Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

157. Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, February 23, 1965.

VIET NAM

It seems desirable and timely for me to put down an outline of my own thinking about a comprehensive approach to our effort to assure the security of South Viet Nam. I am convinced that there is no single miracle-working approach which can get the job done. I am convinced that it would be disastrous for the United States and the free world to permit Southeast Asia to be overrun by the Communist North. I am also convinced that everything possible should be done to throw back the Hanoi-Viet Cong aggression without a major war if possible. We cannot accomplish this result without the risk of major escalation; but the other side, too, must face and worry about the same risk.

I. Stable and Unified Government in South Viet Nam

The highest possible priority must be given by us and the South Vietnamese to the establishment of a government and leadership which not only is stable but looks stable. Without the elementary platform, other efforts in the military and political field are likely to prove fruitless. Political confusion in Saigon (a) diverts military leaders away from their main job of fighting the Viet Cong, (b) undermines the capacity of administration throughout the country to take effective action in pacification and the non-military measures required to organize the countryside, (c) undermines the morale and sense of purpose of the American people, (d) frustrates our effort to obtain increasing help from other free world countries to South Viet Nam, (e) most important of all, convinces Hanoi and its Communist allies that if they persist in their present course of action, they have every prospect of victory, and (f) finally, political confusion in Saigon makes it almost impossible to activate political processes which have the prospect of resulting in the security of South Viet Nam.

It is not easy to prescribe from Washington what further steps the United States can take to bring about greater unity and stability in the GVN. If General Khanh does in fact leave the country, it would be timely for Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland to interview all of the principal political and military leaders and to obtain from them a pledge to demonstrate both publicly and in their actions that, at long last, they are prepared to put aside personal rivalries and work together for the security of South Viet Nam. Every effort should be made to obtain public declarations of support from any and all of the existing non-governmental groups, including Buddhists, Catholics, labor, students, business, or anyone else whose voice can add to a chorus of unified determination.

II. Increased Effort by the South Vietnamese

The gravity of the present situation in South Viet Nam, as well as the gravity of the decisions with which the United States is faced, calls for maximum effort on the part of the South Vietnamese. The slightest acceptance of a “business as usual” situation is not consistent with the possibility of an explosion into larger hostilities nor with the experience of other guerrilla actions in Greece, Malaysia and elsewhere. Apart from the governmental question, discussed above, the South Vietnamese should undertake (a) additional measures of mobilization, (b) the organization of the civilian population into a pacification effort, with emphasis upon information and intelligence, (c) vigorous execution by the South Vietnamese of agreed psychological warfare programs, on which the South Vietnamese have been dilatory and ineffective, (d) sharply increased international diplomatic and political effort, (e) intensified military and pacification effort on the basis of a 24-hour day and 7-day week. It should be made clear that intensified South Vietnamese efforts should not be limited by budgetary considerations or US financial and material support.

III. US Effort in South Viet Nam

We ourselves should consider whether there are additional steps which we ought to take in South Viet Nam. Apart from the political results which increased efforts might achieve, we should think of the importance of conveying a signal to Hanoi and Peiping that they themselves cannot hope to succeed without a substantial escalation on their part, with all of the risks which they would have to face. I would favor the immediate stationing in Da Nang of a Marine battalion combat team, to be reinforced promptly to a brigade if the security situation calls for it. I would also favor the use of US Naval forces, particularly destroyers, to reinforce counter-junk operations and to ensure that there are no repetitions of seaborne Viet Cong supply similar to the recent ship discovered in Vung Ro Bay. US destroyers could assist GVN junks and other craft in systematic surveillance of those portions of the seacoast not securely in government hands. They could act as command ships for flotillas of smaller craft to intensify and tighten surveillance of junk traffic coming both from the North and Cambodia. Our military authorities should be asked to be certain that every possible step is being taken for the security of key installations, such as intensive patrolling and the dispersal of the living quarters of American personnel. The military should be asked to look again at the applicability of our most sophisticated conventional weapons, some of which are still highly classified and have not been used. We should continue to permit US aircraft of all types to engage in direct action against the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam.²

IV. Strikes into North Viet Nam

For the present, strikes into North Viet Nam should be considered as serving the political purpose of indicating to the North that they cannot expect to rely upon a sanctuary in the face of their increased infiltration and operations in South Viet Nam.

In this respect, they play their part alongside of MAROPS and our air missions in Laos. The more air strikes against North Viet Nam can be directly linked to specific events in South Viet Nam, the better from a general political point of view. If, at a given moment, there are political reasons for deferring a strike (such as political confusion in Saigon or a major international political contact), we should not bind ourselves to a specific schedule. A strike directly related to the full examination of the evidence of the ship at Vung Ro Bay would involve smaller political difficulties than one not so related. To the extent that strikes can be specifically related to events in South Viet Nam, the responsibility for major escalation will continue to rest with the other side.

V. Political Possibilities

Obviously, the United States should be ready to take advantage of any political possibility of bringing the fighting in Southeast Asia to an end consistent with the security of South Viet Nam and of Laos. The international political objective should be to bring about a cessation of infiltration and the repatriation of those previously infiltrated. This would include, of course, assured compliance with the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos. Negotiation as a cover for the abandonment of Southeast Asia to the Communist North cannot be accepted. This is a weakness of President De Gaulle’s attitude. A formal and public negotiation at this time which would simply register the impossibility of a peaceful settlement would add even greater dangers to the present situation. Our problem is to bring about a combination of circumstances in which negotiations can achieve the abandonment of aggression by Hanoi and Peiping. We have no reliable evidence that Hanoi and Peiping are prepared for any such result. The attitude of the Soviet Union is somewhat more equivocal and it should be a major effort on our part to keep the Soviet Union from complete solidarity with Hanoi and Peiping about Southeast Asia. I will discuss orally the various contacts and possibilities as they shape up at the present time.

VI. Reiteration of Policy

There is some danger that protracted periods of silence on our part can lead to an impression either of indecision or of discouragement and nervousness. Although the essential elements of our policy have been stated many times, reiteration is necessary to remind public opinion here and abroad of the essentials as we see them. I would consider these essentials to be the following:

(1) The right of the nations of Southeast Asia to be left alone by their neighbors to work out their own national life and their own international policy without interference by others;

(2) The systematic and large-scale infiltration of trained personnel by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam contrary to the Geneva Agreements and international law;

(3) The large scale and illegal infiltration of arms by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam;

(4) The absence of any US desire for a national military presence in Southeast Asia, whether in the form of bases or in the form of the continuing presence of American military personnel;

(5) Our commitment to the settlements of 1954 and 1962;

(6) The absence of any desire on our part to destroy by military means the regimes in North Viet Nam or Mainland China;

(7) Our receptivity to political action which would achieve a result consistent with these essential elements.³

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX. Top Secret. The source text is not signed and includes no drafting information, but in a memorandum transmitting it to President Johnson on February 23, Bromley Smith stated: “Secretary Rusk was reading from this paper during the meeting with you this afternoon.” Rusk, together with NcNamara, Ball, William Bundy, and Thompson, met with the President from 5:30 p.m. to 6:23 p.m. on February 23. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of the discussion has been found, but see footnote 1, Document 158, for more information on the meeting. The source text bears an indication that the President read it.
2. On February 24, the Embassy in Saigon issued a statement announcing a strike that day by U.S. jet aircraft from Bien Hoa and Da Nang, at the request of the South Vietnamese Government, against Viet Cong forces in the mountain pass between An Khe and Pleiku in South Vietnam. (Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1965, pp. 371–372) In a February 25 memorandum to Reedy, Cooper provided background information on the use of the U.S. jet aircraft, pointing out that this was the first time that U.S. jets had been used for something other than reconnaissance in South Vietnam. (Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312)
3. Rusk restated these points in greater detail at a news conference on February 25. For text of his statement as well as a transcript of the question and answer period which followed, some of which dealt with Vietnam, see Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1965, pp. 362–371.