457. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
1895. CINCPAC for POLAD. FYI. Following is text of a statement which is being made available to MACV advisors and other Mission personnel to use as background for discussions of recent events in Saigon and USG position. MACV advisors down to division level are being encouraged to initiate discussions in their discretion. Sector advisors will use it to respond to discussions initiated by their counterparts. Zorthian is using text as basis for background statement at this evening’s press conference:
The United States Govt appreciates the motives which led to the actions that were taken by the Armed Forces Council last Sunday but feels that the consequences were not fully appreciated. The armed forces gained much credit and stature, not only in Vietnam but throughout the world, by their statesmanlike decision of last August to provide for an orderly transfer of power to a civilian govt and an orderly method of establishing that govt and its institutions. While progress in establishing that govt and preparing the way for a national assembly had not been perfect nor satisfactory to everyone, the record was very creditable and unique in the history of Vietnam. All of the friends of Vietnam were much encouraged and, as the Ambassador of the United States has publicly stated, the United States was prepared to move forward with additional help for Vietnam, including help in dealing with the problem of infiltration from the North.
Although it is realized that this was probably not the intent, the action that was taken last Sunday was immediately and understandably interpreted by all the world as another military coup, setting back all that had been accomplished since last August and again demonstrating the political instability of Vietnam and raising serious question as to the reliability of Vietnam as an ally. It is inescapable conclusion that if a group of military officers could issue decisions abolishing one of the three fundamental organs of the governmental structure, that is, [Page 1027] the High National Council, and carry out military arrests of citizens, that group of military officers has clearly set themselves above and beyond the structure of government in Vietnam.
Even though those officers might profess that they would not do the same thing again, the fact is that there would be nothing to prevent their similarly seeking to change the Prime Minister or the Chief of State. Thus, even though the armed forces have expressed their support of the Prime Minister and the Chief of State, these civilian officials would have no real power, nor would they be able to speak authoritatively for Vietnam. They and other govts with which they are dealing would always be conscious of the fact that they are holding office only at the sufferance of the military and are subject to removal at any time by them. Thus in fact two govts would be set up, a civilian govt acting simply as a facade with no real authority with a “government” of military officers hovering over them at all times. There would thus be the image of a puppet govt under the domination of military leaders who had no real responsibility but who actually exercised the power.
As far as the United States is concerned, this would present a most difficult situation for the United States Government which would not know where to find the authoritative voice of Vietnam. The United States would not be able to rely on the commitments of the civilian government and thus would not have an effective government with which it could deal on the host of matters of common interest. The United States reps in Vietnam are naturally concerned over the situation which has arisen and are seeking ways to assist in finding an honorable solution.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House and CINCPAC. Received at 7:43 a.m.↩