64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
5534. Please pass following message from Secretary to Foreign Secretary:
“Thank you very much for your message of February 29 about South Viet-Nam.”2
“Let me say at once that we will keep in closest touch with you about further developments in that area. The Viet Cong have obviously attempted to take maximum advantage of changes of government in Saigon and the dislocations which these changes inevitably produce. Whether this increased effort on their part can be sustained over any period of time is not yet clear but there is no doubt that there is a deterioration of morale and effectiveness on the South Viet-Nam side. McNamara’s visit will attempt to sort out just where the problems are and what might be done to deal with them.”
“As we see it there are three broad alternatives before us in South Viet-Nam. We could withdraw and leave Southeast Asia to the communists. We could continue on our present course and do everything possible to assist the South Viet-Namese to win their own war. We [Page 109] could escalate the war by positive and direct military pressures on Hanoi. I can assure you that the second course is the one we greatly prefer. We cannot adopt the first course, with its calamitous results for the entire free world, and the third course is obviously one which would be turned to with the greatest reluctance.”
“We are not convinced that the second course has exhausted its possibilities. We shall do everything we can to make it succeed. Unfortunately, there is not the sense of solidarity in the free world which would give this course the greatest chance of success. The recognition of Peiping by Paris clearly signals to Peiping that their course of militancy pays dividends. The talk of neutralization is phony, given the fact that there is not the slightest indication that North Viet-Nam is interested in breaking away from the communist camp. If neutralization simply means that the US abandons its support of South VietNam, then neutralization is a formula for a communist takeover of Southeast Asia. We have repeatedly said to the other side that if they want to get American forces out of Southeast Asia the way to do it is to leave their neighbors alone.”
“I should like to put to you the dividends of concentrating very hard on Laos at this point. If the Geneva Accords of 1962 were to be fully implemented, the situation in South Viet-Nam would be drastically improved. In Laos we have a firm and flat commitment from the Soviet Union as well as solemn commitments from Hanoi and Peiping. Surely on this even Paris can act with complete solidarity with you and us and other free world countries. The Viet Minh presence in Laos and the free use of Laos as an avenue of infiltration into South VietNam are unacceptable violations of the Accords of 1962. Perhaps you could stimulate Paris to give forceful and public support to those Accords and to make it quite clear that all of us in the free world are determined on performance. I feel that we in Washington are in a position to insist upon this because, as you will recall, we went a long way to meet Paris in working out the Accords of 1962 and in accepting and supporting Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister. I can tell you that we are much concerned about attitudes expressed by Ambassador Millet who seems to think that General Phouma is the problem and that Souvanna Phouma ought to make his peace at any price with the Pathet Lao. This I suppose is consistent with the view expressed to us since 1961 by Paris that France will not commit a single soldier to Southeast Asia.”
“In any event, the purpose of this message is to let you know that we shall certainly keep in touch before any new or important decisions are made about courses of action in Southeast Asia other than those on which we are now embarked.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared with Tyler, Green, and Sullivan.↩
- The message asked for clarification of press stories that the United States was contemplating some form of offensive policy toward North Vietnam and asked for “some advance inkling” of U.S. plans and intentions so that the British Government could concert with the United States on a line to take in public. (Ibid.)↩