Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

186. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, March 7, 1965, 3 p.m.

2879. General Johnson’s party² met with US Mission Council for about three hours on afternoon of March 5. Most of time was spent in discussing causes for retardation of pacification program and areas for possible additional effort to eliminate these causes.

I opened discussion by expressing view that our basic unresolved problem is provision of adequate security for population; that without security most of our other programs are rendered either impossible or of marginal effectiveness. Given security and reasonable time, all of our other problems will fall into place.

Failure to provide security results, I suggested, from three primary causes which, in turn, derive from many secondary and tertiary ones. These three are (1) lack of satisfactory progress in destroying VC insurgents in countryside, (2) continuing capability of VC to replace losses and increase in strength and (3) our inability to establish and maintain an effective government.

Lack of progress in suppressing insurgency is in large measure consequence of insufficient trained military, para-military and police manpower. In spite of build-up of forces in 1964, we have never been able to achieve numerical superiority over VC in excess of 5 to 1 whereas all historical examples in recent past suggest need of superiority of counterinsurgency forces on order of 10–20 to 1. It is essential to make maximum effort in 1965 to raise new forces and improve use of those already in being. Such an effort on part of GVN calls for an overall improvement, in use of manpower for pacification purposes, an efficient application of conscription law, practical measures to increase attractiveness of military and police service and removal of all bottlenecks which presently impede further increase in capacity of training organization.

Limited effectiveness in many provinces of pacification programs which must follow on heels of military clearing operations is another cause of lack of progress against insurgency. These represent, in general, provincial activities of ministries involved in pacification, such as Ministries of Interior, Health, Agriculture, Public Works and Rural Affairs. Throughout 1964 these ministries were weak and ineffective because of governmental instability in Saigon. As result, their programs have lacked continuity and personnel charged with their execution have been constantly rotating. Thus, military successes when they have occurred are frequently not exploited; areas cleared are not held; areas cleared and held are not developed and VC infrastructure remains in villages and hamlets ready to emerge when troops move on.

Throughout this period, counterinsurgency efforts have been plagued by popular apathy and dwindling morale, consequences of long war with no end in sight. There is no sense of dedication on our side comparable to that instilled into VC and no popular commitment to suceeding governments which, because of their constantly changing character, have tended to repel rather than to attract confidence and support.

Second primary cause of our lack of success, continuing growth of VC, I attributed to open frontiers of SVN, land and sea, which it has been impossible to close to infiltration, uninterrupted activities of DRV in reinforcing VC, and continued ability of VC to find recruits in SVN. Frontier problem is result of nature; there are 2500 miles of land and sea frontier to police and inadequate means to effect any thing like complete surveillance. Even with vast increases of manpower, ships and other equipment for mission, frontiers can never be hermetically sealed. Land and air incursions by GVN forces into Cambodia, Laos and DRV could assist in limiting infiltration but there are valid political arguments which impose restraints on such operations and there is a shortage of manpower which would limit them even if political objections did not exist. These facts do not argue against trying to do better job at closing frontiers but do suggest that there is an early point of diminishing returns for such efforts.

The continued support of VC from DRV is heart of infiltration problem. If frontiers cannot be closed from inside—and we are convinced that they cannot—then only way to stop infiltration is to get Hanoi to order it to stop. Such is fundamental justification for Barrel Roll and Rolling Thunder operations. In combination with 34–A activities, they constitute our principal hope of ending infiltration—and end it we must if in-country pacification is to succeed.

It is true that VC, even then, would be able to continue to recruit locally in SVN where lack of security against terrorism and absence of commitment to Saigon govt have favored VC recruiters. However, successful application of pressure on Hanoi offers hope of changing many unfavorable conditions which have worked against us in past; one of which has been this past willingness of many country boys to join VC. An improved national morale, consequence of offensive action against Hanoi, may provide at least partial antidote.

Causes for our failure to establish and maintain an effective govt have been their roots in historical and racial factors difficult to define in precise terms. SVN has never been nation in spirit and, until recently, has never had govt which people could regard as their own. Even now their instinct is to consider any govt as intrinsically their enemy. They have always been divided by racial and religious differences, which over centuries their alien rulers have sought to perpetuate. As result, there seems to be no cement to bind together various elements of heterogeneous society, no instinctive herding together even under threat of war. Since the fall of Diem and sudden removal of restraints imposed by his dictatorial regime, natural tendency to disunity and factionalism has been allowed free play, both among civilian politicians and among generals. Resulting field day has been marked by series of demonstrations, bonze immolations and military coups which have produced political turbulence of last 15 months.

This governmental instability has contributed to most of deficiencies already described in our pacification efforts. Shortage in manpower, inadequate performance of ministries in provinces, popular apathy and poor morale, VC success in attracting recruits all are by-products of weak govt and cannot be completely corrected until some reasonably effective govt is established and maintained for prolonged period—for months at least, perhaps for years. Statement does not suggest that we cannot make significant progress even under present conditions but it does emphasize unlikelihood of quick results and inadequacy of US aid, no matter how massive, to effect sudden changes in national characteristics and inbred habits which lie at root of our difficulties.

Against background of general agreement in foregoing statement nature of our problem, we then considered areas where, if progress can be made, we will be striking at sources of our fundamental difficulties. In this spirit, it was agreed to explore possibility of increased activity in following areas:

A. Improvement in training and mobility of existing forces.

B. Priorities in use of existing forces.

C. Means to expand capacity of training establishment.

D. Ways to give greater attractiveness to military service.

E. Use of US manpower to offset present shortage in armed forces of GVN.

F. Use of US Navy resources to strengthen surveillance of coast and waterways.

G. Increased tempo for Barrel Roll and Rolling Thunder.

H. Expanded use of Peoples Action (Quang Ngai) Teams.

I. Increased US assistance in combatting economic blockage of central Vietnam.

J. Preparations to cope with mounting refugee problem in central Vietnam.

K. Improved procedures and equipment for resources control.

L. Vitalization of public info programs and provision of 250 kw transmitter for Saigon.

M. Prompt filling of all outstanding personnel requests supported by US Mission.

Meeting broke up with understanding that foregoing areas would be examined in subsequent discussions with Washington visitors and that all parties would be free to table any other suggestions as to actions which might benefit pacification program.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. See Document 179.