Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

366. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor) to the President¹

Saigon, September 30, 1964—9 p.m.

Deptel 702.² This is my first try at responding to your request for a weekly assessment of the progress of the pacification program in South Viet-Nam. I am assuming that pacification is meant in the broadest sense which embraces virtually all actions of the Vietnamese Government, the Vietnamese Armed Forces and the U.S. Mission except a limited number of long term projects which by their nature do not bear directly on the outcome of the struggle against the Viet Cong. Although most of the actions falling under pacification are a blend of many elements, for simplicity in reporting, I shall usually group my comments under the headings military, political, economic and psychological.

Military—The military activities of the week were characterized by an increase in the tempo of major Vietnamese ground operations and a drop off in the intensity of Viet Cong activity. Friendly air activity was conducted at what may be considered a normal rate but three aircraft were shot down and two crashes occurred in the course of combat operations.

For the first time, we are trying to get some feel for the quality of the thousands of friendly ground operations occurring in a week by requiring U.S. advisors to comment on the success or lack of success of those operations which they have personally observed. During the past week U.S. advisors observed 241 such operations and rated 181 of them as successful in the sense that the observers considered they accomplished their intended mission. Ninety-nine of these involved contact with the Viet Cong and of these 99, the advisors considered that 72 were successful.

The most important activity of the Vietnamese Armed Forces during the week was not directed at the Viet Cong but at the rebellion of certain Rhade CIDG strike forces in Darlac and Quang Duc Provinces. As reported in cable traffic elsewhere, this rebellion was put down without bloodshed on September 27 and for the moment we have the impression that this immediate problem is behind us.

In spite of the many evidences of political weakness in the Vietnamese Government, there is still little indication of loss of military effectiveness of the units of the armed forces. During the week, U.S. advisors rated two regiments and four battalions as being combat ineffective but gave passing marks to the remainder of the ground forces. However, the ineffectiveness of the national and provincial governments was reflected in a sharp drop in the recruiting and conscription rate. It looks as if the September total of volunteers will approximate 1,700 in contrast to a 4,000 average of the previous three months. The conscription for September will remain about 1,600 in contrast to 4,400 in August. The conscription goal for this month had been set at 10,440. Because of its importance, the manpower situation has been placed on the agenda to be discussed by the U.S. Mission with the National Security Council at its meeting next week.

Political—In addition to the Montagnard rebellion, the past week witnessed other new and serious challenges to the Khanh government. These included a large labor strike and demonstration in Saigon and serious civil disturbances in Binh Dinh Province where the military and political situation is clearly deteriorating. By week’s end, only the rebellion had been satisfactorily settled and, additionally, the formation of local people’s salvation councils continued to spread out from Hue down the central lowlands coast, reaching Phan Thiet by week’s end. These developments reinforced the growing impression that General Khanh has largely [let?] governmental authority and responsibility for maintaining law and order pass by default to any interest group which will press its demands. Another disturbing aspect of this further disintegration of governmental authority has been the inclination of Khanh and his senior advisors to underestimate the seriousness of the challenges and therefore the urgent need for sound solutions. A third disturbing aspect of these developments is the clear evidence that Khanh is encouraging the Montagnard rebellion and even of being behind the September 13 coup attempt.

An encouraging note of the past week was the formation and public presentation of the High National Council, charged with forming the new provincial [provisional] government, which was accompanied by a constructive speech by General Minh as chairman of the Provisional Leadership Committee (Triumvirate). Following its public debut, the Council immediately elected its officers and established an agenda for its first substantive session of September 28.

In implementation of paragraph 6 of NSAM-314,³ the United States Operations Mission (USOM) is developing plans covering a wide range of potential GVN-sponsored work projects designed to create quick employment in urban areas. Likewise the director, Mr. Killen, has been exploring with the GVN the prospects for and financial implications of a 25 percent across-the-board salary increase for civil servants, with a special adjustment for low-paid school teachers. We feel these short-term stimuli should be applied as soon as ready to keep life in the interim government; proposals of long-range will be held back for use in encouraging the provisional government which we hope will emerge from the current deliberations of the High National Council.

Psychological—One sees on all sides increasing signs of discouragement caused by the lack of effective government and strong leadership, and by the continuing civil disturbances. The morale of civil servants in Saigon and in the provinces is being adversely affected in the present situation and government operations at both levels are being increasingly marked by indecision and indifference. There is a growing tendency to blame the U.S. for the troubles of South Viet-Nam, a phenomenon which is likely to increase as troubles continue and the Viet Cong exploit them.⁴

“There is not much comfort here, and Bill Sullivan, who is in town this week, confirms the particularly serious point made at the end of Max’s telegram to you—namely that there are increasing signs that the Vietnamese are blaming us for their troubles.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President) No record of Sullivan’s discussions in Washington has been found.

For the broader and deeper treatment of the current situation, I should like to invite your attention to Embtel 972.⁵

Taylor⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Transmitted as telegram 1000 from Saigon, which is the source text. According to another copy of telegram 1000, it was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
2. See footnote 6, Document 356.
3. Document 345.
4. On October 1, McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of telegram 1000 to the President under cover of a short memorandum in which he stated:
5. Document 365.
6. Telegram 1000 bears this typed signature.