390. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
1351. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1340.2 I called on Khanh this morning (October 31) prior to the reception of the Diplomatic Corps by Chief of State Suu. I had with me the provisional slate of Ministers reported in reftel.
General Khanh, who had spent the last two days in Dalat, was unaware of the discussions which PriMin-designate Huong has been conducting with possible Ministers. Hence, he was interested in seeing the tentative slate which I showed him. He said that he did not know about half of the Ministerial candidates but that he was satisfied with the key men, Huong, Vien, Hach and Than. Without stressing the point, he indicated that he would have preferred Quat to Tran Van Do as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
I expressed some concern about having Huong as Minister of National Defense in addition to PriMin. This does not bother Khanh who says that he will see that Huong gets plenty of help (no doubt about that) in conducting the work of the Ministry of National Defense. He anticipates the need of a Dep Minister to reinforce Huong in this area.
I explained my feeling of a need for a War Cabinet consisting of the Heads of National Defense, Interior, FonAffs, Public Works, Information and Rural Affairs, preferably chaired by Dep PriMin Vien. Khanh also favors such an arrangement and promised to push it. He also assured me that the weekly NSC/US Mission Council meetings will be continued. In general, he expects that Huong will work with the Americans about as he has.
I took the opportunity to mention the need which Gen Westmoreland feels to meet on a regular basis with Khanh about once a week. Khanh who is aware of the accumulation of important military matters which has built up over the past weeks readily agreed. At one point, I expressed surprise over General Ky’s recent visit to Suu during which the press reports that Ky promised his support to the new govt. I asked if Ky considers himself the spokesman for the so-called Young Turks and in a position to offer or withhold support for the govt. Khanh replied rather lamely that the army had fallen into such bad habits in [Page 861] the last year that it would be difficult to get the Generals quickly out of the habit of making pronouncements and dabbling in politics. He recognizes that it is one of his principal jobs to get them to mend their ways.
In summary, I would say that Khanh and the senior officers whom he represents accept the proposed govt but with little real enthusiasm. I think that they can be counted upon to give it a reasonable try but may grow quickly impatient if it proves to be ineffective.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC.↩
- Telegram 1340, October 30, transmitted a list of the officials whom Huong wished to include in his cabinet. (Ibid., POL 15–1 VIET S) Taylor commented that the Ministerial candidates possessed a reputation for honesty and competence.↩