Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

367. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Forrestal) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, September 30, 1964.

I have been a little disturbed at the recent spate of gloomy reports from Embassy Saigon, particularly their prognosis for General Khanh. While I don’t dispute the essential accuracy of the reporting, I am worried about the effect it is going to have in the intelligence community here in Washington. There is a SNIE in preparation² which, in my judgment, gives an unbalanced picture of the situation. I am going to try to defer formalization of the draft SNIE until Bill Sullivan has had a chance to confer on it.

I had a talk with Lou Conein this morning. As you may know, he has been sent home from Saigon at the request of Max Taylor. He tells me that personal relations between Max and General Khanh are definitely not good and really have not been since early August. He cites a number of conversations he has had with both of them; but I will not bore you with the details. In any event, I want to check this out with Bill Sullivan. The difficulty seems to be essentially one of personality more than anything else. Differences in age and rank seem to have made easy communication between the two men difficult, and I would doubt there is much we can do to correct the situation at the moment.

Under these circumstances, however, I think it is important that we be very careful in our public characterization of the political situation in Saigon—particularly we should avoid doing or saying anything which could impel Khanh to decide to drop out of the picture before the end of October, at which time I figure he may have decided to go anyway. I should like a chance to discuss this with you further when you get a minute.

In order to restore some balance, at least for you, I attach a briefing paper³ done by Tom Corcoran over here, which we have used in briefing other Assistant Secretaries of the Department. Although it may be a touch optimistic, I think it sets a better tone.

On the subject of actions outside Vietnam, I hope you will look at the JCS memorandum 835–64.⁴ This is a remarkable step forward under the circumstances, and I am willing to subscribe to the whole thing, subject only to the assurance that the timing of the execution is kept firmly in the White House and State control. The memorandum is of course addressed to Bob McNamara, and he will, I hope, promptly bring the proposals up to the highest levels for decision. As you know, we’ve only gone out to the field on the Laos air action. We need a decision on the ground action.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XV111, Memos. Secret and Personal.
2. Reference is to a September 30 draft of SNIE 53–2–64. (Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam Intelligence Estimates) See Document 368.
3. Not printed.
4. Dated September 30, ICSM 835–64 provided the plans for implementation of air and ground operations into the Laos corridor specified in NSAM 314 (Document 345). (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Prairie Fire, 1964–1967)