389. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor) to the President 1

Embtel 1205.2 Two months ago today Khanh undertook the commitment to give up his position as Prime Minister and to install a civilian government on a pattern to be designed by the High National Council. He made good on his promise yesterday by submitting his resignation and that of the cabinet to the newly designated Chief of State, Pham Khac Suu.

The box score of progress in moving toward civilian government includes the promulgation of a reasonably satisfactory charter which has received generally favorable acceptance, the selection of Suu as Chief of State, and the conversion of the High National Council into the legislative element of the government pending the organization of a National Assembly. We are not too happy over the choice of Suu who was slipped in ahead of Minh at the last minute by pressure on the High National Council by a delegation composed of Buddhist, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai leaders. Suu is a respected man of high principles, but old beyond his years and clearly lacking in physical stamina. However, he may be in for only a short time, as he has stated his unwillingness to continue unless given a popular mandate at the time of the formation of the National Assembly. In any case, after making the initial appointments of the Prime Minister and Chief of State, he will have a nominal role so that I do not view his selection as cause for great concern.

I have had two meetings thus far with Suu, the first3 to convey our displeasure at not being consulted by the Council with regard to the final choice of Chief of State and our expectation to be consulted in the future before final agreement on a government slate. I have taken the position that we are not pushing individual candidates but that we have a thoroughly legitimate right to insist upon a strong and stable government which can utilize U.S. aid with maximum effect.

This morning, Suu showed that he got the point by calling me in to discuss the possible composition of the government.4 He seemed quite receptive to all my comments and again indicated his intention to consult frequently with us. The danger we saw several days ago of a [Page 859] clash between Khanh and the armed forces on the one hand and the High National Council on the other seems allayed for the time being. Khanh now appears sincere in his intention to return to the armed forces and to assist in their purification from past political contamination. He called in 40 Generals last Saturday and, I hear, gave a ringing plea for unity within the armed forces.5 He appears quite ready to cooperate with Suu in the formation of the new government. However, he and the armed forces will henceforth be on the side lines watching intently the performance of the new civilian government. If it appears to falter, the Generals may be expected to make a new grasp for political power.

Military activity this week was at about normal levels, offering nothing special to report. The quality of South Vietnamese military actions was quite good; out of 77 contacts with the VC observed by U.S. advisors, the latter rated 68 as having been successful.

The pacification program around Saigon, Hop Tac, is still moving very slowly. Inadequate military and police forces remain an obstacle which we hope to overcome progressively. All indications are that a long, hard process of mobilization and organization lies ahead.

Our hopes for the future rest heavily upon the new government which is being formed. In reviewing the disappointments of recent months, we should not forget that there has never been a stable government, and at times, no government at all in South Viet-Nam since Diem was overthrown last November. Without a government to work with, we have been seriously hampered in carrying out the military and economic programs which we have promoted. No one can really say how far we would be today if we had had a reasonably effective government in Saigon during the past year. Such a government will not appear over-night, but we all hope that the modest advance toward restoring government which has been made in the last two months will develop into an effective organization with which we can mesh our U.S. efforts.

Taylor 6
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Transmitted as telegram 1292 from Saigon, which is the source text.
  2. Telegram 1205, October 20, transmitted Taylor’s report to the President for the previous week. (Ibid.)
  3. See Document 387.
  4. The second meeting with Suu took place during the morning of October 27. Taylor transmitted his account of it in telegram 1278 from Saigon, October 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S)
  5. Taylor transmitted Khanh’s account to him of this October 24 meeting in telegram 1277 from Saigon, October 27. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S) A similar account was transmitted in TDCS 314/84655–64 from Saigon, October 25. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XX, Cables; published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 23A)
  6. Telegram 1292 bears this typed signature.