Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

459. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, December 22, 1964—12:58 p.m.

1324. From Secretary for Ambassador. Your 1900² received too late for us to arrange for statement at noon briefing, particularly since President and SecDef are in Texas, and I feel that on a matter of this importance there must be full consultation.

I expect, however, that by the end of the day we will be able to send you by flash telegram a draft of a statement which we could put out here and which could be carried by VOA during the day in Saigon.³

I badly need your advice on several points which I feel have to be considered in charting our future course.

1. What is your best judgment as to the support Khanh can mobilize among his military colleagues? Westmoreland and Ambassador Khiem have indicated that Khanh’s position is weak, but under the existing circumstances, we need to be as sure as we can of degree of significant military support he may have been able to muster.

2. Who are the most likely candidates to replace Khanh and what do we expect would be their relationship with political groups in Vietnam, with the Huong Government and with ourselves?

3. We must attempt downplay personality issue between USG and Khanh which risks coalescing anti-US sentiment Should we not measure all our steps in terms of encouraging unity among the Vietnamese, stating that this is the main objective of U.S. policy. That unity can best be achieved by a process of consultation among the important political groups, including the military, so as to restore effective government commanding broad support where no one group dictates to the others.

I should like to emphasize, as I see it, that political unity within the South Vietnamese leadership is the utterly fundamental object of our policy and a basic condition for any prospect of success in South Vietnam. Every step, whether concerning the future of a particular South Vietnamese personality or otherwise, should be measured by its effect upon strengthening or weakening unity. There are several circumstances which could face us with the elementary decision as to our role in South Vietnam. But, because of the far-reaching consequences of any such decision, we must do our best to create circumstances in which that issue does not arise. I wish to compliment you on the vigor with which you have pursued this issue of unity since your return from Washington. I would much appreciate any further thoughts you have on the relation between this present crisis and the issue of unity.

I shall be available this afternoon and evening, and you may wish to arrange a telecon in the early morning your time for further discussion.

Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIV, Cables. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CIA, and the White House. Rusk’s Appointment Book shows that he met with William Bundy and Forrestal at 11:22 a.m. and 12:40 p.m., and with Forrestal alone at 1:10 p.m., presumably to discuss the drafting of this telegram. (Ibid.)
2. Supra.
3. See footnote 3, Document 462.