Office of the Historian

170. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)1

Washington, February 27, 1965, 4:52 p.m.

JCS 736–65. At highest level meeting held evening 26 February Washington time2 to explore Vietnamese problem the following decisions were taken:

A.
Phased deployment ashore at Da Nang of two BLT’s and a helicopter squadron of 9th MEB was approved. Deployment of 3d BLT and remainder of command and support elements (including fixed-wing aircraft component) was deferred for future decision.
B.
Medium level photo recce of the southern part of North Vietnam in conjunction with Rolling Thunder IV was approved. Separate Blue Tree message refers.3
C.
Recognizing that Rolling Thunder probably could not be executed on 27 February for weather reasons, execution on 28 February or as soon thereafter as weather permits was favorably considered. You will, of course, be advised by separate messages of strike approvals.

2.
It was made clear that U.S. policy is as follows:
A.
Do everything possible to maximize our military efforts to reverse present unfavorable situation.
B.
In accordance with A. above, increase substantially our military efforts in South Vietnam. More on this in subsequent paragraphs. Increase tempo and effectiveness of our strikes against DRV being careful to avoid pushing them to the extent of forcing ChiCom intervention.
C.
In view of lack of interest exhibited by Hanoi and Peking in negotiations at this time and the weakness of the GVN/U.S. position at the Council table, refrain from early negotiations. In this connection it was recognized that the preliminaries to any realistic negotiations would require at least three to six months to produce results, making it even more necessary for us to take positive action to reverse the unfavorable situation in South Vietnam by all means available.
3.
On the military side, the following items were discussed in an exploratory way centering about the desire to determine what military actions can be increased or what new actions can be taken to improve the over-all situation.
A.
Provision of additional U.S. advisors at the fighting unit level.
B.
Measures to improve intelligence so that VC installations and concentrations can be detected and struck from the air.
C.
Provision of more helicopters for both surveillance and fire support.
D.
Increased use of U.S. jet aircraft in South Vietnam to support the conterinsurgency effort. In this connection, COMUSMACV’s recommendations4 are being processed by the Joint Staff.
E.
Increased use of light observation type aircraft, perhaps with a photo capability, to find VC targets.
F.
U.S. naval augmentation of efforts of Vietnamese Navy to prevent infiltration of material from the sea. In this connection, CINCPAC’s present proposals and actions4 were noted. In addition, the idea was advanced that low-level helicopter reconnaissance patrols along selected VC dominated coastal areas might be used effectively to augment surface patrol and fixed-wing air patrol.
G.
Note was taken of actual and prospective removal of military commanders and province and district chiefs by Little Minh, Ky, and Thi. There was concern that these actions represent continuing and dangerous friction in the higher military levels and that this attitude plus the removals themselves, will further weaken the already fragile military and government control.
4.
The entire conference reflected determination to press forward despite difficulties to achieve the limited objectives set by the U.S. in Southeast Asia. At the same time, there was evident concern that we are not doing enough to achieve these objectives. All present were invited to present ideas in their respective fields which will enhance our efforts. In turn, addressees are requested to comment as they desire on the above items and to put forward other ideas.
5.
In view of the sensitivity of certain portions of this message, request that it be handled on a close-hold basis.
  1. Source: Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup #13. Top Secret. Also sent to Westmoreland.↩
  2. The President discussed Vietnam in a meeting from 7:05 to 8:35 p.m. on February 26 with Rusk, Ball, McNamara, and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting has been found.↩
  3. Not further identified.↩
  4. Not further identified.↩