Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

174. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)¹

Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:35 p.m.

JCS 739–65. Reference MAC 1061.²

1. In all honesty, I must admit that we here recognize the policy and procedural difficulties imposed upon you, your staff, the GVN and VNAF by close control of Rolling Thunder exercised by Washington. Hence, I will not address the several points which you logically raise. Let me assure you that we here, both the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, are doing our utmost to clear away the restrictions which hinder you in carrying out your mission. However, you should understand that there are sizable and vexing domestic and international political problems inherent in our military operations against the DRV. Washington authorities are attempting to steer a careful course which maximizes the effect of our operations both inside and outside South Vietnam, while minimizing the chance of suddenly escalating military action to the point where the ChiComs would become involved. Setting aside the weather problem, the recent visit of Mr. Kosygin to Hanoi and the Communist conference now underway in Moscow have contributed to the political problems being faced here and have had an impact upon contemplated military action.

2. You may ask what does the future hold? Recall that Yankee Team and Barrel Roll missions were subject to the same type of restrictions when these operations were first initiated. Over a period of time, restrictions here have been relaxed as people became used to the idea of conducting recce and making strikes in Laos. We are working toward setting up some such similar procedure for Rolling Thunder; i.e., agreeing upon a bank of targets to be struck by VNAF and U.S. forces at times to be selected by field commanders in accordance with the weather and other operational factors. In this connection, it is most important to get off this next Rolling Thunder to break what seems to be a psychological/political log jam.

3. In furtherance of my cable reporting on 26 February high-level meeting,³ we are putting together here a list of possible actions in country which will improve the over-all situation. On the list is the proposal by you to give field commanders full authority to utilize jet aircraft in the area as required to support the war effort against the VC. Another is to do away with the Farmgate concept as you also suggested. I cite these items only as evidence that we understand and sympathize with your views, and we are doing our utmost to untie your hands.

4. As noted above, I have already received a number of ideas from addressees concerning future helpful actions and programs to further our cause in Southeast Asia. If any others occur to you, please let me have the benefit of your thinking.

1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers,COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Sharp.
2. In MAC 1061, March 1, addressed to Wheeler and Sharp, Westmoreland raised several questions about the policies and procedures for combined reprisal strikes. (Ibid.)
3. Document 170.