps while the VC incident rate remains comparatively high, the intensity is low. Only in the contiguous provinces of Dinh Tuong and Go Cong has the GVN made any measurable pacification advances in recent months. There are indications that the VC are regrouping main force elements into regimental formations and, although the GVN has recently inflicted some sharp losses on the VC, they can raise the intensity of military action at any time.
4. To make the forecast which you requested, I have taken the above estimates as a base and have projected the trends we now discern without admitting new factors. I recognize that we have already set in train new actions which can significantly affect the power equation. Nonetheless, I have tried to answer the question, “If we continue the course of action we are now following, what will be the situation six months hence?” I am unable to deal with this subject in 60 day increments as suggested—given all the variables at play, such refinement is just not possible. The forecast for the next six months, made under these limitations, is as follows:
- A.
- The VC, holding the initiative, will increase the tempo and intensity of their activities throughout the RVN, but most particularly in the northern and central parts of the country. At the same time they will be strengthening existing units, forming new ones, and regrouping the main forces into larger formations while re-equipping them with standardized armament. Concurrently, they will be making maximum efforts to consolidate and strengthen their political organization in areas under their control, to extend population control into contested areas, and to penetrate areas held by GVN forces.
- B.
- The bulk of VC military operations will be directed toward driving GVN forces into isolated strongholds—separated from the majority of the population—by denying lines of communications, by encroaching on coastal areas; and by attacking GVN forces wherever found in limited strength.