441. Memorandum of a Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
- The Under Secretary of State
- Ambassador David K. E. Bruce
- McGeorge Bundy
- William R. Tyler
- Richard E. Neustadt
- The British Prime Minister
- The Foreign Secretary
- The Defense Secretary
- Lord Harlech
- Sir Burke Trend
- Sir Harold Caccia
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
The discussions then turned to the subject of Vietnam and the President asked the Secretary of State to describe the problem there.
The Secretary explained that the principal consideration now was to turn Peking and Hanoi around before they had a firm commitment to go South. On the South Vietnam side, the purpose was to get the South Vietnamese to win the war in their own country. The major problem was establishing political unity in the cities and dealing with infiltration from the outside.
The U.S. Government had tried to send political signals to Peking and Hanoi, pointing out that if they left their neighbors alone they would have no problem with the U.S.; if they pushed on, there would be trouble. In addition, military actions were being taken—armed reconnaissance in Laos, the Gulf of Tonkin, and the redeployment of units of the West Pacific fleet—to give them additional signals.
The Secretary went on to say that the U.S. was appealing to a number of countries for assistance, both for its practical effect as well as for the political impact, to demonstrate to Saigon and Hanoi the degree of free world solidarity. It was the U.S. Government’s hope that the UK would put people into the countryside. Engineers, technicians and military were needed. The UK’s Mr. Thompson had good [Page 986] ideas, too. Showing the flag was important. In Hanoi, Saigon and here in the U.S., people were interested in what others were doing and how much help the allies were giving.
Responding to this, Gordon Walker said the U.S. problem in Vietnam and the British in Malaysia were essentially the same. Only the opponents were different. The British had a major commitment, albeit with smaller forces. They could not put troops on the ground in Vietnam for they had a battle of their own to fight. But the British wanted to help the U.S. in ways that could be publicized-training Vietnamese troops in jungle warfare, providing medics, putting police in Saigon. And publicizing these actions would in fact step up the British commitment.
On the policy of signals, the British wanted to help the U.S. in Vietnam and hoped the U.S. would help British in Malaysia. However, Gordon Walker stressed the importance of keeping retaliatory action related to things retaliated against. Disproportionate retaliation would put the British in a difficult position especially since they are co-chairman of the 14-Nation conference. They would not call the conference without U.S. consent and did not want to be forced into a conference against the U.S. will.
Concluding, Gordon Walker said it was important that the British be consulted about further steps contemplated in Vietnam so that they could support U.S. efforts effectively. (The Prime Minister told the President he expected to be questioned extensively about the war in Vietnam during the parliamentary debate.)
Secretary Rusk thought from a tactical standpoint it was important that all participants understand the degree to which the earlier agreements had been violated. This was intolerable and the U.S. was not prepared to go to a conference which took up where the 1962 conference began. In this connection, he pointed out that Laos was important because it was the place where signals could be exchanged with the other side. He also explained that efforts were being made to clear the atmosphere with Cambodia. But as co-chairman he urged the British to press the Soviets to join them in getting compliance with the 1962 agreements and to stop playing a neutral game in the aggression against South Vietnam.
In reply, the Foreign Secretary said the dossier of the violations would be most helpful to him. He also assured the Secretary he would not agree to a conference without U.S. consent.
At this point the communiqué was brought in, checked by both sides and approved by the President and the Prime Minister.2