Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

444. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, December 10, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Stability of South Vietnam’s Government, Report No. 1

This is my initial report covering one of the two matters of current interest to the President regarding Vietnam—the problem of the government’s stability. A report on third country participation will be submitted tomorrow.² Unless unusual developments dictate more frequent reporting, or unless instructed otherwise, I plan to prepare these reports on an every-other-day basis. Subsequent memoranda obviously will tend to be more brief than these initial efforts.

1. Premier Tran Van Huong’s five-week old government appears momentarily strengthened by his own exertions and by the firm support of US officials and VN military leaders. Nevertheless, a concerted Buddhist effort to overthrow Huong still seems likely. The Buddhists have been moving cautiously, however, and ten days of quiet in Saigon have permitted an easing of martial law restrictions. Huong’s firmness against recent demonstrators, largely schoolboys and hoodlums, has been publicly endorsed by the High National Council and key Catholic leaders and privately by responsible labor leaders. Huong’s administrative performance is still spotty, partly through unfamiliarity, but he seems willing to learn. Privately, he has said he is willing eventually to change some of his less able or more controversial ministers, but he will not do this while under fire.

2. External threats to the stability of the government arise from the activities of the Cambodians and the Viet Cong. There have been some hints that Cambodia will recognize the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam as the legitimate government (this in turn would probably result in the Government of Vietnam’s recognizing the dissident Cambodian Khmer Serei movement and closing the Mekong River to Cambodian shipping). The Viet Cong have been stepping up their political agitation and have been sending cadres into Saigon to stimulate and intensify anti-government demonstrations.

3. Buddhist leaders have been holding strategy talks in Saigon and gearing up their followers for possible anti-government action. Their foremost strategist, monk Tri Quang, says they have set up a “Struggle Committee” and plan to apply quiet pressure on Chief of State Suu and the US to get Huong replaced constitutionally. Today, however, the Buddhist leadership issued a communiqué announcing opposition to the government and refusal to cooperate with the present cabinet. Huong [Tri Quang?] privately threatens to stage hunger strikes by monks and mass demonstrations if necessary; these, he says, would prove decisive. The Buddhists imply that they are reluctant to oppose the US and they probably fear army reprisals; they have set no firm deadlines and say there may yet be time for a “quiet solution.” What Buddhist leaders really want is still unclear-perhaps even to themselves. And though we continue to watch and investigate, we have no evidence to tie them to the Viet Cong or even to indicate that they sympathize with Viet Cong aims.

4. Ambassador Taylor has been meeting with Chief of State Suu; Huong, and his cabinet; the High National Council; military leaders; and the local press. He has made it clear that, while it is US policy to help South Vietnam, an expanded US commitment cannot be justified to the US government and public unless Vietnamese groups unite behind their legitimate government. Other Embassy officers are discreetly getting this message to the Buddhists and other political oppositionists. Taylor, in addition, has provided Huong and his top lieutenants (including Khanh) a list of measures designed to strengthen the government’s image domestically and abroad.³ These suggestions seem to have been well received.

5. Complementing the efforts of the Ambassador to urge unity on the disparate elements of the Vietnamese official community, the CIA Station in Saigon is covertly putting pressure on elements close to Tri Quang to moderate Buddhist opposition to the government. Buddhists in the United States and abroad are being urged to bring their influence to bear, and the possibility of getting the Dalai Lama’s brother to visit Saigon with this message is being explored. Covert efforts to generate support for Huong are also being made among the Saigon students, in senior military circles, and among old guard politicians.⁴

CLC

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII, Memos. Secret.
2. A copy of this memorandum is ibid. On December 14, Cooper and McGeorge Bundy sent to the President the second memorandum in this series. For text, see Declassified Documents, 1979, 221C.
3. See Document 442.
4. At the bottom of the source text, the President wrote: “Mac, I like this.”