Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

173. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, March 1, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam

1. Welcome Home.²

2. I have heard it said that you’ll be off and running at the crack of dawn. I hope not. What is needed now is more walking and less running. Perhaps a bit of just plain sitting would be useful. I’ll come back to this theme later but let me, first, bring you up to date.

3. On the Political front:

a. The Government seems to be settling down after the Khanh affair. Quat seems to be more sure-footed than his predecessor. Relations (at least as they come through the cables) between the Embassy and the Government seem to be less subjective, more businesslike. Quat’s statement that the “war must end”³ (quoted out of context by the press) aroused some worry here, but subsequent words and actions indicate determination to press ahead on all fronts.

b. The Buddhists, while giving at least tacit support to the Government, are causing troubles by unhelpful statements on the part of key venerables in favor of negotiations and U.S. withdrawal (it is not always clear which they want first). A “peace” group, with active Buddhist support if not sponsorship, has been active in Saigon as well as in the Northern provinces.

c. The Catholics are worried about increasing Buddhist influence and, while behaving themselves thus far, may stir things up.

d. The generals (especially Ky, Thi and now-discredited Adm. Cang) have by no means settled down to business. Although they make the proper noises, there is enough behind-the-scene activity to indicate that we have by no means seen the end of their maneuvering.

4. On the Negotiations front:

a. There were some traumatic hours last week as a result of U Thant’s press statements⁴ (he tabled “proposals”, the American people were not getting the “truth”, he had assurances that Hanoi was “willing to talk”). This has calmed down now, but I fear it has badly damaged U Thant’s relations with the President and Rusk and that it forced us to talk more and more deprecatingly about negotiations than we may have wished.

b. The UK-Soviet contacts seem to be on dead-center, but apparently still have some life.

c. The French-Soviet conversations appear to have stalled on the issue of preconditions (the Soviets want the U.S. to call off bombing the North prior to a conference). There are signs that France wants to press its role as Negotiators-in-Chief, willy-nilly.

d. Rusk’s press conference⁵ went off very well and his repeated reference to the lack of any indication that the Communists are willing to engage in any meaningful talk—“the missing piece” made a wholesome impact in the press.

5. On the Communist front:

a. Kosygin’s speech⁶ was tough, but measured and not excessively shrill. New element was that we should get out of South Korea as well as Vietnam.

b. Peiping has been its usually unpleasant self, but nothing momentous to note since the last outburst (made before you left) that we have “erased” the 17th parallel as a demarcation line.

c. Hanoi has generally been shrill, arrogant, and blustering, but has said nothing so unusual as to send analysts back to their drawing boards.

d. There has been no discernible hint out of any of these capitals that would lead even an optimist to feel that “meaningful” talks are in sight.

e. Neither Kosygin’s trip nor any other development seems to have done anything to repair Sino-Soviet relations. Rather the reverse.

6. On the Pacification front:

a. Nothing good to report. The situation on the ground in Vietnam is slipping. Nothing new since you left—just more of the same.

b. Taylor has asked that we not send a working-level team from here to look into the situation (“not necessary”). He welcomes visit by Bill Bundy, however.⁷ Meanwhile, there has been some talk and some thinking here which is all to the good, but which in itself will butter no parsnips. I will have more views on this by Tuesday,⁸ after a session this afternoon with Unger and Bundy.

c. The President has expressed concern and understandable frustration re this problem. He keeps wondering if we are doing all we can. I have talked at length with Unger on Bright Ideas and Bright Boys. Have resuscitated the Psy War Committee. Have pressed for careful examination by Unger’s Committee of all ideas, no matter how superficially kooky they might initially appear. Unger has appointed Bright Boy (Rafferty) to follow through.

7. On South Vietnam Military front:

a. Decision re Marines at Da Nang involves immediate deployment of one battalion for airport security, and remainder of Brigade in increments in due course. This story leaked out of Saigon today.

b. Much activity by U.S. bombers against VC concentrations. Damage (i.e., VC casualties) may well be considerable, but reliable read-out is lacking. The only thing we know has happened is that we knocked out an ARVN regimental command post.

c. No major VC or ARVN victories. Incidents at about average level, mostly ambushes and miscellaneous atrocities.

d. Largest chopper operation of the war (about 170) netted nothing.

8. On NVN Military front:

a. Weather and other over-riding considerations washed out several Rolls of Thunder.⁹

b. Attached military roundup¹⁰ will give you the status of other ops.

9. Miscellany:

a. Advance ROK contingent (600 men) arrived and put in place without incident.¹¹

b. White Paper¹² published after much anguish.

c. Ambassador Lodge, Presidential Consultant on Vietnam, in place (Komer’s office).¹³ He has been read in and will get some briefings Tuesday prior to making his rounds. Will be here for about a week.

10. The Home front:

a. So much for where we stand. The real question, though, is where are we going? We are in a new phase of the war, both as regards the North (Rolling Thunder) and the South (U.S. bombing of VC concentrations). The hope is that we will bang sense (or fear) into Hanoi, and will significantly damage VC capabilities in the South. So far so good. But suppose neither happens at present levels of activity? Do we step them up, or turn them off? Presumably, the former. But there are three factors emerging within South Vietnam that should be ground into the calculations. All of them have been alluded to in earlier paragraphs: The fragile relationship among the generals, the “peace movement”, the faltering pacification program.

b. I am aware that we all agreed that our requirements for a central government should be very modest, but this was on the assumption that we had a military chain of command. What might emerge is an acceptable government, but discord among the military. This cannot be shrugged off. One of the Rolling Thunders was cancelled last week because the VNAF had not recovered from the aftermath of the coup.

c. The “peace movement” at the moment appears to be relatively insignificant. But I am not confident that it will remain so. The Buddhist bonzes have been making strange noises lately and are in a position, in the light of their following and the general war weariness, to give it a good shove.

d. Unless we can get cracking fast (i.e., tomorrow), on reversing the trend in the pacification program, our air activity will have bought us considerable risks, but not much else. And I am a little worried that much of our energies here in Washington (and I suspect in Saigon as well) are absorbed in targeting, scheduling, and press releases, rather than the grubby business of clearing and holding.

e. This lugubrious rack-up could add up to a situation where the pressure for negotiations has expanded—internationally (perhaps not very important), in the U.S. (important, but not critical), and in South Vietnam (critical). Meanwhile we haven’t gained much purchase for our troubles.

11. Every military plan has (or is supposed to have) an alternative in the event matters do not proceed as planned. For some reason, it is regarded as treasonable, defeatist—or at least chicken-hearted—to do the same kind of “what if—?” planning in the case of a political scenario. But we have a great stake in our present Vietnam policy (greater than ever before). And for our policy to come off we must rely on several factors over which we have little or no direct control. We cannot simply assume things will go as we plan or hope. We should have some alternative course in mind, in the event that the march of events does not proceed according to our plans and desires. Obviously, there are many imponderables, and it would be footless [foolish] to try to out-guess chance or fate. But, and this is my plea, an effort should be undertaken to develop options as we proceed down our present path. Such an effort will not be exerted unless it is ordered on a priority basis by high authority. I know; I’ve tried. Key people are too absorbed by today’s flaps to have time for tomorrow’s problems.

12. Welcome back!

CLC

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX. Top Secret.
2. McGeorge Bundy had been vacationing in Florida during the last week in February.
3. At the ceremony on February 25 at which General Nguyen Khanh turned over command of the Vietnamese armed forces to General Tran Van Minh, Prime Minister Quat was quoted as saying that South Vietnam was “suffering too much” and “we want to end the war with honor.”
4. See Documents 161, 162, and 164.
5. See footnote 3, Document 157.
6. A speech given on television that day and analyzed in detail in Hughes’ February 26 memorandum to Rusk. (Department of State,INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam INR Studies 64–65)
7. See Document 167.
8. March 2.
9. For a list of Rolling Thunder missions planned but postponed during late February, see R.C. Bowman’s March 1 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. IV.
10. Not attached and not printed.
11. Details regarding the arrival of the Korean contingent on February 25 were provided in William Bundy’s February 26 memorandum to Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files,POL 27 VIET S)
12. See Document 171.
13. See Document 166.