Office of the Historian

63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, February 29, 1964—8:43 p.m.

340. For Ambassador from Secretary. Re your 1601.2 As result your telegram, we requested Ambassador Bohlen to submit his advice as to what we might usefully say to DeGaulle and urged that every effort be made to comply with your request.

Bohlen has now replied,3 stating that in his view the most effective approach in Paris at present is through Couve de Murville, and we are now instructing him to conduct such an approach along the lines you suggest, especially to see whether a public statement clarifying French policy in Viet-Nam is possible. If this approach does not succeed, Bohlen suggests that he should come back here for consultation. President is authorizing Bohlen to approach Couve as he recommends, and depending on Couve’s response we will consider further aspects of Bohlen’s proposal.

Herve Alphand requested to see me today and affirmed (a) France is not engaged in conspiracy in Southeast Asia against US effort, (b) France remains solidly anti-communist and this applies to Southeast Asia, (c) France does not wish to see military effort in South Viet-Nam fail, (d) There is no understanding between Paris and Peiping regarding [Page 108] Southeast Asia, (e) France wishes to keep in closest consultation with US on Southeast Asian matters.4

Clearly we must evaluate this in light of further discussions with French, and implications of some of their recent actions and statements.

Let me repeat that we share your sense of urgency about improving French public position.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy and Rusk and cleared and initialed by Rusk. Attached to a copy of this telegram at the Johnson Library is a note from Read to Bundy indicating that this telegram “is the substance of what the Secretary and the President agreed to at lunch today.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV)↩

  2. This reference is in error and should be to either telegram 1606, Document 59 or to telegram 1613 from Saigon, February 24, in which Lodge reported information from a “very authoritative source that GVN intends to break off relations with France because they think France is going to recognize Hanoi and break with GVN, and they want to beat them to it.” In telegram 1613, Lodge again suggested that De Gaulle be convinced to issue a brief public statement saying that his earlier calls for neutralism in Southeast Asia did not apply to the present time. A De Gaulle statement of this kind would, in Lodge’s opinion, prevent the potential break in relations between South Vietnam and France and discourage neutralist tendencies in South Vietnam which were sapping the war effort. (Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–VIET S)

    Telegram 1601 from Saigon, February 20, reported on a ceremonial call by Lodge, Felt, and Harkins on General Minh. (Ibid., POL 15–1 VIET S; published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 216B.

    ↩
  3. In telegram 4061 from Paris, February 26. In addition to recommending an approach through Couve de Murville, Bohlen stated that going through De Gaulle would only produce vague and ambiguous statements and would convince de Gaulle that he had forced the United States to throw itself on his mercy. Bohlen also said that De Gaulle did not have an operational or general plan for a neutralized Vietnam and might even be considering temporary Communist control of all Vietnam from which a Yugoslavia-like Vietnam would emerge. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩
  4. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting, February 28, 3:30 p.m., is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.↩