Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

442. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 9, 1964—6 p.m.

1763. Embassy telegram 1746.² Westmoreland, Alex Johnson and I again met this morning with PriMin Huong, DepPriMin Vien and General Khanh to follow up on our meeting of Dec 7. I gave them paper translated into French entitled “Actions Designed To Strengthen the Govt of Vietnam”³ pointing out GVN problem is one of better performance vis-à-vis its own people and foreign govts, greater appeal to its own people by convincing them of its interest in them, and the development of national and international confidence in GVN. Paper listed eight areas “in which progress beyond present levels would not only have intrinsic importance in pacification area but would be a measure of the effectiveness of the govt”:

1. Attainment of authorized strength for military, paramilitary and police forces and better use of manpower.

2. Establishment of new and higher force goals for military, pare” military and police forces.

3. Better performance by civilian and military officials, including replacement of incompetent and retention of competent.

4. Improvement of budgetary operations, particularly expenditures in provinces.

5. Clarification and strengthening of province chief powers

6. Clarification and strengthening of police powers.

7. More vigor in Hop Tac operation.

8. After considerable time when stability is achieved, reviewing cases of political prisoners from previous regimes.

Recognizing that much work was already being done in the foregoing fields, the paper singled out the following nine specific points for which clear responsibility needed to be assigned:

1. Establishment of new 1965 force goals for military, paramilitary and police forces.

2. Clarification of roles of popular forces, police and civil defense.

3. Improved budgetary formulation and implementation to insure efficient governmental operations while guarding against inflation.

4. Clarification and strengthening powers of province chiefs and exercise of those powers.

5. An improved and increased effort in the information field to include consideration of a high-powered radio transmitter for Saigon.

6. An extended rural development program in the provinces to include civil and military resources.

7. Additional forms of economic assistance for industrial urban and rural development.

8. Improvement of certain highway bridges and port facilities.

9. Renewed efforts to attract third country assistance.

I also offered to assist in any way govt desired with approaches to minority leaders. Paper closed with statement that foregoing represented an expansion of expenditures, and budget deficit for CY 1965 may be larger than for CY 1964, thus there was compelling need to manage financial and fiscal affairs of govt so as to hold down threat of inflation.

Paper was generally well-received and agreed specific joint action responsibilities assigned to be confirmed by paper which I will make available to them tomorrow.⁴

PriMin said that review of cases of political prisoners was “a very delicate” matter indicating that he did not want to commit himself at this time on this point. In response to statement in paper that it was important that the military continue to express public confidence in the govt, Khanh opined that this was “no problem” pointing to Dec 2 communiqué.⁵ He said that statement had been delayed until then because he did not want it to be just his personal statement but signed by all the military chiefs.

In response to statement in the paper that while not giving an impression of submitting to pressure, the govt might consider honorable ways of conciliating most important minority groups, PriMin said that he felt that he had overwhelming support “in the South” (apparent implication was that Northern politicians and elements such as Tam Chau were primary opponents) and that it was clear they commanded very little support. However, PriMin reaffirmed his willingness to make orderly changes in a few Ministers if and when this seemed desirable.

In discussion third country assistance, I emphasized importance it also had from USG domestic point of view. In reply to PriMin’s question, I said that we did not desire to “internationalize” war such as Korean pattern and agreed with Vien’s observation that the question really involved making third country, free world support concretely evident in Vietnam. Khanh suggested a “third country aid headquarters building” in front of which all the third country flags could be flying but recognized problem of those who did not want to seem to be involved in military activities.

In response to statement in paper on importance of filling diplomatic posts abroad, the PriMin said that he had already discussed this with FonMin and received in silence Khanh’s offer of more unemployed Generals for diplomatic posts.

With respect to powers of province chiefs, Khanh insisted that they in fact already had ample powers to be “little presidents” but it was a matter of training and willingness to exercise their powers. He and Vien agreed to work together on this.

While expressing appreciation for the offer of a stronger radio, Khanh asked that we also urgently study the question of television, at least on a limited and experimental basis in the Saigon area. He said that in underdeveloped countries such as Vietnam the visual image was especially important and could be a powerful instrument in communication for the govt as well as for education. He said he had heard that under an arrangement with the Japanese, Hanoi was to have television by 1966 and that it was expected Cambodia would also shortly have it. I said we were studying the matter and would be prepared to discuss it further with them.

On my offer to be of assistance in dealing with minority elements, both the PriMin and Khanh expressed strong reservations about either Johnson or myself seeing them and urged that even lower level con facts be very carefully managed because of propensity of such elements to misuse and circulate false interpretations of such meetings. However, the PriMin enthusiastically endorsed my proposed meeting with key newspaper editors.

All in all it was, I feel, a good meeting and successful in obtaining a reasonably common approach by PriMin, Vien and Khanh looking toward dealing with some of GVN’s more concrete problems.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Johnson and cleared with Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 6:04 a.m.
2. Document 439.
3. A copy of this paper was transmitted as enclosure 2 to airgram A–468 from Saigon, December 15. (Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
4. A copy of this paper was transmitted as enclosure 3 to airgram A–468.
5. A copy of the communiqué, issued following a meeting at Dalat on December 2 of the corps and division Generals with Khanh, was transmitted in telegram 1732 from Saigon, December 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) Taylor reported on the meeting in telegram 1770, December 10 (ibid., DEF 2 VIET S), as did Westmoreland in MAC J2 15711, December 4. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 12056)