Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

462. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 23, 1964—8 p.m.

1919. This afternoon I called on Vice Premier Vien and Chief of State Suu in that order to discuss with them their meeting this morning with Khanh (see Embtel 1914).² Vien’s account of the meeting was essentially the same as one given me by Huong with one important exception. He anticipates that the events of the next few days will take the following form: after three or four days Khanh, he hopes, will release the prisoners taken over the weekend, after which the government will then reassemble the available members of the HNC and set them to work again at their old stand in Gia Long Palace. Thus, without any announcement, they will nullify in effect the attempt of the Generals to abolish the HNC. At the same time, the government will announce its intention of overhauling the membership of the Council.

I told Vien that this was all very well except for the possibility that Khanh may hold the prisoners as hostage until he gets agreement with the government to validate the actions of the Generals. Vien agrees as to this possibility but sees no way of getting around it.

I urged that the government demand the release of the prisoners at once and if Khanh demurs to denounce the insubordination of the Generals to the public. I doubt very much that the Generals would enjoy being placed in this position.

Vien mentioned that the Generals were meeting again today and that he had indications they were planning an offensive against the American Ambassador. I told him that I was aware of these maneuvers and regretted them primarily because of the effect they would have on U.S. relations.

After a half hour’s conversation with Vien, I moved to Gia Long and talked with Chief of State Suu. I indicated my admiration for the fortitude with which he and Huong were facing the military challenge and assured him of U.S. support. I pointed out that to accept dissolution of HNC by military would be to accept military intervention in the affairs of his government, a situation which would call into question validity of the government itself. I emphasized that it would be impossible to have two governments, one presenting the facade, the other holding the power, and that U.S. cooperation with such a duality would be difficult if not impossible. Finally, I reviewed the four-point position I have been urging Huong to take with Khanh (Embtel 1874) and gave him substance of Department’s statement (Deptel 1328).³

Suu seemed to be in relatively good shape and spirits (in contrast to Huong this morning) although as usual he was not very voluble. He expressed regret for military action and termed it illegal. He referred to meeting earlier today with Huong, Vien and Khanh and indicated they were seeking solution to present impasse. Suu indicated Khanh still does not accept government position and, in effect, is using HNC prisoners as “hostages” against retirement of senior Generals and government’s acceptance of dissolution of HNC. I suggested government could declare that it does not accept dissolution of HNC which it regards as continuing in existence and repeated my suggestion to Vien that, if prisoners were not released to government, the government should publicly demand their release. I observed that Suu and Huang, perhaps, had more power than they realized, noting that military officers would be sensitive to public charges of insubordination. Suu expressed concern that such a position would directly confront the military. I suggested that Suu and Huong might consider discussing the retirement issue with Khanh in the context of the four-point position I had recommended to Huong.

In closing, I stressed again to Suu that (1) it was impossible to live with military officers in whom one had lost confidence and (2) the impasse should not be allowed to drag on.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. Received at 9:19 a.m.
2. Telegram 1914, December 23, 6 p.m., reported that Huong had invited Taylor and Johnson to his office to report on a meeting with Khanh held earlier in the day. Huong indicated that the meeting had “gone very badly” but that Khanh would accept the four conditions for Huong and Suu remaining in office (see Document 452), except for the restoration of the High National Council. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)

3. Telegram 1328 to Saigon, December 22, 5:33 p.m., transmitted the text of the following statement which was being issued by the Spokesman of the Department of State:

   “Ambassador Taylor has been acting throughout with the full support of the US Government. As we have repeatedly made clear, a duly constituted government exercising full power on the basis of national unity, and without improper interference from any group, is the essential condition for the successful prosecution of the effort to defeat the Viet Cong, and is the basis of US support for that effort. This is the position Ambassador Taylor has been expressing to Vietnamese leaders.” (Ibid.)